{"title":"裙带资本主义的编年史:重新审视AIG救助","authors":"Malcolm S. Salter","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2364090","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cronyism may well be an intensifying problem in contemporary American capitalism, but an incorrect identification and labeling of crony capitalism subverts meaningful reform. Five years after considerable financial assistance was provided to the American International Group by the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the U.S. Treasury, the AIG bailout story remains highly controversial as a putative case of capitalism gone bad — crony capitalism at its worst. This paper reviews the record surrounding the AIG bankruptcy and argues that the bailout decision and the subsequent structure of the bailout tell a much different story than the one characterized as “crony capitalism.” Based on a close reading of this record, the story I tell is that the lingering controversies over the bailout are not a result of the corrupt behavior of Federal Reserve and Treasury officials. Rather, they are the result of impromptu and highly improvised risk management by government officials who had no clear regulatory authority over failing investment banks and insurance companies — like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG — and who were conditioned by their professional training and current responsibilities to focus on the worst-case scenarios following the collapse of large financial institutions holding fast-depreciating real estate assets. Operating under severe time constraints and existential anxiety, mistakes and missteps were made by the New York Fed in its unfamiliar role as the chief restructuring officer of AIG. But this is far different story than calculated corruption benefiting large domestic and foreign banks vulnerable to an AIG collapse. This essay is a cautionary tale about exaggerated (and false) claims of institutional corruption in the public and private sectors. We are currently witnessing a sufficient number of cases of both unlawful and lawful-but-corrupt behavior to motivate a debate about meaningful reforms. Inaccurate characterizations of institutional and individual behavior can only serve to contaminate this important conversation.","PeriodicalId":122993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption (Topic)","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Annals of Crony Capitalism: Revisiting the AIG Bailout\",\"authors\":\"Malcolm S. Salter\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2364090\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Cronyism may well be an intensifying problem in contemporary American capitalism, but an incorrect identification and labeling of crony capitalism subverts meaningful reform. Five years after considerable financial assistance was provided to the American International Group by the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the U.S. Treasury, the AIG bailout story remains highly controversial as a putative case of capitalism gone bad — crony capitalism at its worst. This paper reviews the record surrounding the AIG bankruptcy and argues that the bailout decision and the subsequent structure of the bailout tell a much different story than the one characterized as “crony capitalism.” Based on a close reading of this record, the story I tell is that the lingering controversies over the bailout are not a result of the corrupt behavior of Federal Reserve and Treasury officials. Rather, they are the result of impromptu and highly improvised risk management by government officials who had no clear regulatory authority over failing investment banks and insurance companies — like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG — and who were conditioned by their professional training and current responsibilities to focus on the worst-case scenarios following the collapse of large financial institutions holding fast-depreciating real estate assets. Operating under severe time constraints and existential anxiety, mistakes and missteps were made by the New York Fed in its unfamiliar role as the chief restructuring officer of AIG. But this is far different story than calculated corruption benefiting large domestic and foreign banks vulnerable to an AIG collapse. This essay is a cautionary tale about exaggerated (and false) claims of institutional corruption in the public and private sectors. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
任人唯亲可能是当代美国资本主义中一个日益严重的问题,但对任人唯亲资本主义的错误识别和标签颠覆了有意义的改革。在纽约联邦储备银行(New York Federal Reserve Bank)和美国财政部向美国国际集团(AIG)提供了可观的金融援助五年后,美国国际集团(AIG)的纾困故事仍然备受争议,被认为是资本主义变坏的一个案例——裙带资本主义最糟糕的情况。本文回顾了围绕美国国际集团破产的记录,并认为救助决定和随后的救助结构讲述了一个与被描述为“裙带资本主义”截然不同的故事。在仔细阅读这些记录的基础上,我要说的是,围绕救助计划的争议挥之不去,并不是美联储和财政部官员腐败行为的结果。相反,它们是政府官员即兴和高度即兴的风险管理的结果,他们对失败的投资银行和保险公司(如贝尔斯登、雷曼兄弟和美国国际集团)没有明确的监管权力,他们的专业培训和当前的责任使他们专注于持有快速贬值的房地产资产的大型金融机构倒闭后的最坏情况。纽约联邦储备银行(New York Fed)作为美国国际集团(AIG)的首席重组官,在严重的时间限制和生存焦虑下行事,犯了很多错误和失误。但这与有意让容易受到AIG破产影响的大型国内外银行受益的腐败行为截然不同。这篇文章是一个关于公共和私营部门机构腐败的夸大(和虚假)说法的警示故事。我们目前目睹了大量非法和合法但腐败的行为,足以激发有关有意义改革的辩论。对机构和个人行为的不准确描述只会污染这一重要的对话。
Annals of Crony Capitalism: Revisiting the AIG Bailout
Cronyism may well be an intensifying problem in contemporary American capitalism, but an incorrect identification and labeling of crony capitalism subverts meaningful reform. Five years after considerable financial assistance was provided to the American International Group by the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the U.S. Treasury, the AIG bailout story remains highly controversial as a putative case of capitalism gone bad — crony capitalism at its worst. This paper reviews the record surrounding the AIG bankruptcy and argues that the bailout decision and the subsequent structure of the bailout tell a much different story than the one characterized as “crony capitalism.” Based on a close reading of this record, the story I tell is that the lingering controversies over the bailout are not a result of the corrupt behavior of Federal Reserve and Treasury officials. Rather, they are the result of impromptu and highly improvised risk management by government officials who had no clear regulatory authority over failing investment banks and insurance companies — like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG — and who were conditioned by their professional training and current responsibilities to focus on the worst-case scenarios following the collapse of large financial institutions holding fast-depreciating real estate assets. Operating under severe time constraints and existential anxiety, mistakes and missteps were made by the New York Fed in its unfamiliar role as the chief restructuring officer of AIG. But this is far different story than calculated corruption benefiting large domestic and foreign banks vulnerable to an AIG collapse. This essay is a cautionary tale about exaggerated (and false) claims of institutional corruption in the public and private sectors. We are currently witnessing a sufficient number of cases of both unlawful and lawful-but-corrupt behavior to motivate a debate about meaningful reforms. Inaccurate characterizations of institutional and individual behavior can only serve to contaminate this important conversation.