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Corporate Governance: Capital Raising最新文献

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Securitization Debt and Corporate Performance 证券化债务与公司绩效
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2012-02-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2011426
Laurent Bouvier, T. Nisar
{"title":"Securitization Debt and Corporate Performance","authors":"Laurent Bouvier, T. Nisar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2011426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2011426","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether corporate securitization enhances a firm’s debt service capacity. Agency problems may arise in the relationship between bondholders and servicers/managers because of the operating nature of the securitized assets. Securitization overcomes such concerns by introducing a set of operating debt covenants. Our study of the public houses with more than 17,000 retail outlets shows that managed firms perform better that tenanted firms as they maximize cash proceeds from an undervalued part of the firm. Operating covenants must therefore allow for profitable investment opportunities as well as manager equity so as to align their interests with that of bondholders.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124937556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are IPO Underwriters Paid for the Services They Provide? IPO承销商是否为他们提供的服务付费?
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2012-02-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2007982
M. Meoli, A. Signori, S. Vismara
{"title":"Are IPO Underwriters Paid for the Services They Provide?","authors":"M. Meoli, A. Signori, S. Vismara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2007982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2007982","url":null,"abstract":"More reputable underwriters are paid more for taking companies public, because they are expected to provide a better service. However, independently from their reputation, underwriters provide different optional services to the firms they take public. We question whether the services provided are related to the gross spreads. Based on declarations in the prospectuses of Italian IPOs, we find that asking underwriters to stabilize the price does increase the spread. Issuers can therefore pay lower fees by facing the risk of no aftermarket support for their stocks. Conversely, liquidity support does not drive the spread. We further investigate whether the underwriters’ declarations are actually pursued, and find that in general, they do seem to act according to the issuers’ interests. Nevertheless, the fees charged are not informative about the provision of these services. Rather, other factors such as negative price revisions and negative (or low) underpricing drive the provision of these services.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127170425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Initial Public Offering of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 中国工商银行首次公开发行(ipo)
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2011-11-27 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1965572
Darien Huang, Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Mengxin Zhao
{"title":"The Initial Public Offering of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)","authors":"Darien Huang, Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Mengxin Zhao","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1965572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1965572","url":null,"abstract":"The conventional wisdom before the financial crisis that started in 2007 suggested a link between financial openness and economic growth. Papers by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005), Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) have shown that financial liberalization promotes economic growth. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2011) provides additional evidence that financial openness improves the growth of factor productivity. They attribute these liberalization effects to the role of financial openness in stock market and banking sector development, and to changes in the quality of institutions.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126152024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Stimulating Long-Term Shareholding 鼓励长期持股
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2011-10-05 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1939502
Emeka Duruigbo
{"title":"Stimulating Long-Term Shareholding","authors":"Emeka Duruigbo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1939502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1939502","url":null,"abstract":"This article answers, in the affirmative, two core research questions: do we need long-term shareholders and can we find them? The economy needs long-term shareholders to provide prudent and profitable patient capital, generate an antidote to corporate short-termism and spearhead managerial accountability. Finding these shareholders requires a structure that provides the right environment and incentives for such investment. The article presents a novel application of the trust fund theory – the dominant philosophical paradigm of American corporate finance in the 19th century – as a vehicle for stimulating long-term shareholding. The central features of the reformulated trust fund theory include the creation of relatively illiquid trust securities, a permanent fund financed by the sale of the securities, and long-term shareholders who, in exchange for less liquidity, receive an enhanced voice in corporate governance. Apart from addressing the need for long-term shareholding, the revised trust fund theory will also serve the additional functions of providing creditor protection and assuring regulatory compliance.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117301291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Impact of the Parent Company on the Investment Activity of Capital Group Entities 母公司对资本集团主体投资活动的影响
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2011-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1930973
Hanna Sikacz
{"title":"The Impact of the Parent Company on the Investment Activity of Capital Group Entities","authors":"Hanna Sikacz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1930973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930973","url":null,"abstract":"The paper explains the issues related to the investment policy and capital acquisition variants in a capital group. Operation in this integrated economic structure may increase the capabilities of its participants of acquiring finance for the purpose of executing investment projects. Related entities, apart from external financing related to providing capital from outside the capital group, may take advantage of internal financing in the group. The parent company, which may influence the decisions taken in subordinate companies, plays a significant role connected with planning investments and acquiring funds for their execution. The superior goal of this activity is implementing the strategy of the entire capital group aimed at maximising value for shareholders.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132460889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effect of a Firm’s Information Flow Structure on Credit Rationing 企业信息流结构对信贷配给的影响
