发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism 道德实在论与怀疑论的论证
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10017
Olle Risberg, Folke Tersman
{"title":"Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism","authors":"Olle Risberg, Folke Tersman","doi":"10.1163/22105700-BJA10017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-BJA10017","url":null,"abstract":"A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focus on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlying concern is that if moral truths have the nature that realists believe them to ...","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"10 1","pages":"283-303"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-BJA10017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45758222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Scepticism and Self-Detachment 怀疑主义与自我超然
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10011
C. Perin
{"title":"Scepticism and Self-Detachment","authors":"C. Perin","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"10 1","pages":"235-255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-bja10011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45113187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Skepticism and Inquiry 怀疑与探究
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10019
Sanford C. Goldberg
{"title":"Skepticism and Inquiry","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this paper, I am interested in skepticism’s downstream effects on further inquiry. To account for these downstream effects, we need to distinguish (i) the (skepticism-supporting) reasons for doubting whether p, (ii) one’s other background beliefs bearing on the prospects that further inquiry would improve one’s epistemic position on p, and (iii) the value one assigns to determining whether p. I advance two claims regarding skepticism’s downstream effects on inquiry. First, it is characteristic of “radical” forms of skepticism that (i) is sufficient to undermine the prospect described in (ii). By contrast (and second), ordinary forms of skepticism, which can be identified in connection with (ii), can actually be a boon to inquiry by enhancing (iii). In such cases, having reasons for skeptical doubt is not merely compatible with inquiring further, but also serves to motivate and to help frame such inquiry.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"10 1","pages":"304-324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48511662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4–134b5 最困难的争论中的知识与真理：Parmenides 133b4–134b5
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10009
Gail Fine
{"title":"Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4–134b5","authors":"Gail Fine","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000One of Plato’s central tenets is that we can know forms. In Parmenides 133b4–134b5, Plato presents an argument whose sceptical conclusion is that we can’t know forms. Although he indicates that the argument doesn’t succeed, he also says it’s difficult to explain how it fails. Commentators have suggested a variety of flaws. I argue that the argument can be defended against some, though not all, of the alleged flaws. But I also argue that Plato hints at a crucial distinction that hasn’t been brought to bear in this context, and that indeed he is sometimes thought not to draw: that between the content and object of knowledge. Once we are clear about this distinction, we can see that the sceptical argument doesn’t imply that we can’t know forms.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-bja10009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43371583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are There Mathematical Hinges? 有数学铰链吗？
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10013
A. Coliva
{"title":"Are There Mathematical Hinges?","authors":"A. Coliva","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like “2 × 2 = 4” or “12 × 12 = 144,” much like G. E. Moore’s truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a normative function. I then maintain that these mathematical examples were introduced merely as objects of comparison to bring out some peculiar features of the only hinges he countenanced in On Certainty, which were all outside the realm of mathematics. I then close by gesturing at how the distinction between mathematical hinges and non-hinges could be exemplified and by exploring its consequences with respect to (Wittgenstein’s) philosophy of mathematics.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"10 1","pages":"346-366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49017921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
On Religious Skepticism 论宗教怀疑主义
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10006
J. Schellenberg
{"title":"On Religious Skepticism","authors":"J. Schellenberg","doi":"10.1163/22105700-BJA10006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-BJA10006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000I seek to promote a fuller understanding of religious skepticism by defending five theses. These concern, respectively: its breadth, discussed in relation to theism on the one hand and naturalism on the other; why it should be distinguished from a general metaphysical skepticism; how it is supported by the consequences of recent cultural evolution, which at the same time enable new and stronger arguments for atheism; the relations it bears to non-doxastic religious faith; and, finally, its curious capacity in certain not uncommon circumstances to take the form of a soft irreligion that is widely approvable—even from a religious perspective.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"10 1","pages":"268-282"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47748343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus? 拒绝专家共识是否合理？
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10015
Bryan Frances
{"title":"Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?","authors":"Bryan Frances","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10015","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial claims are irrational. This means that most philosophers have irrational philosophical beliefs.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"10 1","pages":"325-345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44227588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Gorgias’ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος and Its Relation to Skepticism 高尔基亚斯的Περ ο ο μ ντος及其与怀疑主义的关系
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10010
Richard Bett
{"title":"Gorgias’ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος and Its Relation to Skepticism","authors":"Richard Bett","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10010","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines whether Gorgias’ On What Is Not should be considered an instance of skepticism. It begins with an analysis of the work as reported by the two sources, Sextus Empiricus and the anonymous author of On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias. It is then argued that the Pyrrhonian skeptics did not regard On What Is Not as skeptical. Nonetheless, it is possible to read the work as offering counter-arguments to Parmenides, with a view to inducing suspension of judgment in Pyrrhonian fashion. However, it is also possible to regard it as skeptical in a sense current in modern philosophy: that is, as posing challenges to our understanding of things with a view to forcing philosophers to come up with better theories. In this light, it can be seen as an important stimulus to the philosophical breakthroughs apparent in Plato’s Sophist.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"10 1","pages":"187-208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-bja10010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47232754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Descartes sceptique malgré lui? 不顾笛卡尔的怀疑?
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-10-15 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10016
F. Peretti
{"title":"Descartes sceptique malgré lui?","authors":"F. Peretti","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Descartes a adopté envers le scepticisme une attitude que d’aucuns parmi ses adversaires ont jugée ambiguë voire coupable. Il a recouru à des arguments sceptiques pour mettre en œuvre son célèbre doute qu’il concevait néanmoins comme l’acte inaugural d’une philosophie en quête de certitude scientifique. Descartes rejetait ainsi la fin poursuivie par les sceptiques et entendait user du doute contre le doute. Cette stratégie fondée sur un scepticisme des moyens pour combattre la fin et l’esprit même du scepticisme s’est-elle révélée pertinente ? Richard Popkin a pensé que non, dans son histoire du scepticisme, et conclu à l’échec d’un Descartes « sceptique malgré lui ». Je me propose de nuancer cette thèse de manière significative, suggérant que Descartes, sceptique à un second degré, était bien conscient de la finitude de l’esprit humain et des limites assignables à la recherche de la vérité des choses telles qu’elles sont en soi.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-bja10016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44718866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is Modern Science a Problem for Living as a Pyrrhonist Today? A Discussion of Richard Bett’s “Can We Be Ancient Sceptics?” 现代科学对今天的金字塔学家来说是个问题吗？理查德·贝特“我们能成为古代怀疑论者吗？”
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-10-15 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10008
Ryan McCoy
{"title":"Is Modern Science a Problem for Living as a Pyrrhonist Today? A Discussion of Richard Bett’s “Can We Be Ancient Sceptics?”","authors":"Ryan McCoy","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In the final chapter of his recent book How to Be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Richard Bett discusses the possibility of living as a Pyrrhonian skeptic today. Chief among his concerns is the scope of the skeptic’s suspension of judgment and whether or not the skeptic could maintain suspension of judgment in light of the results of modern science. For example, how might the skeptic sustain suspension of judgment in light of overwhelming evidence for climate change? Or even atomic theory? Ultimately, Bett concludes that such claims within the natural sciences preclude us from living as Pyrrhonists today. In the following paper I argue, how it is possible for the Pyrrhonian skeptic to suspend judgment on certain well-confirmed scientific theories, how the skeptic does so in accord with rational norms, and in turn, that Pyrrhonian skepticism is possible as a way of life today.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"-1 1","pages":"1-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-bja10008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49167964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信