{"title":"President's Message","authors":"Charles Muniak","doi":"10.56094/jss.v55i1.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v55i1.48","url":null,"abstract":"For the past few years there has been a good deal of discussion of a desired future state of the International System Safety Society. This future state which is the “There” I refer to in the title of this article, includes several things: an ISSS-developed standard, system safety integration into engineering curricula, a safety institute, a system safety certification, obtaining external funding for the Society and a paid staff. The present state (i.e., “Here”) has several characteristics: a very small level of paid staffing, a good number of excellent volunteers (most of whom have very limited time) and a fairly limited amount of financial resources. I do not have a detailed roadmap on how to get from here to there (that will hopefully come out of the ongoing strategic plan effort), but I do have some thoughts on some considerations that I hope are useful to the future EC.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114188203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"System Safety in Healthcare","authors":"D. Raheja, M. Escano","doi":"10.56094/jss.v55i1.51","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v55i1.51","url":null,"abstract":"“You can’t cross the sea merely by standing and staring at the water,” said Rabindranath Tagore, Nobel Prize recipient for literature. Not preventing harm is a practical application of this quote, which serves as an inspirational reminder that people achieve nothing unless they take purposeful action that has measurable results. Taking action on potential human errors so that harm never reaches patients is a productive goal because its impact is highly significant.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128718092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Overview of the Second Edition of ISO 26262: Functional Safety— Road Vehicles","authors":"R. Debouk","doi":"10.56094/jss.v55i1.55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v55i1.55","url":null,"abstract":"Functional safety is of the utmost importance in the development of safety-critical automotive systems, especially with the introduction of driver assist and automated driving systems. ISO 26262: Functional Safety – Road Vehicles, has been the de facto standard for functional safety in the automotive electronics domain since the release of its first edition in 2011. It is currently available in its second edition, published in December 2018. \u0000In this paper, we present an overview of the standard, which applies to all activities during the safety lifecycle of system development. In the concept phase of ISO 26262, the hazard and risk assessment process focuses on identifying possible hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior of electrical/electronic (E/E) safety-related systems and mitigating them through the identification of safety goals. The design phase includes system, hardware, and software development, with requirements developed from the safety goals. ISO 26262 also prescribes the functional safety management activities to be performed during the safety lifecycle and provides requirements for the supporting processes. \u0000In addition to presenting an overview of the standard, this paper highlights some major changes introduced in the second edition of ISO 26262.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129729798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Programmable Logic Device (PLD) Safety Design Approach","authors":"Martin Chizek","doi":"10.56094/jss.v55i1.54","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v55i1.54","url":null,"abstract":"Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs) in ordnance fuze and ignition systems have well-defined design and verification requirements based on U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Safety Review Board guidelines and military standards. However, there are few established safety design and verification requirements for PLDs used in non-fuze safety-significant applications. The primary objective of this paper is to (1) establish a process that assures that PLDs in products and systems are developed and tested to a level of rigor commensurate with the safety risk of the specified application, including fuze and non-fuze safety systems, and (2) to comply with recent guidance from DoD Software System Safety Technical Review Panels on firmware and programmable logic safety assurance. The paper’s secondary objective is to make the PLD safety process applicable to non-DoD and commercial programs such as autonomous vehicles, aerospace and energy systems. To meet this objective, this document incorporates best practices of NASA, commercial aviation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and from international programmable electronic functional safety standards.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129367389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"President's Message","authors":"Charles Muniak","doi":"10.56094/jss.v54i3.58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v54i3.58","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, I was working on an electrical safety issue and came upon an interesting article [Ref 1]. The author describes some research performed from 1936 to 1939 by Baron Whitaker, an electrical engineer at Underwriters Laboratories. Whitaker performed experiments on humans and animals to characterize the injuries that result from electric shock and determine the equipment properties that are needed for safety. The author asserts that this research still stands today and laments that “we don’t do much research anymore,” but instead develop standards based on the “Bunch Of Guys Sitting Around Talking” (BOGSAT) process.