ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)最新文献

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Mass Administrative Reorganization, Media Attention, and the Paradox of Information 群体性行政重组、媒体关注与信息悖论
Anthony M. Bertelli, J. Sinclair
{"title":"Mass Administrative Reorganization, Media Attention, and the Paradox of Information","authors":"Anthony M. Bertelli, J. Sinclair","doi":"10.1111/PUAR.12396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PUAR.12396","url":null,"abstract":"How does media attention influence government decisions about whether to terminate independent administrative agencies? We argue that an agency’s salience with partisan audiences has a direct effect, but a high media profile can disrupt normal government monitoring processes and obfuscate termination decisions. We evaluate our argument in the context of a recent mass administrative reorganization by the British coalition government using probit and heteroscedastic probit regression models. Evidence suggests that termination is less likely for agencies salient in newspapers popular with the government’s core supporters, but not those read by its minority coalition partner. We also find that agencies with greater overall newspaper salience as well as younger agencies have a higher error variance.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130262350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
An Evaluation of Corruption Practices in Ministries, Departments, Agencies in Public Sector in Developing Nations 发展中国家公共部门部委、部门和机构腐败行为的评估
M. Kingsly, Samuel F. Johnson-Rokosu
{"title":"An Evaluation of Corruption Practices in Ministries, Departments, Agencies in Public Sector in Developing Nations","authors":"M. Kingsly, Samuel F. Johnson-Rokosu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2603556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2603556","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption practice in Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in public sector has become a way of life and it is synonym with government official, a culture, phenomena, religion or pathological. Corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit and includes; bribes, cronyism and nepotism, political donations, kickbacks and artificial pricing and fraud of all kinds, theft or misuse of asset, improper use of influence in a transaction for own benefit and falsification of financial statement. While questions on fraud and corruption practices have received considerable attention in the wider international community especially on inter-country comparison; there is a considerable dearth of literatures on inter-country comparison between developing countries. This study evaluated the effect of corruption practices in Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in public sector in developing economies; specifically it examined the impact of corruption practices on the stewardship role of a career civil servant in public sector. Stewardship theory is used as a motivation to explain the level of corruption practices in public sector. The research approach entails literature review that was carried out to identify the knowledge gap in previous studies and use survey research technique. Literature study is complemented with the use of nonparametric and descriptive statistics techniques and is applied on primary data obtained in a population of four (4) public MDAs in Cameroon and Nigeria. Finding in the study revealed that corruption practice is an obstacle to stewardship role of civil servant in MDAs. Also, the study revealed that in both countries bribe or kickback are offered before obtaining services from civil servant.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114749668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Bounding the Population Shares Affected by Treatments 限定受治疗影响的人口份额
K. Borusyak
{"title":"Bounding the Population Shares Affected by Treatments","authors":"K. Borusyak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2473827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2473827","url":null,"abstract":"The fraction of a population that is affected by a treatment (the “responders”) may be as important to identify as the average magnitude of the treatment effect. I show that if the distributions of potential outcomes with and without treatment are identified, then the total variation distance between them serves as the sharp lower bound on the share of responders. It can be computed for randomized control trials, instrumental variables, and other empirical designs. I demonstrate the usefulness of the approach in three examples of economic interest, related to behavioral biases in retirement savings, electoral fraud, and student cheating.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"14 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131858923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Civil Servants and Code of Conduct in India: Question of Raising Standards 印度的公务员和行为准则:提高标准的问题
Subramaniam Chandran
{"title":"Civil Servants and Code of Conduct in India: Question of Raising Standards","authors":"Subramaniam Chandran","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2758509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2758509","url":null,"abstract":"Searching for compatibility between ethics and law in the terrain of human subjectivity is a perennial problem seen in the public sphere of democracy. It becomes almost an ideal of attaining a moral administrative community after prolonged failed endeavours of raising a political community. In the promiscuous public interest of the political realm, the rational sharing of accountability between the political executives and administrative executives has come to sharp resistance. Serving the public interest, customer-driven, benevolent political neutrality, and organizational humanism are increasingly contemplated. Constitutional provisions and code of conduct reflect inadequate schemes of accountability. Though various forms of control exist to resist the over-stretch of bureaucracy in a democratic set up, the idea of accountability is still highly linked with political executives. This paper examines the constitutional provisions and the code of conduct pertaining to higher civil service, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), in relation to problems of ethics and accountability and raising standards in India. It attempts to outline a code of conduct appropriate to tackle the situation of declining ethical standards. It specially focuses on the higher civil service in Tamil Nadu, a southern state of India, to examine the above issues. Since, more and more top civil servants in Tamil Nadu have been suspended, arrested or charged with cases, it is important to examine the accountability and ethics of civil servants, Constitutional protection, code of conduct, and the process of political victimization in a democratic set up.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126007366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An Efficient Anticorruption Sanctions Regime? The Case of the World Bank 有效的反腐败制裁制度?世界银行的案例
Tina Søreide, Linda Gröning, Rasmus H. Wandall
{"title":"An Efficient Anticorruption Sanctions Regime? The Case of the World Bank","authors":"Tina Søreide, Linda Gröning, Rasmus H. Wandall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2602839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2602839","url":null,"abstract":"With its sanctions regime, the World Bank has sent a clear message to client governments and suppliers that it will not tolerate corruption. However, as this article argues, with its present design, the sanctions regime at the same time runs counter to the World Bank’s own development agenda. Thus, the regime will have limited effect in protecting funds for development, reducing corruption risks, promoting the integrity and functionality of markets, and strengthening domestic law enforcement institutions. A key problem is that efforts to strengthen law enforcement at the national level are too limited. The sanctions primarily target private suppliers, while governments are not held responsible when fraud or corruption occurs. This reflects the World Bank’s challenging mandate to offer financial support to developing country governments while also trying to secure efficient use of the funds after they have been transferred. In considering alternative designs for its anticorruption strategy, the Bank should collaborate with other international development banks to demand integrity mechanisms that rely upon and strengthen domestic law enforcement institutions and competition authorities in client countries.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125439563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Ensuring Accountability and Transparency at Local Level Finance: A Study from Sylhet Sadar Upazila 确保地方财政问责制和透明度:来自Sylhet Sadar Upazila的研究
