University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series最新文献

{"title":"Conditions for Framework Legislation","authors":"E. Garrett","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.588901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.588901","url":null,"abstract":"Congress structures some of its deliberation and decision-making through framework legislation. Framework laws establish internal procedures and rules that will shape legislative deliberation and voting with respect to a specific subset of laws or decisions in the future. Although framework laws are passed in statutory form, the portions of the laws that set out internal frameworks are usually identified as exercises of the two houses' constitutional rulemaking powers, and the right of either house to change the framework unilaterally is, in most cases, explicitly reserved. Framework laws are familiar, although little scholarly attention has been paid to them as a related legislative phenomenon in the United States. I specify some of the conditions that are necessary for the adoption of framework laws. In Part I, I present two necessary conditions that make it possible for Congress to use a framework law to deal with a set of particular decisions defined in the framework. Even when these conditions are present, Congress may decline to use the option of a framework, but without the two conditions, a framework is not an option for lawmakers. First, Congress must be able to identify a concrete problem and describe it with specificity so that the framework can be triggered in appropriate circumstances. Second, the partisan configuration of Congress is significant in several ways to the adoption of framework laws, although further empirical work focused on each of the two houses is required to specify this condition more fully. In Part II, I assess three conditions that could lead Congress to choose the statutory path with respect to framework laws, rather than using an internal vehicle like a concurrent or simple resolution. First, Congress may use a statute to signal that it is making a significant change in the way it does business and that it perceives the change as more durable than other rule changes. I conclude that this has little explanatory power. Second, and most importantly, Congress will use a statute when the internal procedural change is an integral part of a larger package that must be adopted simultaneously and contains some parts that must be enacted with legal effect. In many cases, the framework is part of a larger \"inter-branch treaty\" that affects both houses of Congress and the executive branch, often with provisions delegating authority to the President. This is a necessary condition for enactment of frameworks. Finally, path dependency and institutional learning play a role, so that when an area like budgeting or trade begins to be characterized by rulemaking statutes, then future changes also tend to be adopted by statute. This is a plausibility condition, making it more likely that internal rules will be adopted by statute, but it is not a necessary condition.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126912353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Expanding Discrimination Research: Moving Beyond Ethnicity and to the Web","authors":"T. Kuran, Edward J. McCaffery","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.383001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.383001","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to expand research about perceptions of discrimination both substantively and methodologically beyond the domains of race and ethnicity, relying partly on web-based surveys. Copyright (c) 2004 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131114623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contract Law is Not Enough: The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments","authors":"Gillian K. Hadfield","doi":"10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134147292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Market Design with Endogenous Preferences","authors":"A. Heifetz, Ella Segev, E. Talley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.536962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.536962","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the interdependence between market structure and an important class of extra-rational cognitive biases. Starting with a familiar bilateral monopoly framework, we characterize the endogenous emergence of preference distortions during bargaining which cause negotiators to perceive their private valuations differently than they would outside the adversarial negotiation context. Using this model, we then demonstrate how a number of external interventions in the structure and/or organization of market interactions (occurring before trade, after trade, or during negotiations themselves) can profoundly alter the nature of these dispositions. Our results demonstrate that many such interventions frequently (though not always) share qualitatively similar characteristics to market interventions that are often proposed for overcoming more conventional forms of market failure. Nevertheless, our analysis underscores the importance of understanding the precise link between cognitive failures and market structure prior to the implementation any particular proposed reform.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115544681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose?: Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of 'Decoupling'","authors":"A. Choi, C. Sanchirico","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.304193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304193","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a 1991 paper, Polinsky and Che argue that lowering plaintiffs’ recovery and raising defendants’ damages can deliver the same level of deterrence with fewer filed suits. A subsequent paper by Kahan and Tuckman provisionally corroborates Polinsky and Che’s analysis in an extended model that accounts for the effect of litigation states on litigation effort levels. In contrast, we show that when litigation effort is endogenous, Polinsky and Che’s proposal to lower recovery and raise damages may no longer improve social welfare. We then characterize the kinds of suits where it is in fact suboptimal to set recovery below damages. Of significance for the current policy debate, we find that such suits share many of the empirical premises about litigation that ground conventional arguments in favor of making recovery less than damages. Our findings are robust to the possibility of out‐of‐court settlement, plaintiffs’ employment of contingent‐fee lawyers, and alternative fee‐shifting rules.