发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
The Debasing Demon Resurrected 妖魔复活
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10072
Mikael Janvid
{"title":"The Debasing Demon Resurrected","authors":"Mikael Janvid","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10072","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to strike a blow for the relevance of the debasing demon originally summoned by Jonathan Schaffer. I do so by, first, defending this skeptical hypothesis against critics and, second, by noting important similarities between the workings of this demon and implicit bias. Along the way, I elucidate the structure of this skeptical argument by comparing it to other better-known skeptical arguments. I also clarify the kinds of access the debasing skeptical scenario, as well as some of the replies, operate with. Apart from being interesting in its own right as a different skeptical challenge, the debasing demon raises important issues regarding bias, as I will show by using an example from epistemic decolonialization.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140036335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers 有偏见的知识分子、有偏见的理由和有偏见的哲学家
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10078
Michael Veber
{"title":"Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers","authors":"Michael Veber","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10078","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In <em>Bias: A Philosophical Study</em>, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First, if we are applying Kelly’s theory of bias to skepticism, it is best to think of the skeptic’s challenge to be that our anti-skeptical beliefs are based on what we know to be biased reasons. Kelly has not shown that this sort of bias is compatible with knowledge. Second, Kelly’s approach to the problem of skepticism is an example of what I have called “unambitious epistemology.” And, for that reason, it is not a satisfactory answer to skepticism.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139981439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Call for Proposals for Monographs and Edited Volumes 征集专著和编辑卷的提案
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-14010001
{"title":"Call for Proposals for Monographs and Edited Volumes","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/22105700-14010001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-14010001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140437863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’s Why We Doubt 关于安赫尔-皮尼略斯《我们为何怀疑》的评论
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10079
Branden Fitelson
{"title":"Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’s Why We Doubt","authors":"Branden Fitelson","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10079","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In these brief remarks, I describe the author’s Bayesian explication of the narrow function of the meta-cognitive, heuristic algorithm (<span style=\"font-variant: small-caps;\">pbs</span>) that is at the heart of his psychological explanation of why we entertain skeptical doubts. I provide some critical remarks, and an alternative Bayesian approach that is (to my mind) somewhat more elegant than the author’s.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139920865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question 不同意见、怀疑论和提出问题
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10077
Jonathan Matheson
{"title":"Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question","authors":"Jonathan Matheson","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10077","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I examine Thomas Kelly’s account of the epistemic significance of bias presented in <em>Bias: A Philosophical Study.</em> Kelly draws a parallel between the skeptical threat from bias and the skeptical threat from disagreement, and crafts a response to these skeptical threats. According to Kelly, someone who is not biased can rely on that fact to conclude that their disagreeing interlocutor is biased. Kelly motivates this response by drawing several parallels to recent lessons in epistemology: that some question-begging reasoning is permissible, and that there are important asymmetries between epistemological good cases and bad cases. I argue that there are several reasons to resist Kelly’s response. In brief, there are problems with each of the motivations Kelly gives for his picture. Each parallel faces significant obstacles. In addition, his response also fails to take the new evil demon intuition seriously.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139772186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Case for Spirit Realism: A Reply to Fales 精神现实主义的案例：答复法尔斯
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-09 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10076
Hans Van Eyghen
{"title":"The Case for Spirit Realism: A Reply to Fales","authors":"Hans Van Eyghen","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10076","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I respond to some criticisms raised in Evan Fales’ review of my book <jats:italic>The Epistemology of Spirit Beliefs</jats:italic> that was published in this journal. The points I will address are the following: (i) Fales’ complaint about unclarity in my epistemological position, (ii) his complaint about my insufficient presentation of alternative explanations, and (iii) his complaint about my use of the terms ‘naturalism’ and ‘naturalistic explanation’.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139772153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics, written by Peter Königs 道德揭穿者的问题：彼得-柯尼希斯（Peter Königs）撰写的《道德揭穿者的问题：经验主义伦理学的逻辑和局限性》（On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10074
Olle Risberg
{"title":"Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics, written by Peter Königs","authors":"Olle Risberg","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10074","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139608250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-Ideal Epistemology, written by Robin McKenna (2023) 非理想认识论》，罗宾-麦肯纳撰写（2023 年）
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10071
Angela O’Sullivan
{"title":"Non-Ideal Epistemology, written by Robin McKenna (2023)","authors":"Angela O’Sullivan","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10071","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138950002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Précis of Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment 分歧、尊重和宗教承诺的实践
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-11-25 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10069
John Pittard
{"title":"Précis of Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment","authors":"John Pittard","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10069","url":null,"abstract":"This paper summarizes <jats:italic>Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment</jats:italic>. The book’s central question is whether confident (ir)religious commitment can be rationally maintained in the face of systematic religious disagreement. Part <jats:sc>i</jats:sc> develops an account of the epistemic significance of disagreement and considers the implications of this account for religious belief. This part argues against the commitment of “strong conciliationists” to a rigorous form of epistemic impartiality, a commitment that underlies the strongest argument for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism. Part <jats:sc>ii</jats:sc> considers the implications for religious commitment if the impartiality constraint favored by strong conciliationists is correct. It is argued that the commitment to epistemic impartiality does not clearly support religious skepticism. However, such a commitment does induce a thoroughgoing normative uncertainty that arguably prevents one from rationally pursuing a religious (or explicitly irreligious) way of life.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138534162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rational Insight and Partisan Justification: Responding to Bogardus and Burton, Thurow, and Kvanvig 理性洞察与党派辩护:对Bogardus、Burton、throw和Kvanvig的回应
IF 0.2
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-11-25 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10070
John Pittard
{"title":"Rational Insight and Partisan Justification: Responding to Bogardus and Burton, Thurow, and Kvanvig","authors":"John Pittard","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10070","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses responses to <jats:italic>Disagreement, Deference, and Rational Commitment</jats:italic> from Bogardus and Burton, Thurow, and Kvanvig. Each of these responses objects to the rationalist account of “partisan justification” defended in the book. After explaining partisan justification and its significance, I first take up Bogardus and Burton’s argument for a more restrictive account of partisan justification which says that partisan justification requires certainty. I argue that this account yields implausible discontinuities in the verdicts given to nearly identical cases. Next, I consider Thurow’s suggestion that perceptual evidence can provide partisan justification without supporting rational insight. I explain why insight plays a crucial role in cases where perceptual beliefs enjoy partisan justification. Finally, I address Kvanvig’s objection that my account of partisan justification applies only to highly reflective agents. I argue that a subject’s actual reflectiveness does not bear on the sense of justification principally at issue in the disagreement literature.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138534157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信