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A Vote at the Opera? The Political Economy of Public Theatres and Orchestras in the German States 在歌剧院投票?德国各州公共剧院和管弦乐团的政治经济
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-06-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2296877
M. Tepe, P. Vanhuysse
{"title":"A Vote at the Opera? The Political Economy of Public Theatres and Orchestras in the German States","authors":"M. Tepe, P. Vanhuysse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2296877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2296877","url":null,"abstract":"Policymakers generally have powerful incentives to attract votes by strategically manipulating public policies, for instance by increasing public spending during election periods or by implementing ideologically valued policies for their electoral base. At first sight, public theaters and orchestras appear an unlikely domain for such tactics. Highbrow culture is elitist and provides few jobs to artists as voters (patronage). However, we argue that policymakers indirectly target a larger highbrow culture-consuming voting public, as this public is more likely to go voting, to actively engage in politics, and to influence other voters' political behavior through political and sociological multiplier effects. We find evidence of such manipulation tactics in Germany, 1993–2010. Artist numbers increase during state-level, and even more during municipal-level, election years (electioneering). More tentatively, leftwing party power increases cultural subsidies and jobs in Eastern states.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127158422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
Can Imprisonment Be Cheaper? The Law and Economics of Private Prisons 监禁能更便宜吗?私立监狱的法律与经济学
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2449265
Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko
{"title":"Can Imprisonment Be Cheaper? The Law and Economics of Private Prisons","authors":"Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2449265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2449265","url":null,"abstract":"Custody is the most expensive method of punishment in the western world, as compared to other alternatives. Although expensive, prison is an indispensible instrument to deal with judgment proof or dangerous offenders. Hence, by using the law and economics approach, this paper explores prison privatization as an instrument for less expensive incarceration. This method has the potential to reduce the prison costs without hampering its quality. However, a restructuring of the current contracts is needed to achieve this purpose. The attention given to the topic of private prisons by the law and economics scholars, especially in the European context, is limited and this paper attempts to fill this gap. The present paper applies arguments from the bureaucracy and political science literature to explain the inefficiencies of public prisons. Subsequently, the potential problems of private prisons are presented through the principle-agent model and solutions are offered.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133006099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Framework for Policy Crowdsourcing 政策众包框架
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-05-05 DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/pmfdx
John Prpic, Araz Taeihagh, J. Melton
{"title":"A Framework for Policy Crowdsourcing","authors":"John Prpic, Araz Taeihagh, J. Melton","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/pmfdx","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/pmfdx","url":null,"abstract":"What is the state of the literature in respect to Crowdsourcing for policy making? This work attempts to answer this question by collecting, categorizing, and situating the extant research investig ...","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121556079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Фактор Образования и Науки в Модернизационной Стратегии Современной Российской Бюрократии (Science and Education Factor in Modernization Strategy of Modern Russian Bureaucracy)
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-04-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2420774
Oleg Vladimirovich Ageyev
{"title":"Фактор Образования и Науки в Модернизационной Стратегии Современной Российской Бюрократии (Science and Education Factor in Modernization Strategy of Modern Russian Bureaucracy)","authors":"Oleg Vladimirovich Ageyev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2420774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2420774","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: Статья посвящена изучению современного состояния российского образовании и науки с точки зрения политического анализа. Современным состоянием нашей Родины, качеством ее экономики, социальной сферы, политических институтов, не удовлетворены ни субъекты, ни объекты российской политики.English Abstract: Article is devoted studying of a current state Russian science and education from the point of view of the political analysis. The current state of our country and the quality of its economic, social and political institutions are not satisfied with neither subject nor object of Russian policy.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132827989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Annals of Crony Capitalism: Revisiting the AIG Bailout 裙带资本主义的编年史:重新审视AIG救助
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-12-05 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2364090
Malcolm S. Salter
{"title":"Annals of Crony Capitalism: Revisiting the AIG Bailout","authors":"Malcolm S. Salter","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2364090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2364090","url":null,"abstract":"Cronyism may well be an intensifying problem in contemporary American capitalism, but an incorrect identification and labeling of crony capitalism subverts meaningful reform. Five years after considerable financial assistance was provided to the American International Group by the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the U.S. Treasury, the AIG bailout story remains highly controversial as a putative case of capitalism gone bad — crony capitalism at its worst. This paper reviews the record surrounding the AIG bankruptcy and argues that the bailout decision and the subsequent structure of the bailout tell a much different story than the one characterized as “crony capitalism.” Based on a close reading of this record, the story I tell is that the lingering controversies over the bailout are not a result of the corrupt behavior of Federal Reserve and Treasury officials. Rather, they are the result of impromptu and highly improvised risk management by government officials who had no clear regulatory authority over failing investment banks and insurance companies — like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG — and who were conditioned by their professional training and current responsibilities to focus on the worst-case scenarios following the collapse of large financial institutions holding fast-depreciating real estate assets. Operating under severe time constraints and existential anxiety, mistakes and missteps were made by the New York Fed in its unfamiliar role as the chief restructuring officer of AIG. But this is far different story than calculated corruption benefiting large domestic and foreign banks vulnerable to an AIG collapse. This essay is a cautionary tale about exaggerated (and false) claims of institutional corruption in the public and private sectors. We are currently witnessing a sufficient number of cases of both unlawful and lawful-but-corrupt behavior to motivate a debate about meaningful reforms. Inaccurate characterizations of institutional and individual behavior can only serve to contaminate this important conversation.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133724303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Power of Perception: Reconciling Competing Hypotheses About the Influence of NRA Money in Politics 感知的力量:调和关于全国步枪协会资金在政治中的影响的相互矛盾的假设
