发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Regulation, Institutions, and Productivity: New Macroeconomic Evidence from OECD Countries 法规、制度和生产力:来自经合组织国家的新的宏观经济证据
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/AER.P20161026
Balázs Égert
{"title":"Regulation, Institutions, and Productivity: New Macroeconomic Evidence from OECD Countries","authors":"Balázs Égert","doi":"10.1257/AER.P20161026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.P20161026","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical research on the drivers of multi-factor productivity (MFP) is abundant at the firm- and industry level but surprisingly little research has been conducted on the determinants of MFP at the macroeconomic level. In this paper, we seek to understand the drivers of country-level MFP with a special emphasis on product and labour market policies and the quality of institutions. For a panel of OECD countries, we find that anticompetitive product market regulations are associated with lower MFP levels and that higher innovation intensity and greater openness go in tandem with higher MFP. We also find that the impact of product market regulations on MFP may depend on the level of labour market regulations. Better institutions, a more business friendly environment and lower barriers to trade and investment amplify the positive impact of R&D spending on MFP. Finally, we also show that cross-country MFP variations can be explained to a considerable extent by cross-country variation in labour market regulations, barriers to trade and investment and institutions (including corruption).","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127524687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 77
Retrofitting Collaboration into the New Public Management:Lessons from New Zealand 将合作改造为新的公共管理:来自新西兰的经验教训
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-03-05 DOI: 10.16935/EJSS.2016.32.1.001
R. O’Leary
{"title":"Retrofitting Collaboration into the New Public Management:Lessons from New Zealand","authors":"R. O’Leary","doi":"10.16935/EJSS.2016.32.1.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.16935/EJSS.2016.32.1.001","url":null,"abstract":"New Zealand, like most countries around the world, is experimenting with collaborative techniques and processes in order to address cross-boundary public policy challenges. Still prevalent in New Zealand, however, are the policies and philosophies of that country’s sweeping public management reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s - commonly called “The New Public Management (NPM)”. This article highlights the tensions between the NPM and collaboration in New Zealand, analyzes what is needed to change the bureaucratic culture of New Zealand to make it more receptive to the idea of collaboration, and offers concrete steps that can be taken to create opportunities for collaborative advantage in any country.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129171476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Why Government Institutions in Developing Countries Cannot Account for Public Funds: Empirical Evidence from Cross River State of Nigeria 为什么发展中国家的政府机构不能解释公共资金:来自尼日利亚克罗斯河州的经验证据
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-01 DOI: 10.13189/UJAF.2016.040102
W. Inyang
{"title":"Why Government Institutions in Developing Countries Cannot Account for Public Funds: Empirical Evidence from Cross River State of Nigeria","authors":"W. Inyang","doi":"10.13189/UJAF.2016.040102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13189/UJAF.2016.040102","url":null,"abstract":"The study investigated why MDAs in African countries cannot account for public funds. A 5-point likert scale questionnaire was used to collect primary data from 62 staff members of State and Local government auditor-general’s offices who participated in the study. Five hypotheses were formulated and tested for the study using multiple regression. The study attributed the occurrence of unretired imprests in Cross River State MDAs to the following factors: lack of budgetary provisions, fraudulent delegation of imprest retirement and improper reimbursement of imprests and it was further revealed that off-budget expenditures and non-retirement of imprests by other heads of departments have little or no association with unretired imprests. The study therefore, recommended that overhead cost budgets of the MDAs be constantly revised and appropriate sanctions be levelled against MDA officials who engage in fraudulent delegation of accountability over the imprest funds and improper reimbursement of imprests.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128060418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Examining the Concept of Misappropriation under the Anti-Corruption Act 2008 (Which Repealed and Replaced the Anti-Corruption Act 2000) 检视《2008年反贪法令》(废除并取代《2000年反贪法令》)下的挪用概念
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2534797
Michael Imran Kanu
{"title":"Examining the Concept of Misappropriation under the Anti-Corruption Act 2008 (Which Repealed and Replaced the Anti-Corruption Act 2000)","authors":"Michael Imran Kanu","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2534797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2534797","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the offence of misappropriation of public funds, property or revenue under the Anti-Corruption Act 2008 and the judicial interpretation following judgments in corruption cases in the courts of superior judicature in Sierra Leone. It examines the key elements of the offence and the possible extension of the elements by the judges, with respect to the importation of dishonesty, thereby and perhaps ex arguendo extending the burden of proof on the prosecution. The elements of the offence will be analysed by reviewing the relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and decided cases by the courts of superior judicature in Sierra Leone; interspersed with examination of relevant English statutes and jurisprudence referenced in the decided cases. This article also looks at the importation of foreign jurisprudence based on statues that conflict with section 74 of the Courts Act 1965. The primary consideration will be either it was the intention of parliament to expressly exclude dishonesty as an element of the offence, or whether by judicial activism, the judges have introduced an element outside the intentions of parliament.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125293825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Selection Under Veto with Limited Foresight 具有有限远见的否决权下的选择
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-12-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2986427
D. Caditz
{"title":"Selection Under Veto with Limited Foresight","authors":"D. Caditz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2986427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2986427","url":null,"abstract":"I consider a class of two-party, zero sum sequential selection games where players compete over the composition of a panel comprising one or more seats. The players have a limited number of vetoes which can be used to reject panelists, with replacements being selected at random from a pool. One player wishes to maximize, and the opposing player wishes to minimize a utility function over panelist ratings. This selection game is notable in that 1) it is common, with application in fields such as trial jury selection, selection of job applicants by committee, selection of panelists and moderators for a debate, arbitrator selection, and group decision making, and 2) it leads to complex games, obscuring optimal strategies and thereby increasing the costs of optimal play. In this paper, I consider various simplified, limited foresight panel selection strategies and compare these with optimal play. I find that a commonly used limited foresight strategy – vetoing panelists less favorable than some fixed value, such as the replacement pool average - is not generally effective for selection games, such as jury selection, which comprise more than a few slots.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129229557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Tragedy of Corruption. Corruption as a Social Dilemma 腐败的悲剧。腐败是一种社会困境
