ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Donors Doing Political Economy Analysis™: From Process to Product (and Back Again?)","authors":"J. Fisher, H. Marquette","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2206474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2206474","url":null,"abstract":"This paper refocuses current debate on political economy analysis (PEA) by firstly critiquing existing scholarly tendencies to analyze donors through a particular lens, as a unique analytical category, which does not adequately capture donor officials as the civil servants they are. Current donor debates which move the purpose of PEA away from ‘thinking politically’ towards ‘managing risk’ may thus not reflect failure to mainstream PEA, but instead reflect a logical response from civil servants when faced with a product that exists to flag up risks or potential failure. Informed by Hood’s work (2010) on risk and blame, the paper argues that by understanding donors as blame-averse civil servants, we can better comprehend their continued ambivalence towards PEA. Secondly, the paper responds to a second critique of PEA, which highlights its politically sensitive nature. The paper argues that this sensitivity is not simply an operational matter but instead presents a significant challenge to donor commitments to country ownership. The paper explores how both of these issues have played-out in the World Bank’s evolving work on PEA. Drawing on interview data and participant observation, it is suggested that the Bank may be better placed to navigate these complexities given its apolitical mandate.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127436898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"External Competitiveness of EU Candidate Countries","authors":"Lucia Országhová, Li Savelin, Willem Schudel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2185897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185897","url":null,"abstract":"As the current financial crisis has shown, macroeconomic imbalances such as persistent current account and trade deficits, can seriously undermine a country’s resilience to economic shocks. Maintaining and enhancing external competitiveness has thus become of increasing concern, particularly to European Union (EU) candidate countries whose economic growth models have been challenged in recent years. Drawing on previous studies, this paper assesses developments in the external competitiveness of EU candidate countries between 1999 and 2011. Taking a broad approach to the issue of competitiveness, the paper considers various indicators of both short and long-term competitiveness, including those related to domestic prices and costs, export performance, and institutional and structural issues. In the context of EU integration, comparisons are drawn with developments in the EU12. We find that, during the pre-crisis period, all candidate countries experienced robust export market growth, but also suffered losses in price and cost competitiveness. In terms of export characteristics, progress has been heterogeneous and also fairly slow when compared with the EU12. All candidate countries have increased their number of export products and trading partners, but only a few have been able to export more complex products. As regards structural issues such as corruption and bureaucratic efficiency, all countries have performed quite poorly with the exception of Iceland. JEL Classification: H3, H6, E6, G1","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"157 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130525568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bribe-Taking and Bureaucratic Competition: A Search Cost Model of Corruption","authors":"E. Kiselev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2032239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2032239","url":null,"abstract":"Competition among bureaucrats for bribe revenue has often been viewed as a way to reduce the incidence and magnitude of bribe payments. This paper proposes a model where firms can search among multiple corrupt bureaucrats to find the cheapest bribe associated with obtaining a required service. Competition among bureaucrats can reduce the size of bribes only when all firms can search without cost. When search costs prohibit some firms from shopping around, competition actually increases the bribes that bureaucrats charge. This result is tested empirically using Russia as a case study. Using firm-level surveys and regional panel data I find evidence that more competition within the municipal administrative bureaucracy is associated with larger bribe payments made by firms. I conclude that bureaucratic competition for bribe revenue is not always a solution to the corruption problem.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115972836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Economic Investigation of Confiscation as a Tool Against Money Laundering","authors":"R. Araujo, T. Moreira","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2071331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2071331","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper the eciency of the confiscation as a tool against organized crime is studied by using a general equilibrium model that considers the existence of a representative criminal organization that generates profits that need to be laundered. The main result of the paper shows that if on one hand confiscation diminishes the optimal amount of money laundered on the other it increases the fraction of resources allocated to the criminal activity. This result suggests that confiscation has to be connected to further repressive measures in other to be an ecient tool against organized crime.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128113798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Lost Republic? A Review of Lawrence Lessig's Republic, Lost","authors":"Edward J. López","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2852660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2852660","url":null,"abstract":"Lawrence Lessig's book Republic, Lost argues that a new type of corruption has overcome the modern Congress. Unlike the venal corruption of earlier periods, for example the gilded age, the 21st Century Congress has become corrupt in entirely legal ways. The pressures of campaign finance, and of making connections in the influence economy, distract and distort elected officials from serving the public interest. Voters perceive the electoral system to be corrupt, losing trust in government. Lessig proposes reforms remove elected officials from having a role in campaign finance. Through mechanisms such as the \"democracy voucher\", Lessig proposes to spend more in aggregate on elections, but have the composition be much less concentrated. This review critically reviews Lessig's argument by comparison to the received empirical literature in the social sciences. While drawing attention to important yet underappreciated aspects of these problems, Lessig book warrants a strong audience. However, the corruption narrative is not supported by the literature, and the reform proposals like previous reforms can be strategically circumnavigated.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121094663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Decentralized Bribery: The Costs, The Benefits, and The Taming","authors":"Sergey V Popov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1994374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1994374","url":null,"abstract":"I propose a bribery model in which bureaucratic decisionmaking is decentralized. I establish that bribe extortion is economically nonneutral, and that capital markets in corrupt economies exhibit higher returns. There are multiple stable equilibria: high levels of bribery reduce the economy's productivity due to suppression of small businesses. Competition among bureaucrats might improve the outcome, but does not necessarily decrease the total graft. The choice of corruption fighting tactics and the choice of whom to blame provide nontrivial outcomes.