ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Harnessing Natural Resources for Sustainable Development: An Alternative View","authors":"C. Onyimadu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2020133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2020133","url":null,"abstract":"This study evaluates a possible alternative view on managing resource revenue for economic growth. Based on recent postulates that resource revenues should be primarily used to increase current consumption and capital stock through investments in the economy (van der ploeg and Venebles, 2009), we evaluate the implications of this policy on an economy plagued by low capital absorbtion, dysfunctional institutions and corruption. We established that the problems of corruption and dysfunctional institutions can potentially stymie any form of economic growth in the short term. This in turn crowds out needed investment and can deepen the problem of the popular natural resource curse. However, the paper introduces a form of international trade where by, resources are exchanged for needed capital investments as a possible alternative to managing resource booms. This alternative will boost economic growth even in the presence of corruption and guarantee increased consumption and capital stock but only in the short run.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134550301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anchoring Bias in TARP Warrant Negotiations","authors":"Linus Wilson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1553969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1553969","url":null,"abstract":"This paper finds that banks that offered lower opening bids were rewarded with significantly lower warrant repurchase prices in transactions that raised $2.856 billion in 2009. These results were scaled by third-party consultants’ and the Congressional Oversight Panel's estimates of the warrants’ value. In contrast to the experimental psychology studies on anchoring bias in negotiations, these are real transactions involving large sums of money. This paper finds that larger banks paid significantly higher prices after controlling for other factors, and the U.S. Treasury obtained better prices over time. The results on anchoring bias are strong even after controlling for bank managers’ potential informational advantages over U.S. Treasury negotiators.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133526417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Data Sharing, Civic Engagement, and Technology Use in Local Government Agencies: Findings from a National Survey","authors":"Mary K. Feeney, E. Welch, Fengxiu Zhang, Leonor Camarena, Seongkyung Cho, Federica Fusi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3069941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3069941","url":null,"abstract":"This report presents findings from the 2016 national survey of local governments on public participation, technology use, data sharing, and work life as part of a long-term research study interested in understanding the relationships between technology and civic engagement in local governments sponsored by the Center for Science, Technology, and Environment Policy Studies (CSTEPS) at Arizona State University. The survey was administered to five lead administrators in 500 local governments where the government is of sufficient size and capacity to purchase and use technology for civic engagement. The survey was administered to individuals working in five positions: City Manager/City Administrator, Director of Community and/or Economic Development, Finance Director, Director of Parks and Recreation, and Deputy Police Chief. The final sample, adjusted for ineligibles, is 2166. The response rate can be calculated as 643/2166 (30%) for completed responses or 841/2166 (39%) if partials are included. This report draws from the statistical analysis of survey data and is organized into four sections: participation, utilization of technology, data sharing, and work life.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129546306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Corruption Matter? The Impact of Corruption in Share Returns of Listed Industrial Companies in Euro Area","authors":"Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini, Laura Pellegrini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1731047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1731047","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate finance literature has devoted much effort in analysing stock returns and in developing models in order to precisely forecast their yields on the market, because of the different useful purposes of these forecasts that animate economic life of countries and corporations. Following a new approach (Bellavite Pellegrini, 2008) in order to measure the relevance of impact of control variables on returns of European stocks since the introduction of Euro and sharing the sample in different portfolios according to different capitalization, this research develops the issues underlined contributing to the identification of a further control variable affecting stock performances: corruption. The goal of this study is an enquiry about the connections between European industrial stock returns and a macroeconomic index of corruption in order to assess the impact of corruption in the performances of listed European industrial companies. This paper is organized as follows: the first paragraph is a brief introduction with an outline of surveys in the Law and Economics literature, paragraph two focuses its attention on data and methodology and paragraph three implements an empirical analysis in order to verify the importance of the above mentioned control variable of corruption in industrial listed companies of European countries. Concluding remarks and some suggestions in order to develop this issue will follow in the last paragraph.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114976037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Consequences of Corruption: Evidences from China","authors":"B. Dong, B. Torgler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1628567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1628567","url":null,"abstract":"With complementary Chinese data sets and alternative corruption measures, we explore the consequences of corruption. Adopting a novel approach we provide evidence that corruption can have both, positive and negative effects, on economic development. The overall impact of corruption might be the balance of the two simultaneous effects within a specific institutional environment (“grease the wheels” and “sand the wheels”). Corruption is observed to considerably increase income inequality in China. We also find that corruption strongly reduces tax revenue. Looking at things from an expenditure point of view we observe that corruption significantly decreases government spending on education, R&D and public health in China. We also observe that regional corruption significantly reduces inbound foreign direct investment in Chinese regions, which indicates that the pollution haven hypothesis may not hold in China. This finding sheds a new light on the “China puzzle” that China is the largest developing host of FDI while it is appears to be very corrupt. Finally we observe that corruption substantially aggravates pollution probably through loosening environment regulation, and that it modifies the effects of trade openness and FDI on the stringency of environmental policy in a manner opposite to that observed in literature to date.