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The Desire for Desire: Hegel's Constitutive Model of Rationality in Chapter IV 欲望的欲望：黑格尔理性的本构模式（第四章）
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13053
Jensen Suther
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引用次数: 0
Kant's Schematisms 康德的系统性组合
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-02-13 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13055
Alexander Stoltzfus Host
{"title":"Kant's Schematisms","authors":"Alexander Stoltzfus Host","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13055","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I provide a history of Kant's extensive experimentation with the doctrine of the schematism. I claim that diverse interpretations of schemata—as syntheses or intuitions; as attributable to the imagination or to the understanding; even as wholly incomprehensible—mark specific stages in Kant's own thought, and that the changes in the doctrine reflect changes in the very idea of transcendental philosophy. Ultimately, I argue that the instability here lies at the heart of Kant's critical project: the schematism plays an essential role in securing its most basic presupposition, but it is difficult to account for within that project. This is a problem that Kant recognizes and grapples with directly, without completely resolving it to his own satisfaction.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"890-909"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13055","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Individuality of Meaning in Life 生命意义的个体性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-02-10 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13050
Roland Kipke
{"title":"The Individuality of Meaning in Life","authors":"Roland Kipke","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13050","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In contemporary philosophical discourse, there is a widespread assumption that meaning in life is individual: that it is a value inherent in individual human lives, that the content of this meaning varies from individual to individual, and that it differs in degree based on the individual. Despite these claims, however, objectivist theories of meaningful life have so far failed to do full justice to this assumption of individuality, leading to certain deficiencies and distortions in the understanding of meaningful life. This paper aims to highlight these shortcomings and to explain how the individuality of meaning in life can be better understood within an objectivist framework. This proposed <i>individuality account</i> provides a necessary correction and complement to existing objectivist accounts of meaningful life. The paper demonstrates how the individuality account successfully addresses common shortcomings, withstands various objections, and differs significantly from current approaches.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1137-1153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13050","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Self-Knowledge and History: Gadamer and Collingwood 自知与历史：伽达默尔与科林伍德
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-02-06 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13047
Peter Fristedt
{"title":"Self-Knowledge and History: Gadamer and Collingwood","authors":"Peter Fristedt","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13047","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Quassim Cassam argues that contemporary philosophers largely neglect the kind of “substantial” self-knowledge most people care about – knowledge of my character, beliefs, and desires – in favor of “trivial” forms of it that are nevertheless philosophically illuminating. This article takes up Cassam's challenge to turn toward accounts of substantial self-knowledge, and, building on the work of Gadamer, makes the case that any such account has to address the question of the historical formation of the knowing subject. That historical formation – our ‘historicity’ – both erects barriers to self-knowledge and serves as a source of it, and raises the question of how much self-knowledge is even possible for historically situated knowers. To answer that, I take up Collingwood's claim that the aim of historical <i>research</i> is self-knowledge, and his view that, since its scientific turn in the nineteenth century, history has enabled self-knowledge of an especially significant sort. Developing these and other ideas in Collingwood, I draw a distinction between what I call “historico-philosophical” self-knowledge, which includes knowledge of our historicity, and “garden-variety historical” self-knowledge, which is focused on the particular historical formations in which we find ourselves. I argue that both count as substantial self-knowledge and round out an understanding of myself that includes any grasp I might have of my character, beliefs, and desires.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1054-1069"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Necessity and Identity in Hegel's Theory of Modality 黑格尔情态论中的必然性与同一性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13052
Ryan Froese
{"title":"Necessity and Identity in Hegel's Theory of Modality","authors":"Ryan Froese","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13052","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Readings of Hegel's account of modality tend to emphasize the “necessity of contingency” thesis. In this paper, I argue that this is not the primary aim of Hegel's “Actuality” chapter in the <i>Science of Logic</i>. Instead of arguing simply for the necessity of contingency, Hegel argues for the identity between contingency and necessity. I offer a reading of formal, real, and absolute modality in Hegel's <i>Logic</i> that shows how this identity claim is established, demonstrating that necessity is not simply that which cannot be otherwise, but a process whereby something becomes what it is in becoming its other.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"974-988"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Telepathy, Other Minds, and Category Errors 心灵感应、他人意识和分类错误
