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International Journal for the Study of Skepticism最新文献

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Psychological Reflections in the Philosopher’s Mirror: Comments on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study 哲学家镜中的心理学思考：评论托马斯-凯利的《偏见：一项哲学研究
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10087
Jared B. Celniker, Nathan Ballantyne
{"title":"Psychological Reflections in the Philosopher’s Mirror: Comments on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study","authors":"Jared B. Celniker, Nathan Ballantyne","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10087","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this brief commentary, we offer thoughts on Thomas Kelly’s <em>Bias: A Philosophical Study.</em> We focus on the book’s relevance to the study of cognitive biases, including Kelly’s discussion of naïve realism (in the psychologists’ sense). While we are largely enthusiastic about Kelly’s theorizing, we also provide some pushback against his notion of emergent biases. We hope that psychologists will engage with Kelly’s work and might consider how some philosophical refinements could improve the empirical study of biases.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141775422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’ Treatment of Global Skepticism in Why We Doubt 关于安赫尔-皮尼略斯在《我们为何怀疑》一书中对全球怀疑论的论述
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-07-08 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10086
Mark Walker
{"title":"Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’ Treatment of Global Skepticism in Why We Doubt","authors":"Mark Walker","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10086","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Ángel Pinillos’ <em>Why We Doubt</em> offers an error theory for at least some versions of global skepticism: skeptical doubts are based on a faulty heuristic. Once this heuristic is replaced by a more apt principle inspired by Bayesian approaches to epistemology, the skeptical doubts are shown not to be motivated. I argue contra Pinillos that skeptical doubts may remain even if we grant the main line of Pinillos’ argument. Skeptical doubts might be generated by disagreement even when we accept Pinillos’ Bayesian inspired principle.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141570216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Navigating Skepticism: Cognitive Insights and Bayesian Rationality in Pinillos’ Why We Doubt 导航怀疑论：皮尼洛斯《我们为何怀疑》中的认知洞察和贝叶斯理性
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-06-29 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10084
Chad Gonnerman, John Philip Waterman
{"title":"Navigating Skepticism: Cognitive Insights and Bayesian Rationality in Pinillos’ Why We Doubt","authors":"Chad Gonnerman, John Philip Waterman","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10084","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Pinillos’ <em>Why We Doubt</em> presents a powerful critique of such global skeptical assertions as “I don’t know I am not a brain-in-a-vat (<span style=\"font-variant: small-caps;\">biv</span>)” by introducing a cognitive mechanism that is sensitive to error possibilities and a Bayesian rule of rationality that this mechanism is designed to approximate. This multifaceted argument offers a novel counter to global skepticism, contending that our basis for believing such premises is underminable. In this work, we engage with Pinillos’ adoption of Bayesianism, questioning whether the Bayesian principle that he invokes truly does fail to generate the verdict that we don’t we aren’t <span style=\"font-variant: small-caps;\">biv </span>s, contrary to what Pinillos asserts. Furthermore, we argue that Pinillos’ empirical argument is not empirical enough; we need a lot more empirical work if we are going to counter global skepticism and win over neutral bystanders.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141547692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Biased Suspension of Judgment 有偏见的暂停判断
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10085
Brett Sherman
{"title":"Biased Suspension of Judgment","authors":"Brett Sherman","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10085","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to Thomas Kelly, traditional skeptical arguments can be conceived in terms of bias. The main aim of this paper is not to challenge Kelly’s conclusions, but rather to draw some interesting consequences from them. Specifically, in addition to cases of biased judgments, which draw the ire of the skeptic, there are also cases of biased suspension of judgment. By examining cases of racially biased suspension of judgment and comparing them to cases of skepticism, I argue that we can help to uncover the mechanism that underlies the skeptic’s accusation of bias. In particular, I aim to show that it is the conclusiveness of one’s evidence, rather than the likelihood of the possibility at issue, that matters to the skeptic.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141512145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Curious Case of the Disappearance of Pyrrhonism from Continental Philosophy 皮尔士主义从大陆哲学中消失的奇特案例
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-06-14 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10083
Robb Dunphy
{"title":"The Curious Case of the Disappearance of Pyrrhonism from Continental Philosophy","authors":"Robb Dunphy","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10083","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, evidence is briefly presented for three facts that together point to something puzzling. (1) That major continental philosophers of the nineteenth century tended to engage in some detail, as part of a broader preoccupation with ancient Greek thought, with Pyrrhonian scepticism. (2) That major continental philosophers of the twentieth century tended to engage in some depth with their nineteenth-century forebears and maintained their tendency to engage significantly with ancient Greek thought. (3) That twentieth-century continental philosophers demonstrate little to no interest in Pyrrhonian scepticism. This raises the question: why does engagement with Pyrrhonism disappear from continental philosophy? The article discusses two hypotheses that might explain this disappearance.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141512146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Simulations, Skepticisms, and Transcendental Arguments 模拟、怀疑论和超越论证