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2011-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1881413
A. Soni
{"title":"The Effect of a Firm’s Information Flow Structure on Credit Rationing","authors":"A. Soni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1881413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1881413","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the effects of the way information is produced and transmitted through an organizational structure on the business dynamics of a firm. Specifically, I study its effects on the agency problem, concluding that it proves to be an efficient and effective solution to overcome the adverse effects of credit rationing. It exercises a tighter cap on the amount an agent can extract from the financier for disclosing his private information ex-ante when in equilibrium with his employee structure and in doing so leashes his personal endeavors. One of the consequences of its effect is that external capital markets would prove more effective and efficient in allocating resources under certain specific principal-agent preferences than internal ones.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124938271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Have Rating Agencies Become More Conservative? Implications for Capital Structure and Debt Pricing 评级机构变得更加保守了吗?对资本结构和债务定价的启示
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2011-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1860998
Ramin P. Baghai, H. Servaes, Ane Tamayo
{"title":"Have Rating Agencies Become More Conservative? Implications for Capital Structure and Debt Pricing","authors":"Ramin P. Baghai, H. Servaes, Ane Tamayo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1860998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1860998","url":null,"abstract":"We document that rating agencies have become more conservative in assigning ratings to corporate bonds over the period 1985 to 2009. Holding firm characteristics constant, average ratings have dropped by 3 notches (e.g., from A+ to BBB+) over time. This increased stringency has affected both capital structure and debt spreads. Firms that suffer most from this conservatism issue less debt and have lower leverage. However, their debt spreads are lower compared to the spreads of firms that have not suffered from this conservatism, which implies that the market partly undoes the impact of conservatism on debt prices. This evidence suggests that firms and capital markets do not perceive that the increase in conservatism is fully warranted.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124902835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 259
Timing of Seasoned Equity Offerings: A Duration Analysis 经验丰富的股票发行的时机:一个持续时间分析
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2011-04-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1815421
Hong Qian
{"title":"Timing of Seasoned Equity Offerings: A Duration Analysis","authors":"Hong Qian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1815421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1815421","url":null,"abstract":"Using a sample of 6,198 US firms that went public from 1975-2004, this paper documents that firms often return for a new round of equity issuance shortly after the preceding one. First SEOs following the IPO are more likely to be conducted at a faster speed than subsequent (follow-on) SEOs. Duration analysis shows that recent stock returns and future growth opportunities are important determinants of the timing of SEOs. First SEOs differ from follow-on SEOs in two aspects: (1) Growth opportunities correlated with the overall economic growth are more important for follow-on SEOs than for first SEOs. (2) First SEOs are more driven by the incentive to time the stock market, whereas follow-on SEOs are more driven by growth needs.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127185276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
The Valuation Effect of IPOs: Evidence from the Bond Market ipo的估值效应:来自债券市场的证据
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2011-03-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1782208
Matthew J. Clayton
{"title":"The Valuation Effect of IPOs: Evidence from the Bond Market","authors":"Matthew J. Clayton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1782208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1782208","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the excess bond return in a sample of IPO announcements from 1983-2007 for firms with publicly trade debt. The main finding is that IPO announcements create a positive abnormal bond return. This finding is not driven by reverse LBOs, venture backing, spinoffs or by a reduction in leverage. This is the first paper to document a valuation effect of IPOs, which provides important new evidence on the motivation behind the decision to go public. The result is consistent with the investment and information aggregation theories and inconsistent with the market timing and diversification theories of IPOs.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126620141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Innovations, Rational Exuberance and Investment 创新、理性繁荣与投资
Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2011-03-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1776188
Praveen Kumar, Nisan Langberg
{"title":"Innovations, Rational Exuberance and Investment","authors":"Praveen Kumar, Nisan Langberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1776188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1776188","url":null,"abstract":"We examine information aggregation and capital accumulation when there is structural uncertainty regarding capital productivity at the industry-level and information is revealed strategically through bilateral contracting. Firms enter sequentially and uninformed investors design sequentially rational renegotiation-proof contracts, based on observations of previous contract outcomes, to elicit information from managers with private signals. For an open set of parameters, investors endogenously get \"stuck\" at overoptimistic posterior productivity expectations and the useful information of managers of newly entering firms does not get incorporated in their decisions. Information is therefore not aggregated asymptotically and there is long run over-investment (when the true productivity is low) even though there is bilateral contracting for inducing information revelation.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116641360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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