Corporate Governance: Capital Raising最新文献

{"title":"Fear and Volatility in Digital Assets","authors":"F. Pervaiz, Christopher Goh, Ashley Pennington, Samuel Holt, James West, Shaun Ng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3721304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3721304","url":null,"abstract":"We show Bitcoin implied volatility on a 5 minute time horizon is modestly predictable from price, volatility momentum and alternative data including sentiment and engagement. Lagged Bitcoin index price and volatility movements contribute to the model alongside Google Trends with markets responding often several hours later. The code and datasets used in this paper can be found at https://github.com/Globe-Research/bitfear.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125447044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Finance Leases: A Hidden Channel of China’s Shadow Banking System","authors":"Jinfan Zhang, Ting Yang, Yanping Shi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3725600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3725600","url":null,"abstract":"By analyzing a hand-collected transaction-level dataset on the finance leases of China’s public firms for the period 2007-2019, this paper sheds light on China’s financial leasing industry. We find that banks use their affiliated leasing firms to provide credit to constrained clients in order to circumvent the government’s targeted monetary tightening policy, which offsets the expected decline in traditional bank loans in overcapacity industries and hampers the effectiveness of the monetary policy. Although this regulatory arbitrage may cause systemic risk at the macro level, bank-affiliated leasing firms exhibit much tighter risk control than other non-bank-affiliated leasing firms at the micro level, indicating that banks use finance leases as a channel to support their low-risk clients rather than to make excessive profit.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127222941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Partisanship in Loan Pricing","authors":"R. Dagostino, Janet Gao, Pengfei Ma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3701230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3701230","url":null,"abstract":"We document a strong effect of lender partisanship on corporate loan pricing. Using novel data on the voter registration records of bankers in charge of originating large-scale corporate loans, we find that bankers who are registered with a different party from the one represented by the president of the United States (\"misaligned bankers\") charge 7% higher loan spreads compared to bankers affiliated with the same party as the president. This effect is not explained by bankers’ innate characteristics, borrower fundamentals, or bank-level policies, but is consistent with misaligned bankers having a more pessimistic economic outlook. Despite charging higher interest rates, misaligned bankers do not seem to generate higher revenue than aligned bankers.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125092629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dividend Policy Implementation Modeling Within Neutral Approach Conditions As Analysis and Forecasting Instrument","authors":"S. Krylov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3693981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693981","url":null,"abstract":"The article treats a concept of the formalized modeling of the dividend policy scores and company marketing performance scores derived (stock market position) within neutral dividend policy implementation approach conditions as an instrument of the scores analysis and forecasting. The methodology of the research consists of the Dividend Irrelevance theory, Dividend Policy Significance theory and sustainable company development concept. It has been stated that a formalized approach of the dividend policy implementation presumes a construction of the basic relevent scores models characterizing the company dividend policy and its marketing performance as Dividend Payout, Dividend Cover, expected Share Price, Dividend Yield, Price / Earnings Ratio (common stock price/earnings ratio). The formalized models of the scores mentioned are applicable for a forecast-analytical scores evaluation and their variances as well by estimating an impact of the models defining factors exercised by the appropriate factoring analysis method within the neutral dividend policy implementation approach conditions. The conclusion is drawn, that the formalized models of the dividend policy scores and company marketing performance scores derived, having been developed, are an effective instrument for their forecasting and analysis so that proactive decisions to manage the company dividend policy implementation within neutral approach conditions are ensured.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129901322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic on Annual Shareholders Meetings and Dividend Determination in Japanese Companies","authors":"Hiroyuki Watanabe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3686394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3686394","url":null,"abstract":"Looking back on the trends of the 2020 annual shareholders’ meetings in Japan, due to the effects of the new coronavirus, many companies have been slow in closing their accounts, which has led to difficulties in responding to the shareholders’ meeting. According to the Japanese Companies Act, if the record date for exercising the rights of shareholders is set in the articles of incorporation, the rights must be exercised within three months from the standard date (Article 124 of the Companies Act). Many companies in Japan have set the record date at the end of March, so they have held an annual shareholders’ meeting by the end of June. \u0000 \u0000As a result, many companies managed to meet the scheduled date for shareholders’ meeting. In any case, in the current situation, a company that makes a resolution on dividends at the shareholders’ meeting will be faced with a difficult response or decision. \u0000 \u0000In Japan, in principle, resolutions regarding the determination on dividends of surplus are to be made at the shareholders’ meeting (Article 454, Paragraph 1 of the Companies Act). However, under the current Companies Act, the authority to determine dividends does not always exist only at the shareholders’ meeting. Under the current Companies Act, 1) a company with accounting auditors, 2) the term of office of directors does not exceed one year, 3) a company with a board of company auditors, with an audit etc. committee, or with a nominating committee, etc. In a company that meets all of the three requirements, the articles of incorporation may stipulate that matters concerning dividends of surplus can be decided by a resolution of the board of directors (Article 459, paragraph 1 of the Companies Act). \u0000 \u0000It has been generally believed that the determination on dividends would basically be made at the shareholders’ meeting in Japan. However, with the experience of the Corona crisis, we should look at the implications of determining dividends at the board of directors. By the way, in the United States, it is common for the board of directors to determine dividends, while at the same time, governance is carried out in such a manner that the proposals for the appointment and dismissal of directors are scrutinized at the shareholders’ meeting. In the UK, according to the provisions of the articles of incorporation, the structure for selecting