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“Mind Your Own Business!” Relationships and Standing to Give Reasons “管好你自己的事！”关系和给出理由的立场
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2026-02-22 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70076
Emma R. Duncan
{"title":"“Mind Your Own Business!” Relationships and Standing to Give Reasons","authors":"Emma R. Duncan","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70076","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The rebuke “mind your own business!” often serves to deflect what would otherwise be an acceptable intervention. It charges that the addressee lacks standing to intercede as they have. Theorists have argued that blame, which can function as a form of influence via the provision of (moral) reasons, is inappropriate if the matter is not the blamer's business. Others have argued that even addressing reasons in the form of advice-giving, requesting, and the like, is also subject to the so-called business condition. On this view, to address certain kinds of reasons one must have a stake in the matter or stand in the right kind of relationship to the addressee. However, what constitutes such a stake and how relationships make it one's business to intercede in various ways, is less than clear. In this paper I offer a novel articulation of the business condition that illuminates how interpersonal relationships both ground a stake in influencing others and affect the appropriateness of influencing them in certain ways.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"517-530"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148203068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Embarrassment and the Social Dimensions of Moral Agency 尴尬与道德能动性的社会维度
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2026-02-09 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70069
Shawn Tinghao Wang
{"title":"Embarrassment and the Social Dimensions of Moral Agency","authors":"Shawn Tinghao Wang","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70069","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Unlike guilt and shame, embarrassment is rarely considered by philosophers to be a morally relevant emotion.This downplaying of embarrassment is well justified, given traditional views on moral agency. However, recent theorists have argued that the traditional views are too individualistic and overlook the external social conditions that they believe are part and parcel of our moral agency. Their alternative approach is often referred to as the “socially scaffolded accounts” of moral agency. In this paper, I argue that, if the socially scaffolded accounts are on the right track, then we should re-examine the moral value of embarrassment. More specifically, I propose a moral alerting model to account for embarrassment's moral value and risks. The basic claim is that a kind of embarrassment—what I will refer to as moral embarrassment—plays an attention-directing role in the process of responding to an audience's evaluative feedback. The moral alerting model demonstrates an intriguing tension between moral embarrassment's value and risks: though it is valuable in contributing to moral agency by virtue of its attention-directing role, it causes systematic risks when it comes to successfully engaging with the social feedback that one is sensitive to.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"483-499"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70069","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148203092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Civilly Disobeying What? On Directness and Relevance in Civil Disobedience 文明地不服从什么？论公民不服从的直接性与相关性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2026-02-09 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70073
Federico Zuolo
{"title":"Civilly Disobeying What? On Directness and Relevance in Civil Disobedience","authors":"Federico Zuolo","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70073","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent acts of civil disobedience in protest against politicians' inaction about climate change have often targeted works of art to provoke public opinion on the issue. Such initiatives have attracted criticism from those who object to this form of political dissent. Can civil disobedience be indirect and target objects that are unrelated to the problem at stake? This paper argues that indirect civil disobedience should comply with a criterion of relevance according to which the target should be in some sense related to the problem denounced by the action. Such a requirement draws on Grice's conversation maxims and ensures that civil disobedience be a proper communicative act. Relevance may be a component of disobedience without implying that radical protest should take the form of direct action.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"500-516"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70073","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148203093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Schopenhauer's Debt to Spinoza1 论叔本华欠斯宾诺莎的债
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2026-01-26 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70064
Julian Young
{"title":"On Schopenhauer's Debt to Spinoza1","authors":"Julian Young","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70064","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Schopenhauer offers ‘nature is not divine but demonic’ as a direct rebuttal of Spinoza's pantheism, his identification of ‘nature’ with ‘God’. And so, one would think, he ought to have been immune to the ‘Spinozism’ that became, as Heine called it, ‘the unofficial religion’ of the age. In fact, I argue, Schopenhauer's Spinozism is at least as deep as that of any of his contemporaries: his debt to Spinoza, I claim, is deeper than his more obvious debt to Kant. From Spinoza, he absorbs into his own system: monism, ‘all is one’; double-aspectism, the mental and the physical are aspects of <i>the same thing</i>’; panpsychism, <i>everything</i> has a mental as well as a physical aspect; and ‘will’, ‘striving’ is the mental aspect of all things. Schopenhauer does criticize the pantheism that had made Spinoza so à la mode: the divinity of the One is ‘shipwrecked’ on the suffering and evil of the world. Ultimately, however, this criticism dissolves in the face of Schopenhauer's ‘better consciousness': though a world overwhelmed by suffering is something that ‘ought not to be’, Kant's idealism shows us that, in the end, not only this world <i>but also</i> the primordial will that is its source belong to the realm of mere appearance. Ultimately, Schopenhauer's primordial One turns out to be, like Spinoza's, ‘divine’.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"656-672"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70064","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148203084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant's Dialectic of Enlightenment 康德的启蒙辩证法
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2025-12-31 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70056
Laurenz Ramsauer
{"title":"Kant's Dialectic of Enlightenment","authors":"Laurenz Ramsauer","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70056","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Kant's moral thought emphasizes both our ability to make adequate, immediate moral judgment, as well as our deep-seated forms of self-entrapment. Strikingly, these forms of self-entrapment are not simply the result of reason being overpowered by forces external to it, but arise out of reason itself, as pathological versions of otherwise genuine ideals of reason. Two such pathologies are false versions of the moments of Kant's enlightenment ideal. Kant's enlightenment ideal encompasses both thinking for oneself and thinking in community with others; in their pathological versions, these moments of the enlightenment ideal become the delusion of full control over one's epistemic situation through “logical egoism” and the delegation of responsibility by choosing “immaturity” vis-à-vis external authority. Because these pathologies of reason easily drop out of view, interpretations of Kant's enlightenment project frequently obscure the challenge of avoiding them and underestimate the difficulty of making progress toward enlightenment. In this article, I discuss both the pathologies of reason and Kant's own implicit resolution: the capacity for healthy forms of trust. Together, the two moments of enlightenment, their respective pathologies, and healthy forms of trust constitute the original dialectic of enlightenment.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"639-655"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70056","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148202975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Moral Perfection: An Atemporal Reading of Kant's Postulate of Immortality 论道德的完美：康德不朽假设的非时间解读
