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Lobbying in Europe: New Firm-Level Evidence 游说在欧洲:新的公司层面的证据
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2984891
Konstantinos Dellis, David Sondermann
{"title":"Lobbying in Europe: New Firm-Level Evidence","authors":"Konstantinos Dellis, David Sondermann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2984891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2984891","url":null,"abstract":"Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation or not opening already excessively regulated markets, it could potentially reduce overall economic welfare. We create a unique firm-level database on EU lobby activity and firm characteristics. We tend to find that firms in more protected sector, e.g. firms from non-tradable or higher regulated sectors tend to spend more for lobby activities. Also such firms tend to have higher profit margins and lower productivity, as often the case in sheltered sectors. JEL Classification: D72, D78, O38","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"251 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132275710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
The Spillover Effects of Gender Quotas on Dishonesty 性别配额对不诚实行为的溢出效应
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-04-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2985425
V. Maggian, N. Montinari
{"title":"The Spillover Effects of Gender Quotas on Dishonesty","authors":"V. Maggian, N. Montinari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2985425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985425","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally test for spillover effects of gender quotas on subsequent unrelated, unethical behavior. We find that introducing quotas has no systematic effect on unethical behavior for both genders. High performing, competitive females are more likely to display unethical behavior than their male counterparts. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133424760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
The Origin of the State: Incentive Compatible Extraction under Environmental Circumscription 国家的起源:环境约束下的激励相容开采
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-04-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2944106
David Schönholzer
{"title":"The Origin of the State: Incentive Compatible Extraction under Environmental Circumscription","authors":"David Schönholzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2944106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2944106","url":null,"abstract":"Theories of early state formation posit that the state enabled an emerging elite to extract resources in exchange for protection from outside groups. This paper formalizes and empirically evaluates these forces in a unified framework. The model shows that extraction is closely linked to the idea of environmental circumscription: only if outside options are sufficiently poor for potential extractees, (a) they are willing to accept extraction, and (b) extractors consider extraction capacity a worthwhile investment. In a global dataset of archaeological sites on a grid with 184,523 cells, we then show that circumscription is strongly associated with the location of early states, using the intersection of large rivers through arid regions as an instrument. Our estimates suggest that extraction was more important in the Old World civilizations of Egypt and China while other motives such as protection were more important in the New World.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124944963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Administrative Centralization and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: Evidence from the Food Stamp Program 行政集权与官僚反应:来自食品券计划的证据
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2654309
Vladimir Kogan
{"title":"Administrative Centralization and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: Evidence from the Food Stamp Program","authors":"Vladimir Kogan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2654309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2654309","url":null,"abstract":"Delegation of administrative authority is commonly thought to involve a tradeoff between the discretion necessary for bureaucratic effectiveness and democratic responsiveness. In many contexts, however, discretion and responsiveness go hand-in-hand: Street-level bureaucrats may adapt their behavior to accommodate local norms and values, even when implementing identical statutory language. I argue that this type of bureaucratic adaptation can explain local variation in participation rates in the national food stamp program. By exploiting between-state differences in the level at which the program is administered, I further show that administrative centralization does not appear to moderate such responsiveness, which is high across institutional settings. Using data on application denial rates for a subset of these states, I offer additional evidence that some of the county-level variation in program participation is a product of decisions made by local case workers. Together, these findings offer important insights on the institutional preconditions for bureaucratic responsiveness and control.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"256 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134092332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Effects of Treasury Single Account Policy on Corruption in Nigeria 财政单一账户政策对尼日利亚腐败的影响
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2940695
Chukwunonye Akujuru, N. Enyioko
{"title":"Effects of Treasury Single Account Policy on Corruption in Nigeria","authors":"Chukwunonye Akujuru, N. Enyioko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2940695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940695","url":null,"abstract":"The study examined the effects of treasury single account policy on corruption in Nigeria: analysis from 2011 to 2017. The study adopted a cross sectional survey design and used questionnaire to generate its data. The population of the study consisted of 6393 staff from the federal ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) in Rivers State. The sample size of the study was determined at 377 staff through the use of Prof. Taro Yameme sample size method. The data were analyzed through the use of descriptive statistics. The study found that the treasury single account (TSA) policy was introduced to block financial leakages, reduce corruption, promote transparency and prevent mismanagement of government's revenue in public sector organisations. The study revealed that the major challenges hampering the effective and efficient implementation of the treasury single account (TSA) policy include: Inability of federal government to remit appropriately to the various MDAs, uncertainties underlying federal government inactions and actions, bottlenecks/bureaucracy, internet platform delays, inefficient human capital development and time wasting in the banks and payment points. It is evident from the study that the policy will pave the way for the timely payment and capturing of all revenues going into the government treasury, without the intermediation of multiple banking arrangements. The policy will also enable the government at the centre to know its cash position at any given time without any hindrance. The study therefore, recommends that government should secure as soon as possible the appropriate legislative support to facilitate the relevant regulatory environment which will drive the effective implementation of the treasury single account.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114498095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Competitive Clientelism and the Politics of Core Public Sector Reform in Ghana 竞争性裙带主义与加纳核心公共部门改革的政治
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-18 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2954598
D. Appiah, A. Abdulai
