Corporate Governance: Capital Raising最新文献

Bank Mergers, Acquirer Choice and Small Business Lending: Implications for Community Investment 银行合并、收购方选择和小企业贷款:对社区投资的启示

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3611721

Bernadette A. Minton, Alvaro G. Taboada, Rohan Williamson

引用次数: 1

The CSR Supply Chain Risk Management Hypothesis Evidence from the Suez Canal Ever Given Obstruction 企业社会责任供应链风险管理假说:来自苏伊士运河的证据

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2021-06-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3867169

Eric de Bodt, Jean-Gabriel Cousin, M. Dupire-Declerck

{"title":"The CSR Supply Chain Risk Management Hypothesis Evidence from the Suez Canal Ever Given Obstruction","authors":"Eric de Bodt, Jean-Gabriel Cousin, M. Dupire-Declerck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3867169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3867169","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities help reduce supply chain disruption risks thanks to supply source diversification strategy-building. The Suez Canal obstruction in March 2021 by the Ever Given container ship provides the empirical setup to identify firms exposed to supply management shocks. The intensity of firms’ CSR activities is recorded in the Refinitiv Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) database for a sample of 299 European listed firms. During the first three days of the Ever Given grounding, the portfolio of firms in the lowest quantile of ESG scores experienced negative and statistically significant Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs), in contrast with a portfolio made up of firms in the corresponding highest quintile. This result is consistent with CSR-active firms being less exposed to supply chain disruption risks. Robustness checks (day-by-day abnormal returns, disaggregated ESG scores, sector-specific analyses) and cross-sectional regressions controlling for confounding effects (firm size, valuation, and stock volatility) bring additional support to this interpretation.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"12 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114118773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Price Discovery from Offer Price to Opening Price of Initial Public Offerings 首次公开募股从发行价到开盘价的价格发现

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3874314

Reena Aggarwal, Yanbin Wu

{"title":"Price Discovery from Offer Price to Opening Price of Initial Public Offerings","authors":"Reena Aggarwal, Yanbin Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3874314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3874314","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the price discovery process of initial public offerings (IPOs) from the offer price to the first day’s open price. Stock exchanges have made major changes to the IPO preopening process, and introduced an open auction process in which all investors are able to enter orders and participate in price discovery. The time spent in preopening has increased for IPOs over the years, with an average of 77.23 minutes in 2020. The same pattern is not found for special purpose acquisition (SPAC) offerings. The percentage of the day’s volume executed in the IPO Cross is much higher, at 15.3%, than the approximately 1% for non-IPO stocks. Each phase of preopening contributes to incremental price discovery, with almost all of the price adjustment occurring during preopening. However, for “cold” IPOs, half of the price adjustment takes place after the market opens. Even though participation by retail investors has increased during preopening, their role in price discovery is limited. Our results suggest that institutional investors use the IPO Cross to sell shares. We also find that underwriters take advantage of changes implemented after the Facebook IPO that gave them a bigger role in deciding when to release an IPO for trading.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122009423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

SEBI’s Stewardship Code, 2019 & Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance SEBI的《2019年管理守则》和《公司治理中的机构投资者》

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2021-05-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3853007

Mrinal Aiyappa

引用次数: 0

PRODUCT IMAGE INFLUENCE OF THAILAND JEWELRY ENTERPRISES ON EXPATRIATE’S PURCHASE INTENTION ON GOLD JEWELRY IN THAILAND 泰国珠宝企业产品形象对外籍人士在泰国购买黄金首饰意愿的影响

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2021-04-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3824057

A. Taghipour

引用次数: 0

Quos Custodiunt Custodes? Determinants of Capital Structure Dynamics in Leveraged Buyouts 报价保管人保管人?杠杆收购中资本结构动态的决定因素

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2021-02-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3781879

Sophie Shive, M. Forster

引用次数: 0

The Value of Brand Names in Bank Financing: Evidence from the 1996 Federal Trademark Dilution Act 品牌名称在银行融资中的价值:来自1996年联邦商标稀释法的证据

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2021-01-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3418210

Wan-Chien Chiu, Po-Hsuan Hsu, Chih‐Wei Wang

引用次数: 2

Build of Indicators of Operating Profitablenesses in Projects with Multiple Values IRR. Examples and Comments 多值IRR项目经营盈利指标的构建。示例和注释

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2020-12-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3742385

A. Zhevnyak

{"title":"Build of Indicators of Operating Profitablenesses in Projects with Multiple Values IRR. Examples and Comments","authors":"A. Zhevnyak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3742385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3742385","url":null,"abstract":"The technique of applying the method of replacement credits to build the operating and real profitableness of the investor and recipient in investment projects with multiple (simple and multiple) IRRs value is shown. In each of the replacement credits, the interest rate is chosen equal to one of the IRR values, and the areas of operating profitableness of project participants are defined as the intervals of the discount rate where the discounted amounts of interest payments are positive (for the investor) or negative (for the recipient). In such areas, the operating profitablenesses of project participants are taken equal to the selected IRRs value. As a result, the operating and real profitablenesses of the investor and the recipient are determined in the form of unequivocal piecewise-constant functions. A dynamic interpretation of the areas of operating profitableness as areas of attraction or repulsion of the singular points of a dynamic system with a phase velocity equal to NPV is given. Using a dynamic interpretation allows you to build profitability indicators in the form of piecewise constant functions of the discount rate for investment projects of the most general form solely on the basis of known IRR values.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127401435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Lending Along the Supply Chain 供应链贷款

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3499812

Dan Amiram, Xinlei Li, E. Owens

{"title":"Lending Along the Supply Chain","authors":"Dan Amiram, Xinlei Li, E. Owens","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3499812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3499812","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the fact that economic interconnections among firms are very common, there is little research that examines the equilibrium outcome of such interconnections in credit markets. We examine how supply chain interconnections among borrowers within a lender’s loan portfolio affect equilibrium loan spread and lead arranger share in the syndicated loan market. We find that both loan spread and lead arranger share are significantly lower when the lead arranger has a pre-existing loan with the borrower’s major customer. This finding suggests that such “supply chain loans” ease syndicate participants’ moral hazard concerns more than they exacerbate concerns about adverse selection. We further document that these effects are stronger where syndicate participants’ information asymmetry concerns are more pronounced. Consistent with supply chain loans providing benefits to both the borrower and lead arranger, we provide evidence that a borrower is more likely to obtain a loan from a lender who already has an existing loan with its key customer. Our findings provide insights into the mechanisms through which supply chain interdependencies, and more generally, economic relationships, affect debt markets.","PeriodicalId":321552,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Capital Raising","volume":"349 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126684090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Credit Default Swaps and Debt Overhang 信用违约互换和债务积压

Corporate Governance: Capital Raising Pub Date : 2020-11-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2959302

Tak-Yuen Wong, Jin Yu

引用次数: 13