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University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series最新文献

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A Note on the Nonstationary Binary Choice Logit Model 关于非平稳二元选择Logit模型的一个注记
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2002-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.299561
E. Guerre, H. Moon
{"title":"A Note on the Nonstationary Binary Choice Logit Model","authors":"E. Guerre, H. Moon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.299561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.299561","url":null,"abstract":"This paper derives the rate and the asymptotic distribution of the MLE of the parameter of a logit model with a nonstationary covariate when the true parameter is zero. The limit distribution of the t-statistic is also given.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123352630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information 软信息的串通、委托与监督
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2002-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.279522
Antoine Faure-Grimaud, J. Laffont, D. Martimort
{"title":"Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information","authors":"Antoine Faure-Grimaud, J. Laffont, D. Martimort","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.279522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.279522","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever supervisors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds then to derive an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. We consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent's type. In a centralized organization, the principal can communicate and contract with both the supervisor and the agent. However, these two agents can collude against the principal. In a decentralized organization, the principal only communicates and contracts with the supervisor who in turn sub-contracts with the agent. We show that the two organizations achieve the same outcome. We discuss this equivalence and provide various comparative statics results to assess the efficiency of supervisory structures. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124219297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 223
The Singularity of the Efficiency Bound of the Mixed Proportional Hazard Model 混合比例风险模型效率界的奇异性
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2001-11-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.290119
G. Ridder, Tiemen Woutersen
{"title":"The Singularity of the Efficiency Bound of the Mixed Proportional Hazard Model","authors":"G. Ridder, Tiemen Woutersen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.290119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.290119","url":null,"abstract":"We reconsider the efficiency bound for the semi-parametric Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) model with parametric baseline hazard and regression function. This bound was first derived by Hahn (1994). One of his results is that if the baseline hazard is Weibull, the efficiency bound is singular, even if the model is semi-parametrically identified. This implies that neither the Weibull parameter nor the regression coefficients can be estimated at the root N rate. We show that Hahn's results are confined to a class of models that is closed under the power transformation. The Weibull model is the most prominent model of this class. We also present a new nonparametric identification result. This identification results allows for infinite mean of the mixing distribution and ensures that the efficiency bound is nonsingular. This implies that root N estimation is possible.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"212 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116155774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Mechanism Design and Communication Costs 机制设计与沟通成本
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2001-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.304198
R. Deneckere, S. Severinov
{"title":"Mechanism Design and Communication Costs","authors":"R. Deneckere, S. Severinov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.304198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304198","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on implementation issues in environments where it may be costly for the players to send certain messages. We develop an approach allowing to characterize the set of implementable outcomes in such environments, and then apply it to derive optimal mechanisms. The key elements of our approach are the absence of any restrictions on the communication structure in a mechanism and the ability of the principal to screen the agents not only on the basis of their preferences over the outcomes, but also on the basis of their communication abilities. A number of interesting implications for the monopoly regulation, signaling and screening is derived. In particular, we show that a monopoly may not want to exclude low-valuation consumers if some consumers in the population are not able to misrepresent their valuations, and why the employers may prefer to screen applicants via multiple rounds of interviews rather than via menus of contracts. Our findings also provide a justification for privacy laws.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127541060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 40
Corruption and the Optimal Use of Non-Monetary Sanctions 腐败与非货币制裁的最佳使用
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2001-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.276117
Nuno Garoupa, Daniel Klerman
{"title":"Corruption and the Optimal Use of Non-Monetary Sanctions","authors":"Nuno Garoupa, Daniel Klerman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.276117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.276117","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents a model of non-monetary sanctions with corruption. It is a well-known result in the law enforcement literature that in the absence of corruption, non-monetary sanctions, such as imprisonment, should be imposed infrequently. We show that, in the presence of corruption, it is still sometimes optimal to use non-monetary sanctions. In fact, it may be optimal to use them more often. Corruption transforms a non-monetary sanction into a monetary bribe. While this reduces deterrence, it also lowers the social cost of non-monetary sanctions, because they are seldom actually imposed. In addition, non-monetary sanctions can be beneficial in a corrupt environment, because they allow officials to extract higher bribes, thus restoring some deterrence.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126663790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Profit Centers and Incentives in Teams 团队中的利润中心和激励机制