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"160 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115995594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions","authors":"K. Hendricks, R. Porter, G. Tan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.475584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.475584","url":null,"abstract":"This paper extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value environments, and applies the theory to explain joint bidding patterns in U.S. federal government offshore oil and gas lease auctions. We show that efficient collusion is always possible in private value environments, but may not be in common value environments. In the latter case, fear of the winner's curse can cause bidders not to bid, which leads to inefficient trade. Buyers with high signals may be better off if no one colludes. The bid data is consistent with oil and gas leases being common value assets, and with the prediction that the winner's curse can prevent rings from forming on marginal tracts.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"30 23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125105251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach","authors":"Roberto A. Weber, Colin Camerer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.276288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.276288","url":null,"abstract":"We use laboratory experiments to explore merger failure due to conflicting organizational cultures. We introduce a laboratory paradigm for studying organizational culture that captures several key elements of the phenomenon. In our experiments, we allow subjects in \"firms\" to develop a culture, and then merge two firms. As expected, performance decreases following the merging of two laboratory firms. In addition, subjects overestimate the performance of the merged firm and attribute the decrease in performance to members of the other firm rather than to situational difficulties created by conflicting culture.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124224493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Testing for a Unit Root in Panels with Dynamic Factors","authors":"H. Moon, B. Perron","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.400720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.400720","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies testing for a unit root for large n and T panels in which the cross-sectional units are correlated. To model this cross-sectional correlation, we assume that the data is generated by an unknown number of unobservable common factors. We propose unit root tests in this environment and derive their (Gaussian) asymptotic distribution under the null hypothesis of a unit root and local alternatives. We show that these tests have significant asymptotic power when the model has no incidental trends. However, when there are incidental trends in the model and it is necessary to remove heterogeneous deterministic components, we show that these tests have no power against the same local alternatives. Through Monte Carlo simulations, we provide evidence on the finite sample properties of these new tests.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"47 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126860007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle","authors":"J. Laffont, J. S. Marcus, P. Rey, J. Tirole","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.340620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.340620","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a framework for Internet backbone competition. In the absence of direct payments between websites and consumers, the access charge allocates communication costs between websites and consumers and affects the volume of traffic. We analyze the impact of the access charge on competitive strategies in an unregulated retail environment. In a remarkably broad range of environments, operators set prices for their customers as if their customers' traffic were entirely off-net. We then compare the socially optimal access charge with the privately desirable one. Finally, when websites charge micropayments, or sell goods and services, the impact of the access charge on welfare is reduced; in particular, the access charge is neutral in a range of circumstances. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127779328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Simple Rules for Simple Courts: Specific Performance, Expectation Damages and Hybrid Mechanisms","authors":"Richard R. W. Brooks","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.304187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304187","url":null,"abstract":"Arguments for and against property rules (roughly equitable remedies) and liability rules (legal remedies) have been largely based on efficiency considerations. Courts can clearly determine efficient remedies when they are sufficiently informed about the valuations of parties. However, courts are rarely so well informed and thus they guess (often incorrectly) which remedy will lead to an efficient outcome. This research presents conditions where uninformed courts can reach efficient outcomes using simple direct mechanisms, mechanisms that are essentially hybrids of equitable and legal remedies. The principal result here is that a court does not have to guess when it can effectively harness the private information possessed by other parties. This result holds even though the court does not actually acquire the private information, though it does require that one of the litigating parties observe some of the other party's information.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121090987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}