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-01-27 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13045
Sébastien Motta
{"title":"Telepathy, Other Minds, and Category Errors","authors":"Sébastien Motta","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13045","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I explore several issues surrounding what is called “telepathy” in the context of the problem of other minds. I begin with a quick review of the conditions in which this notion arose and the difficulties to which it gave rise upon its introduction. This review will allow me, after having shown that the notion of telepathy provides no path to the problem's solution, to draw a distinction between two discursive levels: an epistemological or ontological level, on the one hand, and a semantic or logical level, on the other. I maintain that it is at the second level that the deepest and most intractable difficulties relating to the “powers of the mind” arise. These difficulties occupy a blind spot in discussions involving the notion of telepathy (Alan Turing will provide a striking illustration of this). Finally, I suggest that this pseudo-solution (telepathy) is at root a response to a pseudo-problem—the inaccessibility of other minds—since the difficulties with the intelligibility of telepathy are parallel to those with which the problem of “other minds” is freighted.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1088-1099"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13045","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: The Violence and the Charity, by Morganna Lambeth Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. ISBN: 9781009239271 《海德格尔对康德的诠释：暴力与慈善》，摩根娜·兰贝斯著，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2023年。ISBN: 9781009239271
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-01-26 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13044
Fridolin Neumann
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引用次数: 0
Finitude and the Good Will 有限与善意
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13043
Alex Englander
{"title":"Finitude and the Good Will","authors":"Alex Englander","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13043","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to Kant, both finite (human) and non-finite (divine) wills are subject to the moral law, though the manner of their subjection differs. The fact that the law expresses an ‘ought’ for the human will is a function of our imperfection. On this picture, a non-finite will thus enjoys a certain explanatory priority vis-à-vis its finite counterpart: we can understand the practical constraint that binds the latter by seeing how contingent limitations differentiate it from the former. However, a reading of Kant's principle of autonomy that inextricably ties the achievement of willing to the adoption of a practical standpoint, gives us reasons for doubting this order of explanation. It suggests instead that we might best understand the practical ‘ought’ by taking the human will as explanatorily primitive. And if we do so, we can question the coherence of taking a will for which the law is not normative to furnish a paradigmatic exemplification of the relation that lies at the heart of Kant's notion of autonomy: namely, the relation between free volition and moral necessity.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"927-941"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13043","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Purely Intentional Modal Fictionalism 纯粹意向性情态虚构主义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13049
Hicham Jakha
{"title":"Purely Intentional Modal Fictionalism","authors":"Hicham Jakha","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13049","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article brings two outstanding figures into conversation about the problem of fictional entities and their indeterminacies: Roman Ingarden and David Lewis. Lewis's account of fiction lacks an adequate ontology of ficta-<i>qua</i>-objects. Relying on his modal realism does not help, for it would make ficta “concrete” entities that merely <i>indexically</i> differ from our world's entities. In this regard, I refer to Ingarden's “purely intentional entities.” I read Lewis's possible worlds in terms of Ingarden's ontology; hence establishing what I term “Purely Intentional Modal Fictionalism.” In so doing, the demarcation between fiction and actuality is preserved. In return, Lewis's “Analyses” adequately account for Ingarden's “spots of indeterminacy.” Therefore, my proposal reconciles Ingarden's ficta with Lewis's possibilist approach to truth in fiction. This approach grounds Lewis's account in a less problematic ontology with a distinct <i>sui generis</i> status for ficta and provides Ingarden's ficta with better determination principles.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1100-1116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Critique of Judgment and the Unity of Kant's Critical System. by Lara Ostaric Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. ISBN: 9781009336857 判断力批判与康德批判体系的统一》，拉拉-奥斯塔里奇著，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2023 年。ISBN: 9781009336857
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-01-20 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13046
Michael Rohlf
{"title":"The Critique of Judgment and the Unity of Kant's Critical System. by Lara Ostaric Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. ISBN: 9781009336857","authors":"Michael Rohlf","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13046","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"377-380"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143639227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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