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-04-30 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10065
Abraham Lim
{"title":"Simulations, Skepticisms, and Transcendental Arguments","authors":"Abraham Lim","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10065","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a previous article, I developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the <span style=\"font-variant: small-caps;\">sim</span>-style argument. In this article, I have four main aims. First, I employ the <span style=\"font-variant: small-caps;\">sim</span>-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the <span style=\"font-variant: small-caps;\">sim</span>-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson’s, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140827646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Heavenly Immortality and the Plasticity of the Self 天仙与自我的可塑性
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-04-30 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10082
Brian Ribeiro
{"title":"Heavenly Immortality and the Plasticity of the Self","authors":"Brian Ribeiro","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10082","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I review the dispute between Ribeiro (2011) and Brown (2021) over whether the radical transformation which a human self would need to undergo in order to be heaven-admissible would be such that it leads to a <em>loss of self</em>. Ribeiro thinks it would; Brown thinks it wouldn’t. My primary intention here is to advance the debate by trying to better understand <em>what’s in dispute</em> between these disputants. From this better understanding of what’s in dispute, we can see what would be needed to <em>substantively</em> advance the debate, and one claim I defend here is that in order to substantively advance this debate, a disputant would need to have a compelling defense of his side’s view on (at least) one of the two main issues that my analysis herein identifies.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140827556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Non-Believing Jew: A Historical Survey of Judaism’s Engagement with Atheism 不信教的犹太人犹太教与无神论接触的历史考察
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-04-03 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10081
Daniel R. Langton
{"title":"The Non-Believing Jew: A Historical Survey of Judaism’s Engagement with Atheism","authors":"Daniel R. Langton","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10081","url":null,"abstract":"How important is atheism for Jewish history and Jews for the history of atheism? Modern Jewish histories have tended to focus on Jewish secularization rather than atheism, and historical surveys of atheism in the West have tended to neglect the Jewish experience which is subsumed in the Judeo-Christian tradition. It is possible to make the case that the secularization narrative privileges social change over Jewish intellectual engagement with non-belief, and that just as Jewish and Christian conceptions of theism differ, so do their atheisms. Jewish historical attitudes towards atheism are complicated and have shifted over time. Here, skeptical tendencies, that is, attitudes and ideas that would be associated later with atheism, will be considered alongside claims about atheism <jats:italic>per se</jats:italic>.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140598462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, editted by Nathan Ballantyne and David Dunning 理性、偏见与探索：认识论与心理学的十字路口》，由 Nathan Ballantyne 和 David Dunning 编辑
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10080
Christos Kyriacou
{"title":"Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, editted by Nathan Ballantyne and David Dunning","authors":"Christos Kyriacou","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10080","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140237620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hegel’s Criticism of Pyrrhonism 黑格尔对庇隆主义的批判
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10073
Joris Spigt
{"title":"Hegel’s Criticism of Pyrrhonism","authors":"Joris Spigt","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10073","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents Hegel’s criticism of two central ideas of Pyrrhonism: the importance of stating only how things appear and Pyrrhonism as a way of life. After providing a sketch of the main features of Pyrrhonism, the paper lays out and critically evaluates Hegel’s largely unexamined argument against Pyrrhonism in his early 1802 essay on skepticism. Hegel claims that the Pyrrhonist’s appeal to appearance renders Pyrrhonism philosophically vacuous: insofar as Pyrrhonism merely describes the subjective contents of the Pyrrhonist’s mind, it has no philosophical import. Sextus would not accept Hegel’s criticism because the appeal to appearance could express the provisional rather than purely subjective character of Pyrrhonism. The paper proceeds by examining Hegel’s argument in the <jats:italic>Phenomenology</jats:italic> that skepticism is contradictory on account of conjoining suspension of judgment with acquiescing in appearances as the guide to life. Sextus would reject Hegel’s criticism by insisting on the distinction between judgment and appearance.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140036339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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