{"title":"Competitive Clientelism and the Politics of Core Public Sector Reform in Ghana","authors":"D. Appiah, A. Abdulai","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2954598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2954598","url":null,"abstract":"Although Ghana has implemented several donor-sponsored public sector reforms (PSRs) in an attempt to improve core areas of state functionality, the impact of such reforms remains generally disappointing. In this paper, we show that the nature of the political settlement in Ghana, described as one of ‘competitive clientelism’, is central to understanding the country’s limited success in improving the effectiveness of public institutions. Faced with a credible threat of losing power to excluded factions in competitive elections, reform initiatives tend to be driven largely by the logic of the maintenance of ruling governments, rather than by their potential to enhance the effectiveness of state institutions. This has often resulted in decisions that undermine reform efforts, ranging from needless and costly institutional duplications to the politicisation of the bureaucracy through patronage-based appointments, and the wholesale removal of public servants perceived to be associated with previous regimes. In this political environment, policy discontinuities across ruling coalitions are a norm, undermining the impact of reform initiatives that require a longer time-horizon to bear fruit.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"18 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114100768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
Does Opening Complaints Data Change Company and Consumer Behavior? Evidence from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 公开投诉数据会改变公司和消费者的行为吗?来自消费者金融保护局的证据
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2929790
K. Opoku-Agyemang
{"title":"Does Opening Complaints Data Change Company and Consumer Behavior? Evidence from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau","authors":"K. Opoku-Agyemang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2929790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929790","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze a technological change which improved the public monitoring of financial customer treatment. This major assessment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is based on its exposing credit card-related complaints online while keeping mortgage-related complaints concealed. Exposed companies were more likely to close complaint files while providing explanations and relief to aggrieved consumers and in a timely manner. The transparency policy seems uncompromised by economic inequality. Consumers procrastinate in reporting exposed banks while rewarding exposed banks for their improved behavior with new accounts. Debt remained generally stable. Surprisingly, both consumers and banks benefit when offending banks are exposed online. \u0000The Online Appendix is available here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2931200","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115934977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Match Fixing and Sports Betting in Football: Empirical Evidence from the German Bundesliga 足球中的假球和体育博彩:来自德甲联赛的实证证据
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2910662
C. Deutscher, Eugen Dimant, B. Humphreys
{"title":"Match Fixing and Sports Betting in Football: Empirical Evidence from the German Bundesliga","authors":"C. Deutscher, Eugen Dimant, B. Humphreys","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2910662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2910662","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption in sports represents an important challenge to their integrity. Corruption can take many forms, including match fixing by players, referees, or team officials. Match fixing can be difficult to detect. We use a unique data set to analyze variation in bet volume on Betfair, a major online betting exchange, for evidence of abnormal patterns associated with specific referees who officiated matches. An analysis of 1,251 Bundesliga 1 football matches from 2010/11 to 2014/15 reveals evidence that bet volume in the Betfair markets in these matches was systematically higher for four referees relative to matches officiated by other referees. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and are thus suggestive of potentially existing match fixing and corruption in the German Bundesliga.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123236939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Partisan Culture and Corruption: An Experimental Investigation Based on China's Communist Party 党派文化与腐败:基于中国共产党的实验研究
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-11-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2864171
Haoran He, Shuguang Jiang
{"title":"Partisan Culture and Corruption: An Experimental Investigation Based on China's Communist Party","authors":"Haoran He, Shuguang Jiang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2864171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2864171","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct a lab experiment to investigate the impact of partisan culture and partisan identity on corruption behavior based on China’s Communist Party (CCP). Subjects are randomly assigned to a prime condition that increases the salience of CCP partisan concept or to a control condition in which the partisan concept is not made salient. Our results show that when acting as public officials, subjects in the partisan salience condition demand significantly fewer bribes than in the control condition. Moreover, when subjects are distinguished with their natural partisan identity as CCP members or non-members, we find that non-members behave even less corrupt in response to the partisan priming, while the effect of priming on CCP members’ corruption behavior is insignificant. Our results thus suggest that the prevailing CCP partisan culture is generally able to undermine the corruption behavior, while the partisan identity itself can work in the opposite direction.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"PP 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114317550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulatory Process, Regulatory Reform, and the Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis 监管程序、监管改革和监管影响分析的质量
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2485610
J. Ellig, Rosemarie Fike
{"title":"Regulatory Process, Regulatory Reform, and the Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis","authors":"J. Ellig, Rosemarie Fike","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2485610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2485610","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous regulatory reform proposals would require federal agencies to conduct more thorough analysis of proposed regulations or expand the resources and influence of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which currently reviews executive branch regulations. We employ data on variation in current administrative procedures to assess the likely effects of proposed regulatory process reforms on the quality and use of regulatory impact analysis (RIA). Many specific types of activity by agencies and OIRA are correlated with higher-quality analysis and greater use of analysis in decisions, and the effects are relatively large. Our results suggest that greater use of Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemakings for major regulations, formal hearings for important rules, articulation of retrospective review plans at the time regulations are issued, and expansion of OIRA’s resources and role may improve the quality and use of RIAs.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116506769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
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