{"title":"Evil in Human Nature – Bogusław Wolniewicz on the Root of Evil","authors":"J. Smakulska","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2022.019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2022.019","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Boguslaw Wolniewicz’s position on evil and its source. In pointing to the origins of evil, Wolniewicz refers to a very old concept of the devil. Namely, some cosmic force of unknown genesis that acts in man and through man. In philosopher’s opinion, human nature has an inner inclination to do evil. He therefore acknowledges the existence of evil in an anthropological dimension – as an innate and permanent human tendency to behave wrongly in a moral sense.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48722771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strach na Zachodzie na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. Żyjąc z wrogiem","authors":"M. Jagłowski","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2022.018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2022.018","url":null,"abstract":"Nawiązując do znanej pracy Jeana Delumeau La peur en Occident, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles. Une cité assiégée (Strach w kulturze Zachodu XIV-XVIII w.) oraz zakładając, że człowiek zawsze czegoś się boi oraz że w każdej epoce historycznej istnieje jakaś dominująca forma strachu, w artykule postawiono pytanie o to, czego na Zachodzie bano się na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. Zwrócono uwagę na to, że zachodnia kultura tego okresu miała charakter scjentystyczny, dlatego przyjęto, że źródeł strachu w tej epoce należy poszukiwać w nauce. Za wyjściowy punkt narastającego lęku wskazano pesymistyczną diagnozę demograficzną Thomasa Roberta Malthusa z 1798 r., natomiast za koncepcje wzmacniające ten lęk uznano teorie degeneracji (Benedict Augustin Morel, Cesare Lombroso, Max Nordau) oraz ewolucjonizm (Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer) i eugenikę (Francis Galton). Na podstawie analizy tych koncepcji wyprowadzono wniosek, że nauka mogła stać się źródłem strachu przede wszystkim ze względu na niezrealizowanie własnych kryteriów poznania naukowego, w szczególności ze względu na obecność w jej obszarze pewnych przeświadczeń właściwych dla mentalności religijnej, które uczeni naiwnie uznali za już przezwyciężone.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48727651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Archbishop William King’s Critique of Manichaeism in the Treatise \"On the Origin of Evil\" (1702)","authors":"Przemysław Spryszak","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2022.021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2022.021","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the Irish philosopher, theologian and divine William King’s (1650–1729) discussion of Manichaeism in the essay De Origine Mali (On the Origin of Evil) (1702). King intended to demonstrate that the Manichaeist solution to the problem of the origin of evil, consisting in assuming the existence of two opposite principles of, respectively, good and evil, leaves the problem untouched and, therefore, cannot compete with the orthodox view, according to which the presence of evil, despite appearances to the contrary, is compatible with the one and perfect principle of all creation. Following preliminary remarks about the text, context, and King’s terminology, this paper argues that his criticism is flawed.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43633462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Evil as a “Thick” Ethical Concept","authors":"A. Łukomska","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2022.014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2022.014","url":null,"abstract":"The paper aims to propose a framework for understanding of the concept of moral evil. It argues that “evil” should be considered one of the so-called “thick” ethical concepts, characterized by their ability to be simultaneously descriptive and normative. To that effect, it examines the relationship between the concepts of moral wrongness and the idea of evil, with a view to explaining why moral evil should be understood as a “thick” rather than a “thin” ethical concept. Finally, it offers some reasons for cultivating thick ethical concepts, and suggests the conditions which have to be met if a thick concept of evil is to be helpful rather than harmful.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66635506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Civilization Without Evil in Leszek Kołakowski’s Works","authors":"Agnieszka Biegalska","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2022.017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2022.017","url":null,"abstract":"Leszek Kołakowski had a keen interest in the phenomenon of evil, and many of his works address this topic. Kołakowski made attempts to explore the origin of evil, human experiences of evil, changes in beliefs about evil in European consciousness throughout the ages, and he commented on the proposition that the world should be defined as free of evil. In his works, the phenomenon of evil was examined through the lens of two contextual perspectives: episteme and sacrum. This article explores the ways in which contemporary readers of Kołakowski’s works approach the problem of evil from these two perspectives. The paper discusses Kołakowski’s attempts to analyze the process of eliminating the traditional divide between good and evil and the rejection of Reason, Truth and Virtue in the Platonic and Aristotelean sense.