Scepticism and Self-Detachment

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI:10.1163/22105700-bja10011

C. Perin

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection.

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怀疑主义与自我超然

这篇论文涉及两个问题。有没有一种感觉，像Sextus Empiricus所描述的怀疑论者是与自己分离的？这种自我超然本身是否使怀疑论者的生活方式不受欢迎？我描绘了两个自我超然的概念，然后得出结论，怀疑论者面临着一个困境：要么他比非怀疑论者更超然，要么他容易受到非标准版本的失用症反对。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.