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The Job Market for Teachers in Italy: The AlmaLaurea Documentation 意大利教师的就业市场:AlmaLaurea文件
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2010-01-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1532725
A. Cammelli, F. Ferrante, S. Ghiselli
{"title":"The Job Market for Teachers in Italy: The AlmaLaurea Documentation","authors":"A. Cammelli, F. Ferrante, S. Ghiselli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1532725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1532725","url":null,"abstract":"The ALMALAUREA database offers broad documentation on the characteristics of university graduates who opted for a teaching career one year, three years and five years after their degree, forming a representative sample of Italian school teachers. This essay offers both a descriptive analysis of the data on the characteristics of the groups examined and some deeper study to bring out more specifically the ways in which the features of university trained teachers differ from those of other university graduates. The underlying behavioral hypothesis is that educational and vocational choices depend not only on individuals’ social and cultural background but are also shaped by economic and socio-cultural motivations. The intent of the in-depth study is to determine the distinctive traits of the various groups of teachers, deliberately selected for uniformity with respect to their educational careers and consequently their employment chances.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127409314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model 一个重复博弈异构agent工资发布模型
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2009-08-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1443224
M. Steinbacher, Matjaž Steinbacher, M. Steinbacher
{"title":"A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model","authors":"M. Steinbacher, Matjaž Steinbacher, M. Steinbacher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1443224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443224","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of particular employer is positively correlated with employer’s productivity level and the wage policy of the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133842731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Emergence of English Commercial Law: Analysis Inspired by Ottoman Experience 英国商法的产生:奥斯曼经验启发的分析
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2008-09-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1266403
Daniel Klerman
{"title":"The Emergence of English Commercial Law: Analysis Inspired by Ottoman Experience","authors":"Daniel Klerman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1266403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1266403","url":null,"abstract":"Thirteenth-century England was a commercial backwater whose trade was dominated by foreigners. To accommodate and encourage foreign merchants, England modified its legal system by creating legal institutions which were available to both domestic and foreign traders. Among the most important of these institutions were streamlined debt collection procedures and mixed juries composed of both Englishmen and foreigners. By introducing institutions which treated locals and foreigners equally, England created a level playing field which enabled English merchants to become increasingly prominent in the later Middle Ages. England's ability to modernize its law was facilitated by the secular nature of English law, the representation of merchants in Parliament, and legal pluralism. Medieval England contrasts sharply with the early modern Ottoman Empire. The latter created special institutions for foreign merchants, which eventually put Ottoman Muslims at a competitive disadvantage.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133083351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Disappearance of Deposit Banks: An Explanation 存款银行的消失:一种解释
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2007-06-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2314507
Carolyn Sissoko
{"title":"The Disappearance of Deposit Banks: An Explanation","authors":"Carolyn Sissoko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2314507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2314507","url":null,"abstract":"This paper asks why deposit banks thrived in the late Middle Ages, but had virtually disappeared by 1600 and studies banking in Venice in order to answer the question. A model is developed that shows that a partial reserve banking system is an efficient means of allocating investment funds only if the returns from long-term investment are sufficient both to compensate the banker for the costs of running a bank and to offer depositors a return over what they can receive through market allocation. Thus the collapse of deposit banking in Venice can be explained by the fact that in the 16th c. the costs of operating deposit banks remained high, while the returns from long term investment declined.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134053895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Quality of Law: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the Evolution of Law 法律的质量:司法激励、法律人力资本与法律的演进
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2007-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.967494
Gillian K. Hadfield
{"title":"The Quality of Law: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the Evolution of Law","authors":"Gillian K. Hadfield","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.967494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967494","url":null,"abstract":"Much of the existing literature investigating the relationship between legal regimes and economic growth focuses on the agency problem of aligning judicial incentives with social welfare and is relatively free of institutional detail beyond abstractions about common law and civil code regimes. In this paper I look instead at the detailed institutional factors that influence the quality of law when judges have incentives to promote social welfare but they have limited knowledge about the environment in which law is to be applied. The key insight is that the capacity for a legal regime to generate value-enhancing legal adaptation to local and changing conditions depends on its capacity to generate and implement adequate expertise about the environment in which law is applied. The central mechanism of adaptation is the interaction among three factors: 1) judicial incentives for rule-following and rule-adaptation, 2) litigant incentives for investing in costly evidence and innovative legal argument and 3) the accumulation of shared legal human capital - defined as the sum of litigant investments in evidence and argument - which determines the systemic likelihood of judicial error.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"60 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113970129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Institutions and Popular Control of Public Policy 制度和公众对公共政策的控制
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2006-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.946828
J. Matsusaka
