EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

{"title":"The unity argument: Phenomenology's departure from Kant","authors":"Lilian Alweiss","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12963","url":null,"abstract":"Phenomenology questions the centrality that Kant attributes to the “I think.” It claims that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless as unity is given. I call this the “unity argument.” The paper explores the significance of this claim by focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl. What interests me is that although the unity argument claims that we can account for the unity of experience without appealing to the an “I think,” Husserl agrees with Kant that experience must be owned. Moreover, he endorses Kant's dictum that ‘the “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my presentations’. The aim of the paper is to explore how Husserl can consistently appeal to Kant's account of the “I think” and at the same time contend that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless. The thesis I wish to advance is that although the unity argument acknowledges that experience is necessarily mine, it reveals that it is a necessary feature of self‐reference that I have never taken absolute ownership over my experience. This may explain why our sense of self can often be out of tune with the way we live our lives.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Das Wissen der Person: Eine Topographie des menschlichen Geistes By  Pirmin, Stekeler-Weithofer Edited by  Leander Berger,  Jakob Kümmerer, and  Max Stange Hamburg: Felix Meiner,  2022. ISBN 978–3–7873-4129-0","authors":"Simon Schüz","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12988","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12988","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Puzzle of Empty Formal Indications: On the ‘Deferred’ Meaning of Heidegger's Language","authors":"David Zoller","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12990","url":null,"abstract":"Heidegger's notion of philosophical concepts as “formal indications” is rightly viewed as a crucial development. The idea of formal indication is partly intended to answer concerns that phenomenology objectivizes conscious life. Formal indication responds—in what would become a signature feature of much of Heidegger's early work—by setting up a unique dependency of the meaning of phenomenological concepts on their “enactment” in the first‐personal life of the investigator or reader. Commentators have appropriately wondered whether this move succeeds. Yet relatively little emphasis has been placed on the potential problem of underdetermination: whether this model of deferring meaning to “enactment” leaves the reader with a sufficient understanding of the term that they know what to enact and (hopefully) gain some positive self‐understanding through it. This problem becomes more or less acute depending on how we model the “deferred meaning” of formal indication. Here I study candidate models of “deferred meaning,” including those prominent in the literature, to determine whether any are suitable to model the meaning‐structure of formal indication and stave off the underdetermination problem.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Indeterminate Conception of Practical Reasoning","authors":"Jorah Dannenberg","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12992","url":null,"abstract":"This paper makes a case for treating the boundary between what counts as <jats:italic>practical reasoning</jats:italic> and what does not as essentially indeterminate. The idea that there is an “essential indeterminacy in what can be counted as a rational deliberative process” was put forward by Bernard Williams in his well‐known discussion of statements about an agent's reasons for action. But in contrast to the more familiar argument of that paper, the idea has received almost no attention. To understand and defend the idea, I first offer a somewhat novel reconstruction of the more familiar argument against making statements about a person's reasons intended on an “external” interpretation. On my reading, the argument shows how making such statements runs afoul of ideals of <jats:italic>honesty</jats:italic> in our interpersonal dealings. I then argue for countenancing an essential indeterminacy in what counts as practical reasoning, in a manner that involves a re‐application of these same ideals of honesty, albeit at a higher level of abstraction. One advantage of understanding the entire discussion of reasons statements and reasoning along these lines is that it highlights the deeply anti‐rationalistic flavor of Williams' own interest in these topics. Unsurprisingly, Williams' treatment displays a deep affinity with the anti‐rationalistic ethics advanced by Hume. It also turns out to be at cross purposes with the far more rationalistic ethical vision that animates more recent attempts to advance a “Humean Theory of Reasons,” which is sometimes mistakenly seen as following in Williams' and Hume's footsteps.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anscombe on the shallowness of consequentialism","authors":"Craig Taylor","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12995","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is divided into two parts. In the first I outline and defend Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that consequentialism is a shallow philosophy by considering how two contemporary consequentialists reach opposing but equally outlandish moral conclusions on a matter as fundamental as whether it is good or bad that the human race continues. In the second I argue that in order to show what is wrong with the consequentialist arguments presented in part one, we need to deploy a wider range of critical resources than what typically appears in contemporary analytic moral philosophy. One example of a relevant and under‐appreciated resource I then consider is satire as a mode of moral thought.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141783338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Seeing through the forms ‐ towards a Platonic indirect realism","authors":"Christophe de Ray","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12989","url":null,"abstract":"Universals in the Platonic tradition were intended to play both metaphysical and epistemological roles. The contemporary debate around universals has focused overwhelmingly on the former, with even ‘platonists’ typically holding that our knowledge of universals is derived from our knowledge of particulars. In contrast, I wish to argue for the epistemological primacy of the universal: specifically, I defend the thesis that we perceive particulars as a result of knowing universals, and not the other way around. My argument draws from the work of Malebranche, who notoriously contended that we see ordinary objects <jats:italic>through</jats:italic> the immutable ‘ideas’. I conclude with the suggestion that the resulting account of the relationship between our knowledge of universals and our perception of particulars may be thought of as a kind of Platonic indirect realism.