University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series最新文献

{"title":"An Empirical Analysis of the Queuing Theory and Customer Satisfaction: Application in Small and Medium Enterprises – A Case Study of Croc Foods Restaurant","authors":"W. G. Bonga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2348304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2348304","url":null,"abstract":"Fundamental business principles are very critical to the growth and survival of the business. Waiting in line or queue causes inconvenience to customers and economic costs to firms. Queuing theory is a mathematical approach to the study of waiting in lines/queues. The study presents the results of a study that evaluates the effectiveness of a queuing model in identifying the restaurant queuing system efficiency parameters. It uses Little’s Theorem to analyze data collected from Croc Foods Restaurant in Beitbridge over a three-week period. The study showed that on average 60 customers arrive every hour and the service rate is 84 customers per hour. Using the Queuing Theory calculator, the system utilization factor was 71.43%, the probability of zero customers waiting 0.2857, average number of customers waiting 1.782 and average waiting time 0.0298 hours. The study compared the single server model against multi-server model and concluded that M/M/1 model was not the best for Croc Foods restaurant.Using a questionnaire of 171 respondents, the study found out that about 43.3% of customers are not satisfied about the nature of waiting lines and about 69% customers have at least turned away at regular occasions due to the queues. The long term value of existing customers should not be overlooked; constant check for their changing needs and improvement in the time spent when serving them has been emphasized by the study.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125337031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis","authors":"M. Bradley, G. Gulati","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1948534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1948534","url":null,"abstract":"One of the primary policy initiatives instituted in response to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is a requirement that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013 include provisions referred to as Collective Action Clauses or CACs. These CACs are intended to enable an orderly restructuring of distressed sovereign debt by allowing for a super-majority of creditors to impose restructuring terms on minority holdouts. This paper assesses the likely effect of this proposal on the borrowing costs of Eurozone countries. Economic theory makes ambiguous predictions: on the one hand, making debt easier (cheaper) to restructure could increase the propensity of governments to borrow irresponsibly, which would increase the cost of capital; on the other hand, if restructurings proceed more smoothly, creditors will receive a settlement more quickly, which would reduce the cost of capital. Since this is ultimately an empirical issue, we have assembled a database consisting of over 900 sovereign bonds, issued by more than 75 countries, from 1990 through 2010. Relying on this database we demonstrate that the majority of the existing literature is based on inadequate or inappropriate data, which has led researchers to conclude that the inclusion of a CAC either has no effect or increases the cost of capital for weaker nations and decreases the cost of capital for stronger ones. In contrast, we find that the presence of CACs leads to a lower, not higher, cost of capital, especially for below-investment grade bonds.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134449364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dual Citizenship Institution: A Pareto Improvement?","authors":"Djoulassi K. Oloufade, Roland Pongou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2237761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2237761","url":null,"abstract":"The right to hold dual citizenship is an important political institution that is being adopted by an increasing number of countries. We argue that this right can generate important social and economic benefits beyond its political dimension. Dual citizenship recognition by a country allows members of its diaspora who are citizens of their host countries to retain several legal advantages in their homelands, including unrestricted residency and easy access to investment opportunities, and provides multiple incentives to maintain ties with family, friends and communities, therefore facilitating the development of transnational solidarity and business networks. We assemble a large panel dataset on dual citizenship, and exploit cross-country and cross-time variation in the timing of dual citizenship recognition to estimate its economic impacts. We consider outcomes that reflect cross-national economic activities and so can be directly influenced by the diaspora, and those that would improve as a result of an improvement in the former. We find that in developing countries, dual citizenship recognition favors international labor mobility, increases foreign remittance inflows, increases household consumption, and improves child survival. Additionally, dual citizenship is more effective in improving child survival than other institutional variables such as government stability and the absence of internal and external conflicts. In developed countries, dual citizenship recognition encourages international labor mobility, increases international trade, attracts foreign investment, and raises household consumption. Furthermore, members of the diaspora residing in dual-citizenship-granting countries positively affect economic outcomes in their origin countries. In falsification tests, we find no effect of dual citizenship recognition on outcomes not likely to be affected by the diaspora, including public spending on health and education, which also shows that the diaspora plays little role in homeland politics.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114882959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is the Role of Tort to Repair Wrongful Losses?","authors":"Gregory C. Keating","doi":"10.5040/9781472561077.ch-013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472561077.ch-013","url":null,"abstract":"For more than a generation, corrective justice theories of tort have been the principal alternative to economic theories. Corrective justice conceptions claim (as Jules Coleman, a leading corrective justice theorist puts it) that “tort law is best explained by corrective justice” because “at its core tort law seeks to repair wrongful losses.” This thesis encapsulates a powerful critique of the economic theory of tort. That theory is committed to a relentlessly forward-looking conception of the institution. On the economic account, tort is a mechanism for inducing actors whose activities put others at risk of injury to minimize the combined costs of accidents and their prevention. It does so by placing responsibility for repairing past losses on those actors who are the “cheapest cost-avoiders.” The “cheapest cost-avoiders” are those who are in the best position to minimize the combined costs of accidents and their prevention. Because past costs can no longer be affected, this criterion looks forward and only forward. It therefore misconceives the point of tort adjudication. Tort adjudication looks backwards and assigns responsibility for repairing harm wrongly done. Tort adjudication holds tortfeasors liable to those they have wronged for the losses that they have wrongly inflicted because they are responsible for having wrongly inflicted those losses on those victims. Corrective justice theory thus articulates a powerful critique of the economic theory of tort. That critique, however, spawns its own misconception of tort law. Corrective justice theory puts the cart before the horse and misconceives tort as an essentially remedial institution. Tort is a law of wrongs, not just a law of redress for wrongs. Logically and normatively, obligations of repair are dependent on primary obligations not to wrong others in the first instance. Logically, remedial responsibilities are conditioned on and arise out of failures to discharge primary responsibilities. Normatively, primary responsibilities provide the reason for honoring remedial responsibilities and largely determine the shape of remedial responsibilities. Repairing harm wrongly done is the next best way of complying with an obligation not to do harm wrongly in the first place. Primary and remedial responsibilities form a unity in which primary responsibilities have priority. Corrective justice is thus an essential, but subordinate, aspect of tort. The heart of tort law is constituted by primary obligations to avoid committing various wrongs.