模拟、怀疑论和超越论证

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY
Abraham Lim
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在之前的一篇文章中,我提出了一些超越论证来反驳尼克-博斯特罗姆(Nick Bostrom)的几个版本的模拟假说。我把其中一些论证称为模拟式论证。在本文中,我有四个主要目的。首先,我运用模拟式论证来弥补希拉里-普特南(Hilary Putnam)的 "脑中之脑"(brain-in-vat)论证的缺陷。其次,我证明蒂姆-巴顿(Tim Button)称之为噩梦般的笛卡尔怀疑论的最激进的怀疑论,可以被模拟式论证或我在此提出的另一种超越论证所驳倒。第三,我将我的激进怀疑论方法与唐纳德-戴维森的方法进行比较,因为戴维森的方法通常被视为超越论证的典范。第四,我将解释主要由巴里-斯特劳德(Barry Stroud)提出的对超越论证的著名反对意见是如何导致两种不良结果的:心理主义和康德式怀疑主义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Simulations, Skepticisms, and Transcendental Arguments

In a previous article, I developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the sim-style argument. In this article, I have four main aims. First, I employ the sim-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the sim-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson’s, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
期刊介绍: As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.
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