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2698050
Yefeng Chen, Shuguang Jiang, M. Villeval
{"title":"The Tragedy of Corruption. Corruption as a Social Dilemma","authors":"Yefeng Chen, Shuguang Jiang, M. Villeval","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2698050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2698050","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective failure is introduced when the number of public officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of individual interest prevails and leads to the elimination of honest officials over time. Reducing the size of the groups while increasing the probability of collective failure diminishes the public officials' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the tragedy of corruption altogether.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115702585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Reforming an Institutional Culture of Corruption: A Model of Motivated Agents and Collective Reputation 改革腐败的制度文化:一个动机主体与集体声誉的模型
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-11-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2701766
Justin Valasek
{"title":"Reforming an Institutional Culture of Corruption: A Model of Motivated Agents and Collective Reputation","authors":"Justin Valasek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2701766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2701766","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research has highlighted social image and identity concerns as factors that influence economic decisions. Given that an individual’s choice of employment may be important for their social image, we consider a model of worker sorting into the mission-oriented or private sector with motivated agents who also value the collective reputation of their place of employment. The initial insight of the analysis is that, from the institution’s perspective, there may exist both a high-reputation, low-wage equilibrium and a low-reputation, high-wage equilibrium, which raises the question of how an institution can transition between equilibria. Our main contribution is to characterize a dynamic wage path that will transition from a low-reputation to a high-reputation steady state: Importantly, the effect of wages on motivation depend on the initial reputation - starting from low-reputation, higher wages crowd in motivation, while starting from high-reputation, higher wages crowd out motivation. Therefore, a non-monotonic wage path is required to achieve a transition to the low-wage, high-reputation equilibrium - an initial wage increase to crowd in motivated workers, followed by a wage decrease to crowd out non-motivated workers. These results provide a novel explanation for empirical findings in developing nations that - in direct contrast to evidence from developed nations - public sector workers are less prosocial and higher wages weakly increase motivation. Lastly, we discuss the implication of our results for policy measures aimed at reforming an institutional culture of corruption.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131071125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Political Corruption and Its Cost in Kazakhstan: Policy Analysis Excercise 哈萨克斯坦的政治腐败及其成本:政策分析实践
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-10-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2675094
M. Omarov, Stepan Kuzhin
{"title":"Political Corruption and Its Cost in Kazakhstan: Policy Analysis Excercise","authors":"M. Omarov, Stepan Kuzhin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2675094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2675094","url":null,"abstract":"Given paper is aimed to examine the reliability of Corruption Perception index performed by Transparency International in Kazakhstan. The CPI has been used widely amed to estimate the level of corruption on the global policy agenda and getting people to know about this phenomenon. Nonetheless, the CPI has been subject of strong criticism concerning its methodology. Main concern is that Kazakhstan’s level of corruption is considered as extremely low, along with underdeveloped countries. One of our hypothesis is that CPI measurement of corruption does not reflect the real level of corruption in the Republic of Kazakhstan. It is relevant to examine the relationship between corruption and economic development of the country along with various social economic variables and perform cross-country analysis using Stata software.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132630401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Happiness Gap in Eastern Europe 东欧的幸福差距
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-09-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2658136
Simeon Djankov, E. Nikolova, J. Zilinsky
{"title":"The Happiness Gap in Eastern Europe","authors":"Simeon Djankov, E. Nikolova, J. Zilinsky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2658136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2658136","url":null,"abstract":"Citizens in Eastern Europe are less satisfied with life than their peers in other countries. This happiness gap has persisted over time, despite predictions to the contrary by earlier scholars. It holds after controlling for a variety of covariates, such as the standard of living, life expectancy and Eastern Orthodox religion. Armed with a battery of surveys from the early 1990s to 2014, we argue that the happiness gap is explained by how citizens in post-communist countries perceive their governments. Eastern Europeans link their life satisfaction to higher perceived corruption and weaker government performance. Our results suggest that the transition from central planning is still incomplete, at least in the psychology of people.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"326 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120882357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 102
Media Attention and the Demise of Agency Independence: Evidence from a Mass Administrative Reorganization in Britain 媒体关注与机构独立的消亡:来自英国大规模行政重组的证据
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-05-16 DOI: 10.1111/PADM.12190
Anthony M. Bertelli, J. Sinclair, Haram Lee
{"title":"Media Attention and the Demise of Agency Independence: Evidence from a Mass Administrative Reorganization in Britain","authors":"Anthony M. Bertelli, J. Sinclair, Haram Lee","doi":"10.1111/PADM.12190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PADM.12190","url":null,"abstract":"When administrative agencies are terminated, do they quietly fade from public view? On the one hand, the terminated agencies may have weak issue networks and agency reputations allowing them to lose public salience. On the other hand, strong issue networks and agency reputations may mean that termination increases attention to the agencies, making the government pay the cost of public attention generated by the actors within the issue networks. We assess these competing claims by using a unique dataset from a recent mass reorganization of independent agencies in Britain as well as data capturing media attention to agencies in major national newspapers. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the agencies subject to termination experience reductions in the number of media coverage in major newspapers, disappearing from public view during the post-decision reform period.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121801045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信