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conscience and Bad Conscience","authors":"A. Snelson","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12991","url":null,"abstract":"This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between conscience and bad conscience in the Second Essay of the Genealogy of Morality (GM II). Conscience, which Nietzsche calls the “will's memory” (GM II, 1), is a faculty that enables agents to generate and sustain the motivation necessary to honor commitments, while bad conscience is that “other gloomy thing” (GM II, 4), gloomy because it is a self‐punishing faculty that produces feelings of guilt. In addition to having different functions, conscience and bad conscience have distinct causal origins. Conscience originated as a memory of “I will nots” inculcated by punishment (GM II, 3), whereas bad conscience is produced by the process of “internalization” (GM II, 16)—not punishment (GM II, 14–15). It would seem to be possible, then, that an agent could have a conscience without having a bad conscience. The sovereign individual is sometimes interpreted in such terms. I argue that this separation is impossible, however. An agent would be incapable of generating and sustaining the motivation to honor commitments, thus having a conscience, without having undergone the process of internalization, necessitating the presence of bad conscience as well.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141642856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Experience and naturalism","authors":"Adam Zweber","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12974","url":null,"abstract":"Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of “naturalism.” However, there is little agreement on what “naturalism” is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as “naturalistic.” A metaethical view should count as an instance of naturalism only if it claims that there can be evidence for normative claims that is both public and spatiotemporal. I argue that, unlike other characterizations of “naturalism,” this view shows a clear difference between many metaethical positions and the sciences. The view thereby renders debates about naturalism philosophically significant: the division between naturalists and non‐naturalists is that between philosophers who hold that ethics is relevantly similar to the sciences and those who deny this.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141649463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The art of thinking as an intersubjective practice: Eloquence, affect, and association in the Port‐Royal Logic","authors":"Laura Kotevska, Anik Waldow","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12976","url":null,"abstract":"In the <jats:italic>Port‐Royal Logic</jats:italic>, Arnauld and Nicole argue that eloquence plays a crucial role in the cultivation of the art of thinking. In this essay, we demonstrate that Arnauld and Nicole's reflections on eloquence exemplify the need to reconceive the larger framework in which Cartesian theories of ideas operate. Instead of understanding epistemic agents as solitary thinkers who pursue their intellectual goals without the influence of others, our analysis shows that for Arnauld and Nicole thinking well was an intersubjective discursive activity that unfolds between complexly organized persons. Central to this activity is the ability to gauge the affective and associative tendencies of interlocutors and to communicate accordingly. This ability is required to enable speakers to deal constructively with problems arising from the context sensitivity of language, the influences of the passions, and the audience's capacity to decipher meaning in the communication of ideas that facilitate understanding and knowledge. By drawing attention to communication, affect, and association in the <jats:italic>Port‐Royal Logic</jats:italic>, we show that there is a significant connection between thinking and expressing oneself well in the early modern period.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141613675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A processual account of progress: On Rahel Jaeggi's Fortschritt und Regression","authors":"César Ortega-Esquembre","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12982","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12982","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;In her 2013 book &lt;i&gt;Kritik von Lebensformen&lt;/i&gt;, Rahel Jaeggi, one of the most prominent exponents of the new German social philosophy, set out to offer a revision of critical theory centered on the notion of “forms of life.” This reconsideration, however, did not take the typical form of a new &lt;i&gt;diagnosis of the times&lt;/i&gt;, comparable, for example, to the diagnoses of the reification of social relations (Suhrkamp Lukács, &lt;span&gt;2013&lt;/span&gt;), the one-dimensionality of consciousness (Marcuse, &lt;span&gt;2012&lt;/span&gt;), or the systemic colonization of the &lt;i&gt;lebenswelt&lt;/i&gt;, or lifeworld (Habermas, &lt;span&gt;2014&lt;/span&gt;). Rather, Jaeggi was interested in developing a theoretical conception of how forms of life fail or succeed. We find a similar strategy, albeit oriented to a different theoretical object, in her earlier book, &lt;i&gt;Entfremdung. Zur Aktualität eines sozialphilosophischen Problems&lt;/i&gt;. Here, again, the author did not articulate a diagnosis of the social causes of alienation, but rather a highly abstract theory of human subjectivity from which to offer a functional account of the concept of alienation (Jaeggi, &lt;span&gt;2005&lt;/span&gt;; Neuhouser, &lt;span&gt;2016&lt;/span&gt;). We again find this strategy in the formidable 2013 article “Was (wenn überhaupt etwas) ist falsch am Kapitalismus? Drei Wege der Kapitalismuskritik,” in which Jaeggi is not interested in advancing a concrete critique of capitalist societies, but rather in discussing the three most common forms of doing so (functional, moral, and ethical) in order to develop an integrative and complex approach (Jaeggi, &lt;span&gt;2013b&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If I understand it correctly, Jaeggi's latest book, published by Suhrkamp under the title &lt;i&gt;Fortschritt und Regression&lt;/i&gt; (Jaeggi, &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;), follows the same strategy. Jaeggi does not aim to answer the question (of an empirical nature, of course) of the existence, or nonexistence, of progress in modern societies. Rather, her interest is, again, of a conceptual nature. &lt;i&gt;Fortschritt und Regression&lt;/i&gt; offers an impressive analysis of the concepts of progress and regression as consistent criteria for criticisms of social development, and thus, as useful instruments for critical theory. Of course, this approach is not only legitimate, but also extremely useful in shedding light on some of the central concepts critical social theory is based on—sometimes in an insufficiently reflexive way. However, such a strategy, which is well suited to the category of a “critical theory of criticism” (Boltanski &amp; Honneth, &lt;span&gt;2009&lt;/span&gt;; Celikates, &lt;span&gt;2006&lt;/span&gt;; Jaeggi &amp; Wesche, &lt;span&gt;2009&lt;/span&gt;), should not, in my opinion, exhaust the tasks of social philosophy, lest we run the risk of critical theory of criticism ending up cornering social criticism itself. In order to do justice to both elements, in what follows I will proceed in two steps. First, I will offer a systematic reconstruction of Jaeggi's central theses concerning the concepts of progress and r","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12982","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}