游说在欧洲:新的公司层面的证据

Konstantinos Dellis, David Sondermann
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引用次数: 21

摘要

游说可以为决策者提供特定部门的重要信息,从而促进知情决策。如果远远超出这个范围,特别是如果成功地影响政策制定者不必要地收紧监管或不开放已经过度监管的市场,它可能会降低整体经济福利。我们创建了一个关于欧盟游说活动和企业特征的独特的企业层面数据库。我们往往会发现,处于更受保护行业的公司,例如来自非贸易行业或监管更严格行业的公司,倾向于在游说活动上花费更多。此外,这类公司往往利润率较高,生产率较低,在受保护的行业往往如此。JEL分类:D72, D78, O38
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Lobbying in Europe: New Firm-Level Evidence
Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation or not opening already excessively regulated markets, it could potentially reduce overall economic welfare. We create a unique firm-level database on EU lobby activity and firm characteristics. We tend to find that firms in more protected sector, e.g. firms from non-tradable or higher regulated sectors tend to spend more for lobby activities. Also such firms tend to have higher profit margins and lower productivity, as often the case in sheltered sectors. JEL Classification: D72, D78, O38
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