拒绝专家共识是否合理？

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI:10.1163/22105700-bja10015

Bryan Frances

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引用次数: 1

摘要

哲学家们捍卫并经常相信有争议的哲学主张。由于他们并非一无所知，他们通常意识到自己的观点是有争议的——在某些情况下，这些观点在相关专家中肯定是少数。此外，大多数哲学家都意识到，他们不是上帝赋予哲学的礼物，因为他们承认，与其他哲学家相比，他们在哲学中追踪真理的能力并不非凡。在这篇论文中，我认为在许多现实生活中，有争议的主张中的这种信念是不合理的。这意味着大多数哲学家都有非理性的哲学信仰。

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Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?

Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial claims are irrational. This means that most philosophers have irrational philosophical beliefs.

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来源期刊

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.