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2001-05-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.272609
A. Mariño, Ján Zábojník
{"title":"Profit Centers and Incentives in Teams","authors":"A. Mariño, Ján Zábojník","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.272609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.272609","url":null,"abstract":"Standard models of team production imply that, due to the free rider problem, profit sharing tends to have negligible incentive effects in large organizations. Many observers therefore find the use of profit sharing in large firms puzzling. In this paper we show that if a firm can be decomposed into two separate teams whose outputs can be observed, then a tournament between these two teams sometimes solves the free rider problem. Moreover, we show that the relationship between production risk and the strength of incentives in an optimal tournament contract can be positive, contrary to the standard conclusion that optimal contracts should exhibit a trade-off between risk and uncertainty. We use our efficiency results to endogenize the firm's organizational structure. In particular, we show that in the presence of economies of scale, small firms tend to be organized as unitary firms, while large firms will tend to choose the multidivisional organizational form.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122675306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Holdup and the Evolution of Bargaining Conventions 拖延与议价惯例的演变
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2001-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.277910
H. Dawid, W. Macleod
{"title":"Holdup and the Evolution of Bargaining Conventions","authors":"H. Dawid, W. Macleod","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.277910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.277910","url":null,"abstract":"As Posner (1997) has observed, when individuals in a relationship can commit to imposing costs upon each other then efficient behavior in the absence of law is possible. The question is whether efficient norms of behavior evolve endogenously in a population. We show that in a standard hold up model in which both parties make relationship specific investments the long run outcome of a stochastic adaptation process similar to Young's (1993) 'adaptive play' does not in general correspond to the efficient equilibria. As Grossman and Hart (1986) observe, institutions, such as firms, may be needed to improve the allocation of resources.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130595938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms 信息与企业最优股权结构
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2001-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.304202
Niko Matouschek
{"title":"Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms","authors":"Niko Matouschek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.304202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304202","url":null,"abstract":"I develop a property rights theory of the firm in which managers bargain over the sharing of quasi-rents in the presence of private information. I analyse the interdependence between the ownership structure of firms and the bargaining inefficiency that is due to the presence of private information and derive the optimal ownership structure that minimizes the bargaining inefficiency. I first assume that managers can only contract over the ownership structure and show that they optimally choose one that minimizes (maximizes) their aggregate disagreement pay-off if the minimum expected quasi-rents are large (small). I then extend my analysis and allow the managers to contract over the ownership structure and the bargaining game that is played ex-post. I show that the main results continue to hold if and only if ownership structures are deterministic and cannot be made contingent on information that is revealed ex-post.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115527038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
The Influence of Capital Structure on the Value of Public Companies in Chemical Industry 资本结构对化工上市公司价值的影响
University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3105478
E. Markovskaya, Anna Bitiukova
{"title":"The Influence of Capital Structure on the Value of Public Companies in Chemical Industry","authors":"E. Markovskaya, Anna Bitiukova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3105478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3105478","url":null,"abstract":"The study is about the influence of the financial leverage and its square term on the value of a firm in chemical industry in different parts of the world. The maximizing of the value of a firm is considered to be one of the main goals of business activity of any company. Thus, the management needs to choose different strategies including financing one that raise firm’s value. For that the relationship between firm’s value and its financial leverage needs to be known as specifically as possible. In the study these specifications include country and industry differences. The panel data analysis of public chemical companies in five parts of the world is used to reveal the types and signs of this influence. It is shown that the financial leverage and its square term have opposite influence on the value of a firm for the whole sample as well as the companies in different parts of the world. This means that small and big amounts of debt have different effect on firm’s value. The influence is not the same in different parts of the world. The companies in Europe, Asia and Africa would better follow the pecking order theory of financing and the companies in North and South America – the trade-off theory for choosing best financing strategies in order to maximize the value of firms.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127389868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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