whether to place the authority to determine dividends at the shareholders’ meeting or the board of directors is adopted. Even in Germany, which has the authority to determine dividends at the shareholders’ meeting, the board of directors and the supervisory board also allow their own authority to reserve up to one-half of the annual surplus as a voluntary reserve fund. It should be well recognized that, even internationally, the determination of dividends does not naturally fall under the authority of the shareholders’ meeting. \u0000 \u0000The number of companies that have transferred the authority to determine dividends to the bo","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126280681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does General Solicitation Improve Access to Capital for Small Businesses? Evidence from the JOBS Act","authors":"Anup Agrawal, Yuree Lim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3602183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3602183","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether Title II of the JOBS Act increases small firms’ access to capital. Title II allows firms to sell securities via general solicitations to accredited investors. We find that firms that offer securities via general solicitation tend to be of lower quality. After accounting for selection, we find that general solicitation offerings are less likely to succeed, and they raise lower amounts of capital than other offerings. Moreover, general solicitation offerings incur substantial brokerage costs to verify that investors are accredited under the Act. Our results imply the need to craft policies that induce better ways of signaling firm quality or more transparent approaches to reducing information asymmetry.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"183 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124613096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financing Concerns in April 2020 Appear Worse Than in 2008 Based on Earnings Calls","authors":"Andrew Y. Chen, Jie-An Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3592929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3592929","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate financing conditions have been rapidly evolving during the COVID-19 outbreak. In this short note, we report a timely measure of financing conditions obtained from machine-reading of earnings conference call transcripts. We find that actions consistent with financial concerns spiked dramatically in April 2020. The share of firms drawing down on credit lines, cutting equity payout, or cutting investment was 17, 27, and 42 percent, more than 6.5 standard deviations from their mean values of 2, 5, and 10 percent. For comparison, during the peak of the 2008-2009 financial crises these numbers peaked at 7, 11, and 25 percent. Consistent with the preliminary findings of Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun (2020), we find little evidence of financing concerns between January and March 2020.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116969443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Start-Up Law in Israel","authors":"Ehud Kamar, Ayal Shenhav, S. Yanovsky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3543356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3543356","url":null,"abstract":"This is a chapter on Israel in a forthcoming book on start-up law in several jurisdictions. Israel is a world-renowned leader in innovation and entrepreneurship. The country’s legal environment is an important basis for this success. It allows foreign investors to invest freely and repatriate funds without currency controls, and offers tax exemptions, a legal system based on common law, and an independent judiciary.<br><br>The law permits a variety of investment structures, including equity investments, debt financing, and combinations of the two. Entrepreneurs can also apply for public funding. In addition, the law provides strong protections for trade secrets, patents, copyright, trademarks, trade dresses, and designs. Commercial entities in Israel commonly enter into licensing agreements, including in-licensing agreements, cross-licensing agreements, and technology dispositions.<br><br>The law charges a company’s board of directors with supervision of management. Companies reduce the exposure of their directors and officers to liability using exculpation, indemnification, and insurance.<br><br>Finally, the law contemplates various scenarios for distressed companies, including voluntary liquidation, court-ordered liquidation, court-supervised voluntary liquidation and reorganization.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"271 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116834304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Your Gender Identity Is Who You Are: Female CEOs and Corporate Debt Structure","authors":"Qi Zhu, Yuxuan Huang, Chengyang Yan, Yeqin Zeng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3572752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3572752","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the implications of CEO gender for corporate debt structure. After controlling for endogeneity, firms with female CEOs issue less debt than firms with male CEOs. Although both risk aversion and overconfidence may serve as the channel of our main finding, we show that female CEOs being more risk averse is the underlying mechanism. Further, we find that the CEO gender effect is more pronounced for firms with younger CEOs, higher litigation risk, and more market competition. We also find that firms with female CEOs are more likely to keep positive debt capacity and have longer debt maturities.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115595995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Recent Developments in the FinTech Industry","authors":"Thomas J. Chemmanur, Michael B. Imerman, Harshit Rajaiya, Qianqian Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3558163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3558163","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we review some recent developments in the field of Financial Technology or “FinTech.” We begin with an overview of what FinTech is and why it has become an important growth industry in the financial services area and therefore an important research topic in finance. In the next section, we review some of the academic literature in the FinTech area. In the subsequent section, we characterize the financing of FinTech startups, especially by venture capital firms. In the following section, we characterize innovation by FinTech firms as well as by incumbent financial intermediaries. In the next section, we move on to discuss potential sources of value creation by FinTech start-up firms relative to existing incumbent firms: we conjecture that one source of value creation may arise from FinTech startups being able to provide a superior customer experience relative to incumbent firms in various areas of consumer finance. In the following section, we discuss the regulatory environment facing FinTech firms, in their banking as well as in their financial market activities. In the penultimate section, we analyze the buy-versus-build decision facing firms choosing to enter the FinTech sector and discuss the trade-offs that may drive such decisions in practice. We conclude with some remarks about the future directions that may be taken by the FinTech industry.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121810798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}