Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)最新文献

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The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example. 道德责任的充分而非必要的交替可能性原则:避免法兰克福反例的途径。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2016-02-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9690-2
Garry Young
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引用次数: 7
Ineffability: Reply to Professors Metz and Cooper. 不可言喻:回复Metz和Cooper教授。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2016-12-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9772-1
Guy Bennett-Hunter
{"title":"Ineffability: Reply to Professors Metz and Cooper.","authors":"Guy Bennett-Hunter","doi":"10.1007/s11406-016-9772-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9772-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the first two sections of this reply article, I provide a brief introduction to the topic of ineffability and a summary of <i>Ineffability and Religious Experience</i>. This is followed, in section 3, by some reflections in reply to the response articles by Professors Metz and Cooper. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks on the future of philosophy of religion in the light of the most recent philosophical work on ineffability.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 4","pages":"1267-1287"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9772-1","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36443409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Healing Multiculturalism: Middle-Ground Liberal Forgiveness in a Diverse Public Realm. 治愈多元文化主义:多元公共领域的中间立场自由宽恕。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2016-10-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9758-z
Monica Mookherjee
{"title":"Healing Multiculturalism: Middle-Ground Liberal Forgiveness in a Diverse Public Realm.","authors":"Monica Mookherjee","doi":"10.1007/s11406-016-9758-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9758-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article examines debates about political forgiveness in liberal, pluralist societies. Although the concept of forgiveness is not usually taken up by liberals, I outline a plausible conception by exploring two recent approaches. The first, 'unattached articulation', concept requires no real emotional change on the forgiver's part, but rather a form of civic restraint. In contrast, the second version highlights a strong form of empathy for perpetrators. In spite of their advantages, each concept proves too extreme. The problems are revealed by focusing on the case of the Harkis, who fought for the French during the Algerian war. Often still marginalised in French society, their case helps to highlight the conceivability of a 'middle-ground' or moderate concept of political forgiveness. Its core rests on the forgiver's care for the social world. While this concept brings considerable challenges also, and is not inevitable in any particular case, it entails a more plausible combination of emotional and rational shifts in the forgiver's world-view. Although the article does not recommend forgiveness by any person or group, it observes, recalling Arendt's idea of <i>amor mundi</i> or 'love of the world', that political forgiveness may sustain a viable connection between diverse citizens' public and non-public lives.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 4","pages":"1057-1078"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9758-z","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36439170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat. 建构主义与先验实践哲学:如何从帽子里拉出兔子。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2016-09-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3
Sorin Baiasu
{"title":"Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat.","authors":"Sorin Baiasu","doi":"10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic - whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard's transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 4","pages":"1185-1208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36439172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Nonexistent Objects as Truth-Makers: Against Crane's Reductionism. 作为真理制造者的不存在对象:对克兰的还原论的反对。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2016-04-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9710-2
Filippo Casati, Naoya Fujikawa
{"title":"Nonexistent Objects as Truth-Makers: Against Crane's Reductionism.","authors":"Filippo Casati,&nbsp;Naoya Fujikawa","doi":"10.1007/s11406-016-9710-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9710-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>According to Meinongianism, some objects do not exist but we can legitimately refer to and quantify over them. Moreover, Meinongianism standardly regards nonexistent objects as contributing to the truth-makers of sentences about nonexistent objects. Recently, Tim Crane has proposed a weak form of Meinongianism, a reductionism, which denies any contribution of nonexistent objects to truth-making. His reductionism claims that, even though we can truly talk about nonexistent objects by using singular terms and quantifiers about them, any truth about nonexistent objects is reducible to some truths about existent objects. In this paper, we critically examine the reductionism casting some doubts on the reducibility of truths of sentences like 'a winged pig is possible' or 'some winged pig does not exist' into truths about existent objects. We also argue that the truth of such sentences can be explained by adopting a strong form of Meinongianism which admits contribution of nonexistent objects to the truth-making of such sentences.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 2","pages":"423-434"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9710-2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36441740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Between Indifference and the Regimes of Truth. An Essay on Fundamentalism, Tolerance and Hypocrisy. 《在冷漠与真理政体之间》论原教旨主义、宽容与虚伪。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2015-04-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-015-9596-4
Theo W A de Wit
{"title":"Between Indifference and the Regimes of Truth. An Essay on Fundamentalism, Tolerance and Hypocrisy.","authors":"Theo W A de Wit","doi":"10.1007/s11406-015-9596-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9596-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>There are two basic positions where tolerance as political strategy and moral viewpoint is rejected or made redundant. We are hostile to tolerance when we hold that we are defending an objective truth-religious or secular-which should also be defended and maintained by means of political and legal power. And tolerance become superfluous also when the affirmation of plurality becomes total, and tolerance identical to a vive la difference. As recent developments in my own country-the Netherlands-have demonstrated, the political outcome of this last position is remarkably enough not necessarily an all-inclusive relativistic tolerance. It may just as well be one of intolerance towards 'believers' of all kinds, in short: tolerance becomes polemical and belligerent. Turning to religious fundamentalism or ultra-orthodoxy could then become a possible (extreme) reaction to this relativistic and subjectivist position, as demonstrated in Isaac Bashevis Singer's novel The Penitent. Between these two positions of hostility or indifference towards tolerance, we can situate that democratic attitude which may rightly be called 'tolerance'. As ethical position, the tolerant citizen accepts the democratic disjunction between my (private) truth and the symmetrical justice between citizens. As political strategy, a tolerant democratic regime is based upon a political act of exclusion of what I will here call 'political fundamentalism'.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 3","pages":"689-703"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-015-9596-4","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36441743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Introduction: Forgiveness and Conflict. 引言:宽恕与冲突。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2016-12-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9787-7