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133056330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chasing the Black Swan","authors":"Malcolm Jones","doi":"10.56094/jss.v54i3.63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v54i3.63","url":null,"abstract":"The term “Black Swan” is a familiar concept in the context of high-consequence operations. There is the continual concern that there may be an “as yet” undiscovered flaw or lack of understanding in the design of a product, process or facility that could lead to a catastrophic event. The potential incompleteness in understanding any design concept, implementation and associated assessment is of concern. Given that “absolute confidence” may never be possible, the question becomes how best to continue to search for such possible flaws with a view to subsequent removal or mitigation. At first sight, this appears to be a process without end, but the level of commitment must be balanced against any detrimental consequence that could ensue should a Black Swan exist. But when is “enough is enough?” In this paper, this subject is covered in the context of nuclear warheads, where the Black Swan could indeed be catastrophic should it exist. The paper is framed around what can be learned from the general literature associated with “Black Swan” thinking.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124657593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"TBD","authors":"Charles Hoes","doi":"10.56094/jss.v54i3.61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v54i3.61","url":null,"abstract":"I believe the most important initiative that the International System Safety Society (ISSS) has agreed to undertake is the creation of a new, high-level system safety standard. It seems to me that this new standard should describe the system safety process with enough clarity to provide an “outsider” with a description that lets them understand the philosophy and approach of what we call “system safety.”","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130081252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Speaking Risk With Our Project Managers","authors":"Dustin Nix, J. Fellows, John Hall","doi":"10.56094/jss.v54i3.64","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v54i3.64","url":null,"abstract":"Effective communication between the system safety engineer and the project manager (PM) is an essential characteristic of good risk management in a robust system safety program. However, these two disciplines often use similar terms with disparate meanings that can lead to sub-optimal technical or programmatic outcomes. MIL-STD-882E defines “risk” as “a combination of the severity of the mishap and the probability that the mishap will occur”. The Project Management Book of Knowledge (PMBOK) Guide, 6th Edition, defines “individual project risk” as “an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on one or more project objectives”. \u0000It is incumbent upon the system safety professional to clearly communicate safety-related issues, hazards, risks and concerns using language most likely to be understood by the PM to ensure that he or she has the requisite information to make a sound programmatic decision. This paper explores the discrepancies between project risk management and safety risk management standard processes that hinder clear communication and can drastically impact program performance. We present methods to consider that will improve understanding between the system safety professional and the PM, along with two framework approaches for integrating safety and project risks.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"7 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114118699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Theory of Risk Uncertainty Reduction","authors":"R. Thomas, Marilyn Eichelberger, Missey Lee","doi":"10.56094/jss.v54i2.73","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v54i2.73","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this research is to examine the character of safety programs in not only reducing risk, but also in reducing relative risk uncertainty. This paper approximates the distributions of both the probability and severity of a mishap as lognormal and examines the likely behavior of the co-distribution as the safety process is executed. This paper also shows how differential forces across the risk plane reduce both the risk itself and the relative uncertainty in the risk at the same time. With this new approach, risk now becomes a quantitative item with a known probability distribution, providing a new metric for safety program effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123105936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Safety Versus Survivability","authors":"Gary D. Braman, J. Dowd, Tyler Dorning","doi":"10.56094/jss.v54i2.71","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v54i2.71","url":null,"abstract":"Over the years, people in the defense industry and government have used the terms “system safety” and “survivability” interchangeably. The misunderstanding of these terms has created issues when preparing system safety analysis documents, such as Functional Hazard Assessments (FHA), System Safety Hazard Analysis (SSHA), and Safety Assessment Reports (SAR). In the past, customers have expected that survivability issues will be assessed in these system safety documents. This results in an extensive amount of time to prepare the document and to meet customer expectations. “System safety” is defined as “the design and operational characteristics of a system that minimize the possibilities for accidents or mishaps caused by human error or system failure.” “Survivability” is defined as “the characteristics of a system that prevent fratricide, as well as reduce detectability of the soldier, prevent attack if detected, prevent damage if attacked, minimize medical injury if wounded or otherwise injured, and minimize mental and physical fatigue.” It is clear, though, by these definitions that the two terms are not the same and should not be used interchangeably. This paper will provide indisputable substantiation that system safety and survivability are two distinct domains, and that an assessment of survivability issues is not documented in system safety analyses reports.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122237193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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