{"title":"Safety and Liability Risks for Defense Contractors Entering Commercial Markets","authors":"Martin Chizek","doi":"10.56094/jss.v53i1.101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v53i1.101","url":null,"abstract":"Defense contractors are increasingly seeking commercial customers and markets beyond traditional Department of Defense (DoD) and other government contracts. Commercial markets offer potential advantages such as large and stable customer bases, more predictable income streams and freedom from the burdensome government acquisition process. However, commercial markets pose unique challenges to traditional defense contractors in terms of product safety expectations, legal liability, and risk assessment and mitigation. This paper explores issues and obstacles that a defense contractor safety professional will face when introducing a product into a commercial environment. What commercial safety standards should be used, and what legal protection do they afford? What types of hazard analysis should be performed, and what additional hazard categories should be considered? How can the manufacturer be protected from customer misuse or modification of its products? And, the most vexing question faced by all commercial product designers: How safe is safe enough?","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125596058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Some Legal Considerations of System Safety","authors":"Charles Muniak","doi":"10.56094/jss.v53i1.95","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v53i1.95","url":null,"abstract":"Our work in system safety requires some knowledge of the legal system and liability concepts. The first two technical papers in this issue of Journal of System Safety address some emerging aspects of this topic. Of course, we should always confer with our corporate legal authorities for any specific legal issues with our work.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132083007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"System Safety Matrix Methods","authors":"R. Zito","doi":"10.56094/jss.v52i3.119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v52i3.119","url":null,"abstract":"The analysis of networks is a common feature in system safety analysis. These networks may range from electronic circuits to software flowcharts to maps of land, air, sea and communications traffic. Matrix methods are the natural tool for the analysis of these networks, and the object of this paper is to describe the basics of matrix methods in the context of three common problems encountered by systems safety engineers: the Bent Pin Problem, the Sneak Circuit Problem and the Analysis of Software Logic. Comparison of these analyses will reveal deep connections between these problems and suggest directions for future research.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129992841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Notes on Society History","authors":"Rex B. Gordon","doi":"10.56094/jss.v52i3.117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v52i3.117","url":null,"abstract":"Society old-timers were saddened to learn of the recent passing of Erskine Harton. For those not familiar with the special contributions Erskine has made to the Society, this note is meant to convey a little of what his dedication, initiative and helpful spirit has added to the International System Safety Society. Erskine was an early disciple of system safety in government-funded programs, active in the DC Chapter, elected a Fellow Member and served as Society President from 1987 to 1989. He is best remembered, by those of us who worked with him, for his upbeat attitude and readiness to help out — especially with those setting up new chapters. However, it was his role in the establishment of a permanent headquarters for the Society that Erskine best deserves recognition as a Hero of the ISSS.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116031173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“The Fire” — A Case for System Safety","authors":"Rex B. Gordon","doi":"10.56094/jss.v52i3.116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v52i3.116","url":null,"abstract":"January 27, 1967 is a day that those of us involved with the Apollo 1 program will never forget. This was the day the command module fire at the “Cape” took the lives of three highly trained, experienced astronauts. This mishap occurred during a manned simulated space operation within the Apollo 1 space capsule while it sat atop the unfueled Saturn launch vehicle sitting upright on the launch pad at Cape Canaveral. Because the rocket tanks had only inert gases in them, by NASA safety protocol, this was considered a “non-hazardous” test event.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114677759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"System Safety in Healthcare","authors":"D. Raheja","doi":"10.56094/jss.v52i3.114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v52i3.114","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, I was invited to give my opinion as a patient advocate during a retreat organized by three U.S. federal government groups: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the Office of Health and Human Services. The topic was “Partnership for Patients.” The AHRQ showed data on the significant progress made in the last four years on Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) measures. The data showed that more and more hospitals are achieving higher scores.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124982554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disaster Prevention Through Intelligent Monitoring","authors":"Andy Painting, D. Sanders","doi":"10.56094/jss.v52i3.118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v52i3.118","url":null,"abstract":"Despite various tools and systems that can monitor complex engineering environments, bad things still happen regularly in all types of engineering industries. An intelligent system designed to monitor certain indicators, regardless of engineering industry, that might predict catastrophes would ultimately reduce the potential for loss of human life and property. \u0000In this article, 10 catastrophes were researched to identify their root causes and the various root cause combinations. These documented catastrophes covered a broad spectrum of engineering including oil, gas, nuclear, rail, air and space. The root causes identified in the investigation reports were grouped under 10 trait headings and their efficacy was tested using a qualitative fault tree of a credible catastrophic failure scenario. Each trait was adjusted to signify various levels of failure and fed into the prototype system representing the fault tree. \u0000While near real-time monitoring and trend analysis was investigated and shown to support an intelligent system that might predict catastrophe, one of the surprising additional results from the research was highlighting the need to standardize the approach to investigative reports and audits of existing systems. Reporting in the same “technical language” and looking for specific condition levels for each of the traits could provide a true picture of asset condition and the required funding prioritization, as well as assisting the dissemination of findings to all engineering industries.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"2 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120872316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"System Safety in Healthcare","authors":"D. Raheja","doi":"10.56094/jss.v52i2.123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v52i2.123","url":null,"abstract":"The popular theory that human error, such as making the wrong diagnosis, operating on the wrong body part or administering the wrong medication, in itself causes harm to patients may not always be completely true. According to system safety theory and the “Swiss Cheese” theory of healthcare, at least two things have to go wrong for harm to occur. Usually, the primary cause is a poorly designed care system that allows human errors to happen. Each weakness in the system is called a “hazard.” A human error is a trigger event that finally results in the harm. Therefore, human error is a symptom of a poorly designed system, not necessarily the primary cause of harm. Using the analogy of a gun, the loaded gun is a hazard, while pulling the trigger can result in harm. If the gun is not loaded, the trigger (human error) is not an issue.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"388 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121781325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Developing System Safety Engineers for the Future","authors":"Charles Muniak","doi":"10.56094/jss.v52i2.129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v52i2.129","url":null,"abstract":"The 2016 ISSC took place in Orlando, Florida where, in addition to tutorials, roundtables and paper presentations (see page 45), those in attendance networked with their fellow professionals from around the world to share their ideas, find solutions to challenges, and get better prepared for engineering safety for the future. \u0000Highlights of the 34th International System Safety Conference","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129728767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"System Safety in Organizational Safety Decision Making","authors":"Malcolm Jones","doi":"10.56094/jss.v52i2.126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v52i2.126","url":null,"abstract":"The two cardinal aspects of safety are intrinsic safety and its demonstration. A key element of demonstrating system safety is the organizational structure that is best placed to ensure and demonstrate that high standards of safety are clearly in place for its products, processes and facilities. This is particularly important for high-consequence industries. Accomplishing this depends on a number of organizational integrated layers of scrutiny, ranging from the accumulation of arguments and evidence at the lower levels to final executive decision making. The latter holds final responsibility and accountability. Potential problems arise because products, processes and facilities are becoming more and more complex and the associated supporting data inordinately large. In turn, the organizational processes that enable top-level decision makers to make wise and informed decisions are themselves becoming more complex and difficult. This final stage requires clear and transparent communication. \u0000Organizations have moved more towards the application of peer review to support final decision making but, nevertheless, one still expects the final decision-making layer to provide further independent scrutiny to enhance overall confidence in the process. This would represent a three-tier independent process — strength in depth. This is the subject of the paper.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116998574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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