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130762606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice through the Corporate Practice of Law","authors":"Gillian K. Hadfield","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2183978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2183978","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. faces a mounting crisis in access to justice. Vast numbers of ordinary Americans represent themselves in routine legal matters daily in our over-burdened courts. Obtaining ex ante legal advice is effectively impossible for almost everyone except larger corporate entities, organizations and governments. In this paper, I explain why, as a matter of economic policy, it is essential that the legal profession abandon the prohibition on the corporate practice of law in order to remedy the access problem. The prohibitions on the corporate practice of law rule out the use of essential organizational and contracting tools widely used in most industries to control costs, improve quality and reduce errors. This keeps prices for legal assistance high by cutting the industry off from the ordinary economic benefits of scale, data analysis, product and process engineering and diversified sources of capital and innovation. Lawyers operating in law firms have not generated these benefits but they have appeared in countries, such as the U.K., where the corporate practice of law doctrine does not prevail. Eliminating restrictions on the corporate practice of law can significantly improve the access ordinary Americans have to legal help in a law-thick world.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132401977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability","authors":"Daniel Klerman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1987223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1987223","url":null,"abstract":"This article is the first sustained economic analysis of personal jurisdiction. It argues that plaintiffs should be able to sue where they purchased a product which caused injury. Such a rule allows manufacturers to set prices which take into account the quality of the forum state’s courts. If the courts are biased against out-of-state corporations, have overly generous judges or juries, or apply substantive law which is excessively pro-consumer, manufacturers can, through contracts with distributors and retailers, charge a higher price to consumers in that state. This prevents judges and juries from engaging in inter-state redistribution and gives states an incentive to provide efficient substantive rules and adjudicative institutions. In contrast, a rule which required suit in a place more fully under the control of the defendant – such as the place of manufacture or the location of the distributor – would encourage manufacturers to select inefficiently pro-defendant jurisdictions for their activities. Because consumers are unlikely to know where products are manufactured or distributed and are unlikely to be able to evaluate the quality of the law in those states, it is implausible to think that the market will give manufacturers incentives to locate their jurisdiction-triggering activities in states with efficient laws and institutions. This analysis is particularly important, because the Supreme Court has recently deadlocked on personal jurisdiction in product liability cases.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131781695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Legal Origin or Colonial History?","authors":"Daniel Klerman, P. Mahoney, Holger Spamann, Mark I. Weinstein","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAR002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAR002","url":null,"abstract":"Economists have documented pervasive correlations between legal origins, modern regulation, and economic outcomes around the world. Where legal origin is exogenous, however, it is almost perfectly correlated with another set of potentially relevant background variables: the colonial policies of the European powers that spread the “origin” legal systems through the world. We attempt to disentangle these factors by exploiting the imperfect overlap of colonizer and legal origin, and looking at possible channels, such as the structure of the legal system, through which these factors might influence contemporary economic outcomes. We find strong evidence in favor of non-legal colonial explanations for economic growth. For other dependent variables, the results are mixed.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114873494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Regional Management as a Factor of Innovation in Russian Regions: Statistical Analysis","authors":"K. Grasmik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2257775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2257775","url":null,"abstract":"The paper shows that the innovation activities of Russian companies is determined, rather, short motifs. A number of factors are under the direct influence of the regional authorities. Correlation and regression analysis showed that the current policy of inter-budgetary relations leads to the formation of the type of rent-seeking behavior from the authorities of the regions, which affects the innovation. Based on the results of a case study \"The most influential politicians of Russia\" it was proved that the stronger the influence of the governor of the region, the lower the level of innovation.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129604953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Delegated Monitoring: When Can Boards Rely on Outside Experts?","authors":"Nina Walton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1600387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1600387","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a theoretical model to examine when and how boards of directors can utilize outside experts who provide second opinions to assist them in 1) monitoring managers with career concerns and 2) approving firm investments. Because an agreeable second opinion serves as a signaling mechanism, when such opinions are credible, policies mandating the use of experts are unnecessary as managers will choose to seek out second opinions on their own. Mandates can be counterproductive, however, if they unduly elevate the status of costly second opinions that always agree with management recommendations. In the absence of incentives for truthful disclosure of information to experts, it is better for boards to forego efforts to and require management and experts to present their recommendations as one. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124918177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Price of Admission: Who Gets into Private School and How Much Do They Pay?","authors":"Nina Walton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1393585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1393585","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze how elementary and secondary private schools decide which students to admit from their applicant pool using mechanism design theory. The problem for an individual private school of who to admit and how much to charge in tuition, is complicated by the existence of peer-effects: the value students place on attending school is increasing with the average ability of the entire class at that school. This feature, coupled with the fact that students can always attend public school for free, places constraints on the types of classes the private school can admit. In my model, students have an ability type that is known to the school through testing, as well as a wealth type that is private information. Students report their wealth to the school and on the basis of the results from the ability test and wealth reports, the school institutes an allocation rule and a payment rule. Allocation rules which only admit all high ability students and no others, or all high wealth students and no others are not feasible. I utilize a simple example to show how in a revenue-maximizing allocation, the private school always under-admits the highest ability students relative to the allocation rule that maximizes social welfare.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"147 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115277867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}