Md. Anwar Hossain
{"title":"Ensuring Accountability and Transparency at Local Level Finance: A Study from Sylhet Sadar Upazila","authors":"Md. Anwar Hossain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2545151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2545151","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the degree of accountability and transparency of local level finance in three unions (Khadim Nagor Union, Khandigaon Union and Tuker Bazar Union) of Sylhet Sadar Upazila. It is based on interviews and focus group discussions with general people and government representatives, as well as a detailed review of the existing literature. The study found that local government institutions in Bangladesh are very weak in providing basic services to the citizens and in promoting good governance to their constituencies due to a variety of constraints, including a lack of revenues, a low level of human capital in the local government bodies, the absence of participatory decision-making, and the lack accountability and transparency. The existing problems in transparency and accountability at local level finance are interrelated to a lack of people’s participation in the budgeting process and weak monitoring mechanism. The study recommends that (1) local authority should have enough power to generate revenue and to exercise financial autonomy, which also implies that grants from the government should be adequate, (2) every work area should be independently audited and supervised by the central government, and (3) there needs to be far more dissemination of local financial budgets.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132080186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Regulatory Capture by Default: Offshore Drilling for Oil and Gas 默认的监管捕获:石油和天然气的海上钻探
M. Portman
{"title":"Regulatory Capture by Default: Offshore Drilling for Oil and Gas","authors":"M. Portman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2881268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2881268","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines a form of regulatory capture that occurs when significant ambiguity exists regarding the environmental protection standards for new types of activities in the marine environment. To begin with, there is little research that categorizes the typologies of regulatory capture despite the ubiquity of the phenomenon. After a discussion of theoretical approaches to regulatory capture, I describe the operative definition and theory appropriate to the situation related to authorization of oil and natural gas production in Israel following the discovery of large offshore reserves in 2010. This approach, embodying several facets of existing typologies, is applied to decisions made authorizing construction of the Gabriella offshore exploratory drilling platform. The analysis highlights the nature of capture in the absence of clear agency jurisdiction over new activities located in offshore environs organized as temporal and spatial “vacuums”. I conclude that comprehensive marine spatial planning would result in less capture and the development of more capture-resistant regulations.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126873899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Expropriation Risk, Investment Decisions and Economic Sectors 征用风险、投资决策与经济部门
Diana Constanza Restrepo Ochoa, Ricardo Correia, J. Peña, Francisco Javier Población García
{"title":"Expropriation Risk, Investment Decisions and Economic Sectors","authors":"Diana Constanza Restrepo Ochoa, Ricardo Correia, J. Peña, Francisco Javier Población García","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2487774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2487774","url":null,"abstract":"We build a Real Options model to assess the importance of private provisionand the impact of expropriation risk on investment timing, investmentvolumes, governmental costs and social welfare. We consider two types ofbusinesses (essential and non essential businesses) and two stages (operatingand investment opportunities), and answer questions regarding three maintopics: the firm's reaction to expropriation risk, the government drivers toexpropriate, and the costs this generates in terms of welfare. We find thatthe firm makes suboptimal investment decisions. When we endogenize thereputational costs of expropriation, results show that the decision of the governmentregarding the level of political risk will largely depend on the typeof business. However, in terms of welfare it is never optimal to expropriate","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131358912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Do the Effects of Corruption Upon Growth Differ between Democracies and Autocracies? 腐败对经济增长的影响在民主国家和专制国家之间存在差异吗?
A. Assiotis, Kevin Sylwester
{"title":"Do the Effects of Corruption Upon Growth Differ between Democracies and Autocracies?","authors":"A. Assiotis, Kevin Sylwester","doi":"10.1111/rode.12104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12104","url":null,"abstract":"Many studies examining whether corruption lowers economic growth do not consider if the effects of corruption differ across countries. Whether corruption produces the same effects everywhere or whether its effects are conditional on some country characteristics are important questions. We investigate the association between corruption and growth, where the marginal impact of corruption is allowed to differ across democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Using cross-country, annual data from 1984 to 2007, we regress growth on corruption, democracy and their interaction. We find that decreases in corruption raise growth but more so in authoritarian regimes. Possible reasons are that in autocracies corruption causes more uncertainty, is of a more pernicious nature, or is less substitutable with other forms of rent seeking.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124208814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
Political Corruption and Voter Turnout: Mobilization or Disaffection? 政治腐败与选民投票率:动员还是不满?
Elena Costas-Pérez
{"title":"Political Corruption and Voter Turnout: Mobilization or Disaffection?","authors":"Elena Costas-Pérez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2471065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2471065","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption may affect voter turnout either by mobilizing citizens to go to the polls or by promoting voter disaffection. Using Spanish local and survey data, we study whether these effects depend on partisan leanings or the timing of scandals. Our results show that repeated episodes of corruption increase the boost abstentionism. Independent voters – those with no political attachments – are the only group that that abstains in response to corruption. The incumbent’s core supporters fail to recognise corruption within their party, while both independent voters and the opposition’s core supporters report higher corruption perceptions in response to a scandal.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126430377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 117
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