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-10-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2341790
Arjun Ponnambalam
{"title":"The Power of Perception: Reconciling Competing Hypotheses About the Influence of NRA Money in Politics","authors":"Arjun Ponnambalam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2341790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2341790","url":null,"abstract":"The failure of Congress to enact meaningful gun control legislation despite overwhelming public support in the wake of the 2012 shootings in Newton, CT provides a unique opportunity to examine the influence of money in politics. The suspicion of improper influence arises whenever there is an apparent discrepancy between public opinion and the actions of elected representatives. This paper will explore two competing hypotheses regarding the degree of influence in Congress the National Rifle Association (NRA) has acquired through its political contributions, independent expenditures, and lobbying efforts. Using Lawrence Lessig’s framework of “dependency corruption,” this paper will argue that the influence of NRA money in politics is not as straightforward as it may appear, but that ultimately, the actual nature of the dependency between Congress and the NRA is less important than the fact that both public citizens and elected officials perceive that there is a dependency. This perception is sufficient to undermine public trust in Congress and distort the formulation of public policy.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124596688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Eye of the Beholder: Participation and Impact in Telecommunications (De)Regulation 观察者之眼:电信(去)规管的参与与影响
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-08-12 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2309146
Dorit R. Reiss
{"title":"The Eye of the Beholder: Participation and Impact in Telecommunications (De)Regulation","authors":"Dorit R. Reiss","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2309146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2309146","url":null,"abstract":"The California Public Utilities Commission addressed both pricing deregulation and universal service in telecommunications during the last decade. Both decisions had a similar cast of characters, and similarly elaborate processes. In relation to price deregulation, the utilities positions were accepted on every issue addressed; in relation to universal service, consumer organizations’ positions were accepted in about 60% of the issues. This article tells the story of how those decisions were made, and examines the reasons for the difference in impact. The article examines and reject an explanation of capture; accepts in part a focus on the influence of the commissioner in charge of the decision; and suggests that the most important factor in determining impact was the perceptions and expectations of CPUC Commissioners and staff, reminding us of the importance of agency personal and their profound impact on regulatory results.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"159 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129710017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Underinvestment and Expropriation 投资不足和征用
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-07-01 DOI: 10.4172/2168-9458.1000107
D. Hebert
{"title":"Underinvestment and Expropriation","authors":"D. Hebert","doi":"10.4172/2168-9458.1000107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4172/2168-9458.1000107","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that there are several factors that investors must take into account when choosing to invest or not. One of the most important factors, which goes largely undiscussed in existing literature, is the behavior of governments undergoing political reform. Specifically, the temptation to renege on prior agreements becomes stronger over time. This causes investors to make fewer investments, thus giving markets an appearance of underinvestment. The degree of underinvestment, however, can be used as an indicator for how likely investors believe government expropriation is in particular industries.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116123954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats 官僚提供的合同
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-06-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2286841
Fahad Khalil, Doyoung Kim, J. Lawarree
{"title":"Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats","authors":"Fahad Khalil, Doyoung Kim, J. Lawarree","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2286841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2286841","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low-powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low-powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using the bureaucrat to monitor output.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"2013 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125679682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Effectiveness of Whistleblower Laws in Combating Corruption 举报人法在打击贪污方面的成效
ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-05-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2268429
R. Goel, M. A. Nelson
{"title":"Effectiveness of Whistleblower Laws in Combating Corruption","authors":"R. Goel, M. A. Nelson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2268429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2268429","url":null,"abstract":"Whistleblower laws are becoming important governance tools in both the public and private sectors. To examine the effectiveness of whistleblower laws and their awareness, this study creates a unique internet-based measure of awareness about whistleblower laws and provisions, focusing on the United States. Placing the analysis within the larger corruption literature, our results show that greater whistleblower awareness results in more observed corruption and this holds across specifications. Internet awareness of whistleblower laws appears to be more effective at exposing corruption than the quantity and quality of whistleblower laws themselves. Keywords: corruption; whistleblowers; law enforcement; internet; United States JEL classification: K4; H7","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121256154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
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