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116610873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Local Officials React to State Policy Innovation Tying Revenue Sharing to Dashboards and Incentive Funding","authors":"Thomas M. Ivacko, D. Horner, Michael Q. Crawford","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2351896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2351896","url":null,"abstract":"In 2011, the state of Michigan implemented major policy changes in its statutory revenue sharing program, through which it distributes funding to a subset of Michigan’s 1,856 local governments. The new policy replaced formula-based funding with an incentive program that uses revenue sharing to foster local government reform. The new program, called the Economic Vitality Incentive Program (EVIP), requires local governments to certify that they have met state-specified standards for \"best practices\" in three categories (accountability and transparency; intergovernmental collaboration; and employee compensation policies) in order to receive their full allotment of incentive-based funds. This report focuses on the first EVIP category (accountability and transparency) and examines how Michigan’s local governments are responding to the state’s incentive-driven push for local reform. The findings are based on statewide surveys of local government leaders in the Fall 2011 wave of the Michigan Public Policy Survey (MPPS).","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133088120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bribing to Circumvent Capture and Facilitate Participation in Social Programs: Evidence from Indian Villages","authors":"R. Jha, H. Nagarajan, K. Pradhan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1962178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1962178","url":null,"abstract":"Given that the phenomenon of capture of public programs by sections the population is rampant in developing countries, households can indulge in a strategy to improve their odds of participating in public programs by bribing the suppliers of such programs. This is an important issue affecting both the supply of local public goods and the incidence of corruption. To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis of the impact of bribery on the odds of participating in a local public goods program, anywhere. Using a unique data set for rural India this paper addresses the question of whether households bribe elected officials responsible for assuring such supply to improve their access to local public goods. We find considerable evidence of such bribing. We also model the welfare effects of such bribing on groups of households as well as the impact of bribery on aggregate welfare. Several policy conclusions are advanced.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125663915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?","authors":"Drury D. Stevenson, N. J. Wagoner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1811126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1811126","url":null,"abstract":"The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminalizes bribery of foreign government officials; the frequency of enforcement actions and severity of fines levied against corporations under the FCPA have significantly increased in the last few years. There is an ongoing problem, however, with the sanctions for FCPA violations: enforcement authorities (DOJ and SEC) and contracting officials have limited themselves to fines, civil penalties, and occasional imprisonment of individual violators. Debarment from future federal government contracts, even temporarily, is an unused sanction for FCPA violations, even though Congress provided for this punishment by statute. Debarment offers a far more potent deterrent than fines and penalties, as multinational contractors that conduct business with the U.S. are much less likely to view the sanction as merely a cost of doing business. If ridding foreign markets of corruption truly is a top priority of the U.S., it seems both unfair and imprudent for federal agencies to continue awarding lucrative, multibillion-dollar contracts to firms recently prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining such contracts overseas. Enforcement officials shy away from debarring entities that violate the FCPA due to the short-term inconvenience of an agency’s inability to transact business with its favorite contractor, its inability to demand favorable bids from contractors when the field of potential bidders has thinned, the resulting job loss, and the risk of overdeterring companies that might otherwise pursue lucrative opportunities in emerging markets. This is the \"too big to debar\" problem – the federal government is too dependent on a particular set of large, private-sector corporations for equipment and services. In addition to the virtual immunity from debarment enjoyed by these firms when they violate the FCPA, the fines imposed for engaging in foreign corrupt practices comprise a tiny fraction of the potential revenue generated by lucrative contracts with the U.S. and foreign states. When discounted by the low probability of detection, these sanctions are far too low to deter unlawful activity. Debarment would deter potential wrongdoers and incapacitate actual offenders. The deterrent would induce more firms to comply with the law, which would allow the “too big to debar” problem to diminish over time. To help illuminate these concerns and lend support to the thesis, this Article will examine the third largest FCPA-related enforcement action to date: the BAE Systems case. On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems paid approximately $400 million in fines for its corrupt practices abroad. In the year that followed however, the federal government awarded BAE contracts in excess of $6 billion dollars. The U.S.’s refusal to debar BAE because of the potential “collateral consequences” provides a case study on the benefits and drawbacks of deterring foreign corruption through suspension and debarment. This Article concludes that the U.S. must beg","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"259 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123241239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corruption: A Misesian Economic Analysis","authors":"T. Otáhal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1920149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1920149","url":null,"abstract":"What is corruption? The aim of this paper is to present and analyze selected theoretical definitions of corruption, to point out their implicit characteristics, and to incorporate these characteristics into a Misesian positive theoretical apparatus. Within this analysis, I argue that Ludwig von Mises was the first to recognize the importance of distinguishing among different institutional frameworks where human action, referred to as corruption, may take place. Then I present a critical reflection on the implementation of the market’s “auto regulation mechanisms” into bureaucratic management in order to eliminate corrupt actions.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117036164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}