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International Journal for the Study of Skepticism最新文献

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Non-Evidentialist Epistemology 非证据主义认识论
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-09-23 DOI: 10.1163/9789004465534
Luca Moretti, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
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引用次数: 3
Knowing of Not-Knowing: the Outlines of a Critical Skepticism 知道与不知道：批判怀疑主义的提纲
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-06-21 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10012
Christoph Binkelmann
{"title":"Knowing of Not-Knowing: the Outlines of a Critical Skepticism","authors":"Christoph Binkelmann","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Sextus Empiricus’ definition of skepticism as a search for truth still poses great problems for research today. Perhaps the most urgent of these is: How can we reasonably assert the possibility of knowledge and at the same time deny its reality? The paper tries to solve this question by drawing attention to a hitherto neglected variant of skepticism: the so-called critical skepticism. In confrontation with Hume and Kant, Salomon Maimon develops a skeptical position which, with the help of transcendental argumentation, produces a knowing of not-knowing. Maimon defends with Kant (and against Hume) transcendental knowledge which at the same time offers a reason to reject with Hume and against Kant empirical knowledge. By doing so, he distinguishes a knowledge of possibility from a (non-)knowledge of reality, whereby the search for truth—expressed in the assumption that knowledge is possible—is and remains the only truth.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42498198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Not to Know the Principle of Induction 为什么不知道归纳法原理
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-06-07 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10020
H. Sankey
{"title":"How Not to Know the Principle of Induction","authors":"H. Sankey","doi":"10.1163/22105700-BJA10020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-BJA10020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction.” Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use of induction, since induction is applied to the external world outside our minds. If the principle is interpreted in light of the objective interpretation of induction, it cannot be known to be true a priori, since it applies to frequencies that occur in the world outside the mind, and these cannot be known without recourse to experience. Russell’s principle of induction therefore fails to provide a satisfactory justification of induction.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49113180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemology’s Prime Evils 认识论的主要罪恶
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-05-26 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10021
Patrick R. Bondy
{"title":"Epistemology’s Prime Evils","authors":"Patrick R. Bondy","doi":"10.1163/22105700-BJA10021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-BJA10021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This essay addresses what we can call epistemology’s Prime Evils. These are the three demons epistemologists have conjured that are the most troublesome and the most difficult to dispel: Descartes’ classic demon; Lehrer and Cohen’s New Evil Demon; and Schaffer’s Debasing Demon. These demons threaten the epistemic statuses of our beliefs—in particular, the statuses of knowledge and justification—and they present challenges for our theories of these epistemic statuses. This paper explains the key features of these three central demons, highlights their family resemblances and differences, and attempts to show that a certain kind of internalist view of justification provides the resources to handle these demons well.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43619342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revisiting Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Argument in “Proof of an External World” 再看摩尔在《外部世界的证明》中的反怀疑论证
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-05-13 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10014
C. Stratman
{"title":"Revisiting Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Argument in “Proof of an External World”","authors":"C. Stratman","doi":"10.1163/22105700-BJA10014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-BJA10014","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former is skepticism about the ontological status of fundamental reality, while the latter is skepticism about our empirical knowledge. Philosophers often assume that Moore’s response to “external world skepticism” deals exclusively with the former, not the latter. But this is a mistake. I shall argue that Moore’s anti-skeptical argument targets an ontological form of skepticism. Thus, the conclusion is an ontological claim about fundamental reality, while the premises are epistemic claims. If this is correct, then the conclusion outstrips the scope of its premises and proves too much.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47655187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Peter Baumann, Epistemic Contextualism: A Defence 彼得·鲍曼，认知语境主义：辩护
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-05-11 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10023
R. Clarke
{"title":"Peter Baumann, Epistemic Contextualism: A Defence","authors":"R. Clarke","doi":"10.1163/22105700-BJA10023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-BJA10023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46561454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Structure of Thoreau’s Epistemology, with Continual Reference to Descartes 梭罗认识论的结构，并继续参照笛卡尔
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-05-03 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10022
Tim Black
{"title":"The Structure of Thoreau’s Epistemology, with Continual Reference to Descartes","authors":"Tim Black","doi":"10.1163/22105700-BJA10022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-BJA10022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000We can find in Henry David Thoreau’s work a response to Cartesian skepticism. Thoreau takes this skepticism to get its start in us only when we are not attuned to the world, that is, only when we lose sight of our being integrated with the world in the way we quite naturally are. Thoreau posits for human beings a natural and unshakeable integration with the world. This develops into an attunement with the world, making us ready to engage with the world as mature epistemic agents. Yet even if we fall out of attunement with the world, perhaps in response to the reasonableness of a comprehensive doubt, our natural integration with the world remains. Skepticism lacks force because we are integrated with the world even when we are not attuned to it, and because our integration with the world can always help us return to a healthy epistemic engagement with the world.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48411044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
René Lefebvre (trad.), Sextus Empiricus: Contre les Logiciens rene Lefebvre(译)，Sextus Empiricus:反对逻辑学家
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-30 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10018
S. Marchand
{"title":"René Lefebvre (trad.), Sextus Empiricus: Contre les Logiciens","authors":"S. Marchand","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46272866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Editors’ Note 编者注
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-10030001
Diego Machuca, Duncan Pritchard
{"title":"Editors’ Note","authors":"Diego Machuca, Duncan Pritchard","doi":"10.1163/22105700-10030001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-10030001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-10030001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44708013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Isabelle de Charrière and Skepticism in the Literary Life 伊莎贝尔·德·夏丽<e:1>与文学生活中的怀疑主义
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10007
J. Laursen
{"title":"Isabelle de Charrière and Skepticism in the Literary Life","authors":"J. Laursen","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article explores some senses in which Isabelle de Charrière (1740–1805) may be understood as a skeptic in her personal life and in her literary life, although the two cannot really be separated since she lived the literary life. She called herself a skeptic a number of times, and also showed some knowledge of the Academic or Socratic and especially of the Pyrrhonian traditions of skepticism in her novels and extensive correspondence. This Dutch-Swiss writer provides an example of what it might be to live as a skeptic, serving as a case study for the debates about the feasibility and moral status of living with skepticism.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":"10 1","pages":"256-267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43450737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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