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124184122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion","authors":"J. Jordana, D. Levi‐Faur, Xavier Fernández‐i‐Marín","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1557142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1557142","url":null,"abstract":"The autonomous regulatory agency has recently become the ‘appropriate model’ of governance across countries and sectors. The dynamics of this process is captured in our data set, which covers the creation of agencies in 48 countries and 16 sectors since the 1920s. Adopting a diffusion approach to explain this broad process of institutional change, we explore the role of countries and sectors as sources of institutional transfer at different stages of the diffusion process. We demonstrate how the restructuring of national bureaucracies unfolds via four different channels of institutional transfer. Our results challenge theoretical approaches that overemphasize the national dimension in global diffusion and are insensitive to the stages of the diffusion process. Further advance in study of diffusion depends, we assert, on the ability to apply both cross-sectoral and cross-national analysis to the same research design and to incorporate channels of transfer with different causal mechanisms for different stages of the diffusion process.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122337328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Role of Anti-Corruption Commissions in Changing Cultural Attitudes towards Corruption and the Rule of Law","authors":"Melissa Khemani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1386496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1386496","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is narrow in scope and addresses how an emerging anti-corruption tool, the anti-corruption commission, can play an important role in changing cultural attitudes towards corruption and the rule of law. Citizen participation and engagement has been long-featured as a best practice for development; however, too much focus has been placed on directing this through civil society organisations. What this paper seeks to illustrate is that citizen engagement by government institutions can have a meaningful impact in changing perceptions towards the role of government and the meaning of the rule of law - especially in societies where the government has been long perceived as elitist and far from reach. Anti-corruption commissions are by no means a panacea; however, by directly engaging the public and creating a role for the citizen in the fight against corruption, anti-corruption commissions are able to include the once powerless directly into the process, and thereby help alleviate the culture of complacency that has plagued corrupt States.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124427647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corruption in Public Procurement Auctions: Positive Equilibrium Analysis, Incentive Mechanism Design, and Empirical Study","authors":"M. M. Wihardja","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1294088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1294088","url":null,"abstract":"We study how poor quality of institution, such as corruption in public procurement auction, could hurt welfare. We show how competition effect could improve the cost-efficiency but not the quality of a public procurement auction with corruption. In fact, no incentive mechanism can be efficient in this auction if qualities are non-contractible. An empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders does increase the percentage cost efficiency albeit at a decreasing rate and decreases the percentage cost efficiency after it reaches a certain number of bidders.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116606553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme: Political Corruption of Russian Doctorates","authors":"Ararat L. Osipian","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1293951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1293951","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the issue of doctorates for sale in the Russian Federation. It uses an example of the Russian political establishment to project on the issue of corruption in conferring doctorates and searches to answer the questions: Why do politicians buy doctorates? and Is it possible to stop such a practice and how? This paper derives the definition of corruption in conferral of doctoral degrees to elected politicians and other public officials. It assembles and analyzes a database of doctoral degrees, academic ranks, memberships in the academies, and awards, decorations, and titles, held by the members of the Council of Federation and the State Duma. In theory, doctorates are needed to pursue scholarship and research. Thus, knowledge is the best criterion of the genuine doctorate and professorship along with research achievements is a best usage of doctorates. In practice, however, doctorates offer their holders some indirect or intangible benefits, among which are public recognition and respect. These benefits can then be transformed into direct and tangible benefits through different means, including the electoral process. Accordingly, it may be the case that politicians abuse the existing system of conferring doctorates in order to improve their image and use status-signs in a highly ceremonial society of modern Russia.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"453 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113986681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards Effective Anti-Corruption Strategies in Ukraine: Removing the Cornerstone Without Toppling the Building","authors":"V. Dubrovskiy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1438040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1438040","url":null,"abstract":"The work presents a theoretical framework, and offers a tentative analytical framework for building strategies for combating systemic corruption of the kind that is observed in Ukraine. It argues that, as in some other countries undergoing the process of modernization, corruption in Ukraine plays an important social role by filling gaps between formal (often impracticable) rules, and informal ones. At the same time, it creates incentives and provides the means for maintaining and widening these gaps, as in the critically important case of “capture” of the state by extorting officials endowed with abnormal administrative discretion and affiliated with crony businesses. Systemic factors of such kind make corruption so persistent and anti-corruption so necessary for development. Effective strategies should primarily address the real sources of corruption, and take into account the possible side effects. Otherwise anticorruption efforts can bring only limited success, and may even become counterproductive, as demonstrated in the examples of previous anti-corruption attempts in Ukraine. Meanwhile, prior to the Orange Revolution, systemic factors prevented the implementation of effective anticorruption strategies. In order to facilitate the creation of anti-corruption constituencies, it is proposed to classify the corrupt deals as embezzlement, collusion, overtimes, and extortion based on the interests of involved and suffering parties. Implications from this theoretical analysis are combined with some standard politicaleconomic recommendations in the tentative analytical framework for policy making and public advocacy. As examples of its application, tentative anti-corruption strategies are suggested for some forms of corruption in Ukraine, such as capture in setting up legislation and extortion in its enforcement; embezzlement in budget execution, collusion in procurement and regulation, and asset stripping in state-owned firms; collusion and extortion in public services; and extortion in the public administration.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125413383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}