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International Journal for the Study of Skepticism最新文献

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Gorgias’ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος and Its Relation to Skepticism 高尔基亚斯的Περ ο ο μ ντος及其与怀疑主义的关系
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10010
Richard Bett
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引用次数: 1
Descartes sceptique malgré lui? 不顾笛卡尔的怀疑?
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-10-15 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10016
F. Peretti
{"title":"Descartes sceptique malgré lui?","authors":"F. Peretti","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Descartes a adopté envers le scepticisme une attitude que d’aucuns parmi ses adversaires ont jugée ambiguë voire coupable. Il a recouru à des arguments sceptiques pour mettre en œuvre son célèbre doute qu’il concevait néanmoins comme l’acte inaugural d’une philosophie en quête de certitude scientifique. Descartes rejetait ainsi la fin poursuivie par les sceptiques et entendait user du doute contre le doute. Cette stratégie fondée sur un scepticisme des moyens pour combattre la fin et l’esprit même du scepticisme s’est-elle révélée pertinente ? Richard Popkin a pensé que non, dans son histoire du scepticisme, et conclu à l’échec d’un Descartes « sceptique malgré lui ». Je me propose de nuancer cette thèse de manière significative, suggérant que Descartes, sceptique à un second degré, était bien conscient de la finitude de l’esprit humain et des limites assignables à la recherche de la vérité des choses telles qu’elles sont en soi.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-bja10016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44718866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is Modern Science a Problem for Living as a Pyrrhonist Today? A Discussion of Richard Bett’s “Can We Be Ancient Sceptics?” 现代科学对今天的金字塔学家来说是个问题吗？理查德·贝特“我们能成为古代怀疑论者吗？”
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-10-15 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10008
Ryan McCoy
{"title":"Is Modern Science a Problem for Living as a Pyrrhonist Today? A Discussion of Richard Bett’s “Can We Be Ancient Sceptics?”","authors":"Ryan McCoy","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In the final chapter of his recent book How to Be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Richard Bett discusses the possibility of living as a Pyrrhonian skeptic today. Chief among his concerns is the scope of the skeptic’s suspension of judgment and whether or not the skeptic could maintain suspension of judgment in light of the results of modern science. For example, how might the skeptic sustain suspension of judgment in light of overwhelming evidence for climate change? Or even atomic theory? Ultimately, Bett concludes that such claims within the natural sciences preclude us from living as Pyrrhonists today. In the following paper I argue, how it is possible for the Pyrrhonian skeptic to suspend judgment on certain well-confirmed scientific theories, how the skeptic does so in accord with rational norms, and in turn, that Pyrrhonian skepticism is possible as a way of life today.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-bja10008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49167964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory 皮尔逊怀疑论与言语行为理论相遇
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-08-15 DOI: 10.1163/221057011X588037
John Turri
{"title":"Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory","authors":"John Turri","doi":"10.1163/221057011X588037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/221057011X588037","url":null,"abstract":"This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/221057011X588037","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48286370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
The School of Doubt: Skepticism, History and Politics in Cicero’s, written by Orazio Cappello 《怀疑学派:西塞罗的怀疑主义、历史和政治》，奥拉齐奥·卡佩罗著
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-06-12 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191413
Raphael Woolf
{"title":"The School of Doubt: Skepticism, History and Politics in Cicero’s, written by Orazio Cappello","authors":"Raphael Woolf","doi":"10.1163/22105700-20191413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191413","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-20191413","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44531674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously, edited by Richard Garner and Richard Joyce 《道德的终结:严肃对待道德废奴主义》，理查德·加纳和理查德·乔伊斯主编
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-06-12 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191374
H. Lillehammer
{"title":"The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously, edited by Richard Garner and Richard Joyce","authors":"H. Lillehammer","doi":"10.1163/22105700-20191374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191374","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-20191374","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47340949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Debunking Arguments in Ethics, written by Hanno Sauer 《揭穿伦理学的争论》，作者是汉诺·绍尔
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-06-12 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191397
Erik J. Wielenberg
{"title":"Debunking Arguments in Ethics, written by Hanno Sauer","authors":"Erik J. Wielenberg","doi":"10.1163/22105700-20191397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191397","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-20191397","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43263464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Beyond Quietism: Transformative Experience in Pyrrhonism and Wittgenstein 超越宁静主义:皮龙主义和维特根斯坦的变革经验
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-06-12 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191344
Rico Gutschmidt
{"title":"Beyond Quietism: Transformative Experience in Pyrrhonism and Wittgenstein","authors":"Rico Gutschmidt","doi":"10.1163/22105700-20191344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191344","url":null,"abstract":"Pyrrhonian skepticism is usually understood as a form of quietism, since it is supposed to bring us back to where we were in our everyday lives before we got disturbed by philosophical questions. Similarly, the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein claim that Wittgenstein’s ‘philosophical practice’ results in the dissolution of the corresponding philosophical problems and brings us back to our everyday life. Accordingly, Wittgenstein is often linked to Pyrrhonism and classified as a quietist. Against this reading, I will employ Laurie Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience and argue that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be interpreted as a philosophical practice that changes our self-understanding in significant ways. I will argue that this practice can evoke transformative experiences and is thereby able to yield a non-propositional insight into the finitude of the human condition. This shows that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy go beyond quietism.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-20191344","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46352352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Kevin McCain and Ted Poston’s Best Explanations 凯文·麦凯恩和泰德·波斯顿的最佳解释
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-06-12 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191396
Frank Cabrera
{"title":"Kevin McCain and Ted Poston’s Best Explanations","authors":"Frank Cabrera","doi":"10.1163/22105700-20191396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191396","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-20191396","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49225889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Common Sense, Scepticism and Deep Epistemic Disagreements 常识、怀疑主义和深刻的认知分歧
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-06-12 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20201349
A. Thébert
{"title":"Common Sense, Scepticism and Deep Epistemic Disagreements","authors":"A. Thébert","doi":"10.1163/22105700-20201349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20201349","url":null,"abstract":"Considering the persisting disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics, it seems that they are faced with a deep epistemic disagreement. Taking stock from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, one generally thinks that deep epistemic disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Hinge epistemology, inherited from Wittgenstein, is also considered as an illuminating detour to understand common sense epistemology. But is there really a deep epistemic disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics? Could it not be considered that they share a common background? If so, is the rational resolution of their disagreement logically possible? What rational means can common sense use to convince someone of the privileged status of an epistemic principle? Relying on Reid’s, Alston’s and Lynch’s arguments, I show that common sense epistemology is a more promising approach than hinge epistemology, because it is driven by an optimism about reason in the solving of deep epistemic disagreements.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22105700-20201349","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42239955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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