{"title":"Institutions and Popular Control of Public Policy","authors":"J. Matsusaka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.946828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.946828","url":null,"abstract":"In democracy, public opinion is supposed to influence policymaking, yet evidence on the amount of congruence between policy and opinion, or the factors that affect congruence, is scarce. This paper constructs a simple measure of policy congruence on 10 separate issues in all 50 states. For these policies, states chose the outcome favored by the majority 59 percent of the time, only 9 percent more often than would happen with random policymaking. Congruence was approximately 17 to 19 percent higher when initiatives, a form of direct democracy, were allowed. Congruence was 12 to 14 percent lower when judges were not required to stand for reelection. Congruence was not correlated with a variety of election laws, including campaign contribution limits, public funding of campaigns, and commission-based redistricting.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133974961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Behavioral Economics and Fundamental Tax Reform 行为经济学与基本税收改革
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2006-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.899302
Edward J. McCaffery
{"title":"Behavioral Economics and Fundamental Tax Reform","authors":"Edward J. McCaffery","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.899302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.899302","url":null,"abstract":"The most common use of the insights of behavioral economics in the cause of fundamental tax reform has been to argue for the employment of ad hoc tax-favored savings vehicles - such as individual retirement accounts (IRAs), medical, and educational savings accounts, and so on - within an income-tax framework. There is no reason under a rational life-cycle model of individual savings behavior why these ad hoc vehicles should work, to increase savings on the micro (individual) or macro (collective social) levels, whether they follow the postpaid approach of traditional IRAs or the prepaid approach of Roth IRAs. Prepaid accounts generate a windfall gain to existing savers, and offer no cash-flow relief for current non-savers to help them save. Postpaid accounts can be easily arbitraged by borrowing, or dissaving. Proponents of these plans thus point to lessons from behavioral economics, arguing that myopic individuals who use mental accounts might be led to save by the special vehicles. This essay takes exception to this standard view. It argues that this view of matters misconceives basic principles of behavioral economics, using ad hoc findings in an ad hoc fashion to justify ad hoc, incremental reform. Best understood, behavioral economics suggests that ad hoc tax favored plans will not work. This counter-theory is supported by the data, which show, broadly, decades of ad hoc tax-favored vehicles within the Internal Revenue Code, with more apparently on the way, matched by convincing evidence of little or no savings by most Americans, and little savings in the aggregate. The essay concludes by suggesting that a happier, more stable marriage of behavioral economics and fundamental tax reform suggests fundamental, not incremental, reform of the tax system.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134162247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution 信息、诉讼与普通法演变
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2006-03-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.710301
Keith N. Hylton
{"title":"Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution","authors":"Keith N. Hylton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.710301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.710301","url":null,"abstract":"It is common in the legal academy to describe judicial decision trends leading to new common law rules as resulting from conscious judicial effort. Evolutionary models of litigation, in contrast, treat common law as resulting from pressure applied by litigants. One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaining how trends in judicial decisions favoring one litigant, and biasing the legal standard, could occur. This article presents a model in which an apparent bias in the legal standard can occur in the absence of any effort toward this end on the part of judges. Trends can develop favoring the better-informed litigant whose case is also meritorious. Although the model does not suggest an unambiguous trend toward efficient legal rules, it does show how private information from litigants becomes embodied in common law, an important part of the theory of efficient legal rules.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126133574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 45
A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance 影响理论:公众无知的战略价值
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.660401
I. Brocas, J. Carrillo
{"title":"A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance","authors":"I. Brocas, J. Carrillo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.660401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.660401","url":null,"abstract":"We analyse an agency model where one individual decides how much evidence he collects. We assume that he has free access to information, but all the news acquired becomes automatically public. Conditional on the information disclosed, a second individual with conflicting preferences undertakes an action that affects the payoff of both agents. In this game of incomplete but symmetric information, we show that the first individual obtains rents due to his superior ability to decide whether to collect or forego evidence, i.e., due to his control in the generation of (public) information. We provide an analytical characterization of these rents, that we label ‘rents of public ignorance’. They can be interpreted as, for example, the degree of influence that a chairman can exert on a committee due exclusively to his capacity to decide whether to keep discussions alive or terminate them and call a vote. Last, we show that similar insights are obtained if the agent decides first how much private information he collects and then how much of this information he transmits to the other agent.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116470123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Maximum Score Estimation of a Nonstationary Binary Choice Model 非平稳二元选择模型的最大分数估计
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.425522
H. Moon
{"title":"Maximum Score Estimation of a Nonstationary Binary Choice Model","authors":"H. Moon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.425522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.425522","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the estimation of a simple binary choice model in which explanatory variables include nonstationary variables and the distribution of the model is not known. We find a set of conditions under which the coefficients of the nonstationary variables are identified. We show that the maximum score estimator of the nonstationary coefficients is consistent.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134490441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
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