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2025-11-05 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70040
Eli Benjamin Israel
{"title":"On Moral Perfection: An Atemporal Reading of Kant's Postulate of Immortality","authors":"Eli Benjamin Israel","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70040","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of Kant's postulate of immortality from the Critique of Practical Reason, arguing that immortality should be understood as an atemporal state in which the moral agent, freed from sensibility, is purely rational. Drawing on Kant's discussion in “The End of All Things,” I contend that the eschatological depiction Kant presents in this text is consistent with the postulate's aspirations for establishing the possibility of moral perfection, rather than signaling a change in his view. This account addresses both a philosophical and historical gap, providing content to the postulate of immortality that coheres with its moral aims and demonstrates Kant's consistent understanding of the afterlife across his works.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"621-638"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148203010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Self-Knowledge and the Capacity to Judge 自知与判断能力
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2025-11-09 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70038
Matthew Parrott
{"title":"Self-Knowledge and the Capacity to Judge","authors":"Matthew Parrott","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70038","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Several philosophers have sought to explain certain features of self-knowledge our beliefs on the basis of the relation which holds between them and our judgments. Typically, these philosophers presuppose that there is just a single relation between these, for instance the relation of identity. In this essay, I shall claim that this presupposition is mistaken. Instead, I shall argue that because our capacity to judge has two functions, there are two different types of relation which hold between judgment and belief. In the final section, I show how this dual relations account can resolve an epistemological puzzle that is raised by ‘transparent’ self-knowledge of one's own beliefs.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"407-422"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70038","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148203033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Kant's Nova Dilucidatio 康德《新稀释论》中的充分理性原则
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2026-03-10 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70041
Benjamin Schnieder
{"title":"The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Kant's Nova Dilucidatio","authors":"Benjamin Schnieder","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70041","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper reassesses Kant's early treatment of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in the <i>Nova dilucidatio</i>, situating it historically and in contemporary grounding debates.</p><p>First, I lay out Kant's <i>conceptual framework</i>—his definition of a sufficient reason, and his distinction between antecedently and consequently determining reasons—relating it to Wolff and Crusius and to contemporary grounding theory. I argue that the framework yields valuable insights but also harbours instructive confusions.</p><p>Second, I reconstruct Kant's distinction between two <i>versions of the PSR</i> and two of his <i>proofs</i>—the arguments from indeterminacy and from exclusion. I show that the arguments fail, chiefly by conflating epistemic with objective notions of reasons and by sliding from entailment to grounding.</p><p>Third, I underscore Kant's emphasis on the <i>groundedness of truth</i> while separating his Aristotle-inspired insight—that <i>p</i> is true because <i>p</i>—from any full PSR, and I use this distinction to resist a recent defence of the PSR by Della Rocca.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"599-620"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148203034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Very Idea of Seriousness 严肃的概念
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2026-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70082
Nat Hansen, Zed Adams
{"title":"The Very Idea of Seriousness","authors":"Nat Hansen,&nbsp;Zed Adams","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70082","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What norms govern aesthetic conversations? In Hansen and Adams (2024), we argue for a norm we call, following Stanley Cavell, “the hope of agreement”, along with a requirement of “seriousness”, the “discipline of accounting for one's judgments”. Nick Riggle criticizes the hope of agreement and the requirement of seriousness and defends a norm of “community” in which aesthetic conversations involve “discretionary valuing” in a “mutually supportive way”. In this essay, we elaborate on the importance of seriousness as a constitutive norm for aesthetic conversations. We argue that conversations can satisfy Riggle's community norm without being aesthetic conversations, and that his rejection of seriousness leads him to miss what is distinctive about aesthetic conversation. A fundamental problem with Riggle's “communitarian” theory of aesthetic value and norms governing aesthetic conversations is that it is in fact much more individualistic than conversations governed by the hope of agreement and seriousness. We propose that the kind of community involved in aesthetic conversations is better understood as a <i>democratic experiment</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"545-558"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70082","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148202969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frege on the Task of Logic 论逻辑的任务
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2025-12-12 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70048
Junyeol Kim
{"title":"Frege on the Task of Logic","authors":"Junyeol Kim","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70048","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is hardly controversial to say that it is the task of logic to justify its laws. Frege appears to accept this idea—especially when he offers arguments for the truth of the basic laws in his <i>Begriffsschrift</i>. Yet Frege argues that logic cannot justify its basic laws—and hence, cannot justify any of its laws. This paper aims to resolve this apparent tension. I argue that, for Frege, the task of logic is not to justify its laws, but to determine which truths are logical. His arguments for the basic laws of <i>Begriffsschrift</i> are not meant to justify those laws. Rather, the purpose of these arguments is to present Frege's hypothesis about what logicality consists in.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 2","pages":"691-702"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148203105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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