Paula Satne
{"title":"Introduction: Forgiveness and Conflict.","authors":"Paula Satne","doi":"10.1007/s11406-016-9787-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11406-016-9787-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The papers collected in this volume are a selection of papers that were presented - or scheduled to be presented - at a workshop entitled Forgiveness and Conflict, which took place from 8-10 September 2014, as part of the Mancept Workshops in Political Theory at the University of Manchester. Some of these contributions are now compiled in this volume. The selected papers draw from different philosophical traditions and conceptual frameworks, addressing many aspects of contemporary philosophical debates on the nature and normativity of forgiveness, including its political aspects. The result is a rich collection of essays which covers a wide variety of philosophical issues, displaying cutting edge scholarship in this area. This introduction provides a brief overview of some of the central themes discussed in the volume with a particular emphasis on their innovative aspects.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 4","pages":"999-1006"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9787-7","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36439167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Forgiveness and Identification. 宽恕和认同。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2016-03-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9688-9
Geoffrey Scarre
{"title":"Forgiveness and Identification.","authors":"Geoffrey Scarre","doi":"10.1007/s11406-016-9688-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9688-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Philosophical discussion of forgiveness has mainly focused on cases in which victims and offenders are known to each other. But it commonly happens that a victim brings an offender under a definite description (e.g. 'the boy who kicked his football through my window') but does not know to which individual this applies. I explore some of the conceptual and moral issues raised by the phenomenon of forgiveness in circumstances in which identification is incomplete, tentative or even mistaken. Among the conclusions reached are that correct and precise identification of the offending individual is not essential for forgiveness to take place; that an offender can, under certain strict conditions, be said to be forgiven <i>by proxy</i> where the victim has misidentified the offender and 'forgiven' the wrong person; and that proxy forgiveness of this sort is not subject to the objections commonly levelled against 'proxy' or 'third-party forgiveness.'</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 4","pages":"1021-1028"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9688-9","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36439168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Schizophrenia and Moral Responsibility: A Kantian Essay. 精神分裂症与道德责任:康德随笔。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2016-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-015-9685-4
Matthé Scholten
{"title":"Schizophrenia and Moral Responsibility: A Kantian Essay.","authors":"Matthé Scholten","doi":"10.1007/s11406-015-9685-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9685-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper, I give a Kantian answer to the question whether and why it would be inappropriate to blame people suffering from mental disorders that fall within the schizophrenia spectrum. I answer this question by reconstructing Kant's account of mental disorder, in particular his explanation of psychotic symptoms. Kant explains these symptoms in terms of various types of cognitive impairment. I show that this explanation is plausible and discuss Kant's claim that the unifying feature of the symptoms is the patient's inability to enter into an exchange of reasons with others. After developing a Kantian Quality of Will Thesis, I analyze some real life cases. Firstly, I argue that delusional patients who are unable to enter into an exchange of epistemic reasons are exempted from doxastic rather than moral responsibility. They are part of the moral community and exonerated from moral blame only if their actions do not express a lack of good will. Secondly, I argue that disorganized patients who are unable to form intentions and to make plans are exempted from moral responsibility because they do not satisfy the conditions for agency.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 1","pages":"205-225"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-015-9685-4","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36441739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence? 非凡的主张需要非凡的证据吗?
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 Epub Date: 2016-10-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9779-7
David Deming
{"title":"Do Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence?","authors":"David Deming","doi":"10.1007/s11406-016-9779-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9779-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In 1979 astronomer Carl Sagan popularized the aphorism \"extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence\" (ECREE). But Sagan never defined the term \"extraordinary.\" Ambiguity in what constitutes \"extraordinary\" has led to misuse of the aphorism. ECREE is commonly invoked to discredit research dealing with scientific anomalies, and has even been rhetorically employed in attempts to raise doubts concerning mainstream scientific hypotheses that have substantive empirical support. The origin of ECREE lies in eighteenth-century Enlightenment criticisms of miracles. The most important of these was Hume's essay <i>On Miracles</i>. Hume precisely defined an extraordinary claim as one that is directly contradicted by a massive amount of existing evidence. For a claim to qualify as extraordinary there must exist overwhelming empirical data of the exact antithesis. Extraordinary evidence is not a separate category or type of evidence--it is an extraordinarily large number of observations. Claims that are merely novel or those which violate human consensus are not properly characterized as extraordinary. Science does not contemplate two types of evidence. The misuse of ECREE to suppress innovation and maintain orthodoxy should be avoided as it must inevitably retard the scientific goal of establishing reliable knowledge.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 4","pages":"1319-1331"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9779-7","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36443410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
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