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41501530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nature Without the State: An Anarchist Critique of ‘Animalistic Evil’","authors":"Jason K. Day","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2022.016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2022.016","url":null,"abstract":"I here present an anarchist critique of the idea of ‘animalistic evil’ and its common use as a justification for the State’s existence and use of force. On this view, ‘evil’ is a privation of morality, justice, and civilised behaviour. It is then identified with the ‘animalistic’ since animals are often thought to be defined by the aforesaid privation. I first clarify the idea of animalistic evil within the history of philosophy and science. Aristotle (384–322 BCE), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and Thomas H. Huxley (1825–1895) prominently argue that all that prevents humanity from devolving into animalistic evil, a state of violent and individualistic struggle for bare survival, is the power of State government to forcibly control the animalistic drives within its citizens. I subsequently pose two questions. (1) Is it justified to associate animal life with evil when this is (a) understood as a privation of a morality, justice and society and (b) characterised as an individualistic struggle for survival? (2) If this is not justified, what is the political harm of doing so? Building on the work of the anarchist thinker Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921), I argue that any conception of animalistic evil is unjustifiable, that it is a false justification for the State’s existence and use of force, and that the State, upon making the empty threat of animalistic evil, both violently harms individuals and impedes the socially beneficial practice of mutual aid.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44166107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Thin Moral Concept of Evil","authors":"Michael Wilby","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2022.015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2022.015","url":null,"abstract":"Evil-scepticism comes in two varieties: one variety is descriptive, where it is claimed that the concept of evil does not successfully denote anything in the world; the other variety is normative, where it is claimed that the concept of evil is not a helpful or useful concept to be employing in either our social or interpersonal lives. This paper argues that evil-scepticism can be responded to by understanding the concept of evil as a thin moral concept. Understood in this thin way, the descriptive challenge fades, because the concept of evil does not even purport to denote anything in the world (it is purely evaluative), and so does the normative argument, since the thinness of the concept means that, first, it is ineliminable anyway, and, second, its malleability allows for it to be used for progressive and constructive means.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49171216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ordinary Badness in Aristotelian Ethics: A Virtually Forgotten Question","authors":"Carles José Mestre","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2022.013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2022.013","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we aim to show the way in which a kind of moral badness, what we call ordinary badness, could be understood from Aristotelian ethical writings. First, we document the recognition of this type of badness in the Aristotelian source, which is seen in his presentation of “hoi polloi” (the Many). In particular, it is shown that “hoi polloi” are “phauloi”, one of the (specific) predicates that Aristotle uses to refer to moral badness. Secondly, we highlight the methodological function of “hoi polloi” in the description of incontinence and self-indulgence, and we show how the Many could be considered as a new class within the question of moral effort. Finally, and related to the result of the previous analysis, we document what could be an aporia in the Aristotelian description of the population of the polis, which brings us to join Ian Morris in his global understanding of Aristotelian political philosophy.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49639955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Konceptualizm Richarda Burthogge’a i jego źródła w średniowiecznej optyce perspektywistycznej","authors":"B. Żukowski","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2023.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2023.002","url":null,"abstract":"Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie historycznych uwarunkowań konceptualistycznego argumentu na rzecz idealizmu epistemologicznego, sformułowanego przez siedemnastowiecznego filozofa angielskiego Richarda Burthogge’a. Istotą tego argumentu, niemającego precedensu we wcześniejszej filozofii, jest próba dowiedzenia tezy o immanentnej nieadekwatności ludzkiego poznania na podstawie dysproporcji pomiędzy ogólnością pojęcia a jednostkowością rzeczy pozaumysłowych. Jednocześnie, relację między powszechnikiem a konkretem uznaje Burthogge za analogiczną do relacji między obrazem wizualnym a rzeczą. Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że decydujący wpływ na koncepcję poznania wzrokowego, która dostarczyła podłoża dla tej analogii, a co za tym idzie dla argumentu konceptualistycznego, wywarła średniowieczna optyka perspektywistyczna.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42465453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Husserlowska wariacja imaginacyjna i problem jej wykonalności w kontekście rozważań Romana Ingardena","authors":"Magdalena Gilicka","doi":"10.12775/szhf.2023.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2023.001","url":null,"abstract":"Niniejszy artykuł prezentuje zagadnienie operacji wariacji imaginacyjnej w perspektywie problemu jej wykonalności oraz samej zasadności jej przeprowadzenia. Koncepcję wariacji imaginacyjnej nierozerwalnie wiążę z kategoriami transcendencji oraz konstytuującej świadomości. W pierwszej części pracy dokonuję wstępnej charakterystyki operacji uzmienniania. W drugiej części prezentuję zarzuty Romana Ingardena, jakie wystosował w swoich Uwagach krytycznych, w stronę możliwości i zasadności jej wykonalności.","PeriodicalId":32293,"journal":{"name":"Studia z Historii Filozofii","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46078411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}