ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)最新文献

The Transitional Gains Trap 过渡性收益陷阱

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-08-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3912971

Art Carden, S. Moore

引用次数: 0

Anti-Corruption Activities оf Public Financial Audit Bodies and Digital Economy 反腐败活动:公共财政审计机构与数字经济

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-12-09 DOI: 10.2991/assehr.k.201205.006

Galina Balykina, E. Belikov, A. Belikova, N. Gegediush, V. Popov

引用次数: 0

Lenders’ Culture and the Pricing of US Public Corruption in Corporate Loans 贷款人文化与美国企业贷款中公共腐败的定价

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3750856

Theodora Bermpei, Christine Christofi-Hau, A. Kalyvas

引用次数: 0

Resource Shocks, Corruption, and Local Business in Africa 非洲的资源冲击、腐败和地方商业

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-09-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3688541

Jamie Bologna Pavlik, Amanda Ross

引用次数: 0

Revisiting James Q. Wilson’s Bureaucracy: Appointee Politics and Outcome Observability 重新审视詹姆斯·q·威尔逊的官僚主义:任命政治和结果可观察性

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-04-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3444698

William G. Resh, Heejin Cho

{"title":"Revisiting James Q. Wilson’s Bureaucracy: Appointee Politics and Outcome Observability","authors":"William G. Resh, Heejin Cho","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3444698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3444698","url":null,"abstract":"This study introduces a measurement approach to test a core precept in the study of bureaucratic politics and public organizations. First, we quantify James Q. Wilson’s famous agency typology by the relative observability of agency outcomes. We code over 20,000 stated objectives from Performance and Accountability Reports (PAR) for United States federal agencies over the years 2000 to 2012 by whether the attainment of a given objective can be attributed directly to the programmatic activities of the agency (i.e., observable) or if its attainment is dependent upon other actors or other socioeconomic factors outside the agency’s control (i.e., unobservable). We then test Wilson’s previously untested proposition that “production” and “craft” organizations (i.e., those with more observable outcomes) will be better managed by career leadership, whereas “coping” and “procedural” organizations (i.e., those with more unobservable outcomes) are better managed by appointed leadership. We account for contemporary realities of appointee politics, including the president’s strategic use of unilateral appointments in lower executive and upper management positions and the pervasiveness of appointee vacancies at the highest levels. Although scholars frequently rely on the Wilson typology in empirical and theoretical explorations of bureaucratic behavior, its dimensions have not been systematically measured at any level of government. We find, consistent with Wilson, that politicization diminishes performance in Craft and Production agencies. On the other hand, vacancies in presidential appointee positions are associated with lower performance only in those agencies that do not map to ideal types in Wilson's schema. In other words, the relative observability of an agency’s goal agenda moderates the effectiveness of its appointed leadership—a contingency that has been insufficiently accommodated in previous work.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131588046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Money Politics vs. Political Cost; Enforcing and Honest Democracy 金钱政治与政治成本;执行和诚实的民主

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-01-29 DOI: 10.31014/aior.1991.03.01.146

Edhy Prabowo, Dadang Rahmat Hidayat, D. Sugiana, Bachtiar Aly

{"title":"Money Politics vs. Political Cost; Enforcing and Honest Democracy","authors":"Edhy Prabowo, Dadang Rahmat Hidayat, D. Sugiana, Bachtiar Aly","doi":"10.31014/aior.1991.03.01.146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31014/aior.1991.03.01.146","url":null,"abstract":"Elections require costs, because there are a number of expenses to succeed during the campaign, this is what is referred to as political costs. In addition to political costs, a phenomenon arises in the current democratic system in Indonesia, prevalently called by money politics. There were many cases of campaign violations that used money politics to get as many votes as possible. The purpose of writing this article is to explain the political costs and money politics in the process of democracy in Indonesia especially in the electoral district of South Sumatra 1. In addition, the study wanted to describe how persuasive political communication can be a strategy for low cost campaign but still effective to gain a lot of votes. This is a qualitative using the case study method. The subject of this study was the elected legislators during the period of 2014-2019 with a significant vote acquisition in their electoral district of South Sumatra 1. The results of the study showed that not all electoral participants practiced money politics, evidently there were successful candidates for the South Sumatra electoral district 1 without money politics, even only with low to moderate costs of politics. The legislative candidate for the South Sumatra electoral district 1 in his campaign carried out persuasive political communication as a campaign strategy. The candidates apply two main strategies; direct communication towards constituents and using an opinion leader (Opinion Leader). The communication patterns applied are face to face with constituents, as well as using mass media.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125452067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Automated Discretion 自动化的自由裁量权

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3453068

S. Zouridis, Marlies van Eck, M. Bovens

引用次数: 28

Setting a Good Example? The Effect of Leader and Peer Behavior on Corruption Among Indonesian Senior Civil Servants 树立一个好榜样?领导与同伴行为对印尼高级公务员腐败的影响

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-05-27 DOI: 10.1111/PUAR.13059

Mala Sondang Silitonga, M. V. van Duijn, L. Heyse, R. Wittek

引用次数: 6

Public Accountability System: Empirical Assessment of Public Sector of Malaysia 公共问责制:马来西亚公共部门的实证评估

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.3923/AJSR.2015.225.236

Md. Mahmudul Alam, Jamaliah Said

{"title":"Public Accountability System: Empirical Assessment of Public Sector of Malaysia","authors":"Md. Mahmudul Alam, Jamaliah Said","doi":"10.3923/AJSR.2015.225.236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3923/AJSR.2015.225.236","url":null,"abstract":"As the recent Auditor General‟s report discovered some corruptions, weakness, and lack of control in asset management in the public sector of Malaysia, this study is an attempt to assess the status of current practices of accountability in public sector of Malaysia. This study collected primary data based on a set of questionnaire survey that was distributed by email using the Google Doc application among the head of department of 682 departments and agencies under 24 federal ministries including the Prime Minister Department in Malaysia. Finally, based on the email responses, the final sample of the study is 109 respondents. The data were collected based on the opinion about ten factors of accountability practices in the department or agency by using seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The data are analysed under descriptive statistics and factor analysis. Further, the reliability of the data is tested by using Cronbach alpha test, and the validity of data is tested by checking the normality of data through Shapiro Wilk test and graphically. Overall, 87.3% of the respondents mentioned that overall they practice accountability in their department. However, the priority of these ten factors of accountability differs among the services schemes. The accountability in the administrative & diplomatic, education, and medical & health is below the overall average accountability. The accountability in the financial and information system schemes is also not strong enough. Therefore the public sector in Malaysia needs to be transformed into becoming a reliable and efficient sector by ensuring proper accountability and its proper assessment system.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128019880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 47

Does Corruption Affect Local and Foreign Owned Companies Differently? Evidence from the BEEPS Survey 腐败对本地和外资公司的影响不同吗?来自BEEPS调查的证据

ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-02-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3329236

Gaygysyz Ashyrov, J. Masso

引用次数: 4