皮浪与模糊性:一个格伦的分析

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-10-21 DOI:10.1163/22105700-bja10068

Refik Güremen

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引用次数: 0

摘要

伊里斯的皮洛建议我们不要相信自己的感觉和观点，而要对个别事物不抱任何看法。他建议，要达到这样一种状态，就必须对每一件单独的事物说，它“不是”某种方式，而不是某种方式。本文认为，目前对皮洛观点的形而上学解读未能解释为什么我们不应该相信我们的感觉和观点;此外，它也没有解释如何达到对个体事物“无意见”的状态。有人认为，对皮洛观点的弗雷格式分析可以为这两个问题提供令人满意的答案。然而，本文的目的是完善而不是反驳形而上学的阅读。

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Pyrrho and Vagueness: A Fregean Analysis

Abstract Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations and opinions; in addition, it does not explain how to achieve the state of being “without opinions” about individual things. It is argued that a Fregean analysis of Pyrrho’s views can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. The purpose of the paper, however, is to refine, rather than rebut, the metaphysical reading.

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来源期刊

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.