一个重复博弈异构agent工资发布模型

University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2009-08-03 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1443224

M. Steinbacher, Matjaž Steinbacher, M. Steinbacher

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中，我们模拟了Montgomery(1991)导出的工资发布模型的异质代理版本，其中包括同质工人和不同生产率的雇主。特定雇主的工资政策与雇主的生产率水平和竞争对手的工资政策呈正相关。然而，这是一个生产力较低的雇主，其工资也可能超过一个生产力较高的雇主，尽管只是暂时的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model

In the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of particular employer is positively correlated with employer’s productivity level and the wage policy of the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily.

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University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series

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