拖延与议价惯例的演变

H. Dawid, W. Macleod
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引用次数: 17

摘要

正如波斯纳(1997)所观察到的,当一段关系中的个体能够承诺给彼此施加成本时,那么在没有法律的情况下,有效的行为是可能的。问题是,有效的行为规范是否在一个群体中是内生进化的。我们表明,在一个标准的搁置模型中,双方都进行关系特定投资,随机适应过程的长期结果与Young(1993)相似。“适应性游戏”通常并不符合有效均衡。正如格罗斯曼和哈特(1986)所观察到的那样,企业等机构可能需要改善资源配置。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Holdup and the Evolution of Bargaining Conventions
As Posner (1997) has observed, when individuals in a relationship can commit to imposing costs upon each other then efficient behavior in the absence of law is possible. The question is whether efficient norms of behavior evolve endogenously in a population. We show that in a standard hold up model in which both parties make relationship specific investments the long run outcome of a stochastic adaptation process similar to Young's (1993) 'adaptive play' does not in general correspond to the efficient equilibria. As Grossman and Hart (1986) observe, institutions, such as firms, may be needed to improve the allocation of resources.
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