Purely Intentional Modal Fictionalism

Abstract

This article brings two outstanding figures into conversation about the problem of fictional entities and their indeterminacies: Roman Ingarden and David Lewis. Lewis's account of fiction lacks an adequate ontology of ficta-qua-objects. Relying on his modal realism does not help, for it would make ficta “concrete” entities that merely indexically differ from our world's entities. In this regard, I refer to Ingarden's “purely intentional entities.” I read Lewis's possible worlds in terms of Ingarden's ontology; hence establishing what I term “Purely Intentional Modal Fictionalism.” In so doing, the demarcation between fiction and actuality is preserved. In return, Lewis's “Analyses” adequately account for Ingarden's “spots of indeterminacy.” Therefore, my proposal reconciles Ingarden's ficta with Lewis's possibilist approach to truth in fiction. This approach grounds Lewis's account in a less problematic ontology with a distinct sui generis status for ficta and provides Ingarden's ficta with better determination principles.