发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
How AI Systems Can Be Blameworthy. 人工智能系统如何成为可指责的对象？
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00779-5
Hannah Altehenger, Leonhard Menges, Peter Schulte
{"title":"How AI Systems Can Be Blameworthy.","authors":"Hannah Altehenger, Leonhard Menges, Peter Schulte","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00779-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11406-024-00779-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>AI systems, like self-driving cars, healthcare robots, or Autonomous Weapon Systems, already play an increasingly important role in our lives and will do so to an even greater extent in the near future. This raises a fundamental philosophical question: who is morally responsible when such systems cause unjustified harm? In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising claim that some of these systems can themselves be morally responsible for their conduct in an important and everyday sense of the term-the attributability sense. More specifically, relying on work by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (<i>In Praise of Desire</i>, OUP 2014), we propose that the behavior of these systems can manifest their 'quality of will' and thus be regarded as something they can be blameworthy for. We develop this position in detail, justify some of its crucial presuppositions, and defend it against potential objections.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"52 4","pages":"1083-1106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11579044/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142712082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
W. Matthews Grant's Dual Sources Account and Ultimate Responsibility. W.马修斯-格兰特的《双重来源帐户和最终责任》。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2023-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00610-7
Jordan Wessling, P Roger Turner
{"title":"W. Matthews Grant's Dual Sources Account and Ultimate Responsibility.","authors":"Jordan Wessling, P Roger Turner","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00610-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11406-023-00610-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A number of philosophers and theologians have recently challenged the common assumption that it would be impossible for God to cause humans actions which are free in the libertarian or incompatibilist sense. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this challenge is due to W. Matthews Grant. By offering a detailed account of divine causation, Grant argues that divine universal causation does not preclude humans from being ultimately responsible for their actions, nor free according to typical libertarian accounts. Here, we argue that the kind of divine universal causation that Grant proposes is incompatible with a plausible interpretation of Robert Kane's influential conception of ultimate responsibility. This conclusion is significant since Grant seeks to harmonize his divine causal account with Kane's articulation of ultimate responsibility.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":" ","pages":"1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9886534/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9205347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taxation in the COVID-19 Pandemic: to Pay or Not to Pay. 2019冠状病毒病大流行期间的税收:支付还是不支付。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-021-00354-2
Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere
{"title":"Taxation in the COVID-19 Pandemic: to Pay or Not to Pay.","authors":"Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere","doi":"10.1007/s11406-021-00354-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00354-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Like many governments in this COVID-19 pandemic, the Nigerian government imposed a lockdown on the country. As a consequence of the lockdown, many businesses shutdown and effectively had no source of revenue. Yet, without receiving any bailout or palliatives from the government, these businesses are required to meet their tax obligations to the government. Bearing in mind that this time (COVID-19 era) is different, one wonders what is required of businesses in view of the taxation problem and the social contract between the businesspersons and the government. In view of social contract obligations, in this COVID-19 pandemic should businesses pay tax to a government that seems to have delegitimised itself by its exploitative actions in terms of taxation and delinquent omission in terms of the provision of public goods and social services? The Nigerian government at all tiers (federal, state and local) seldom respect the essence of taxation. Therefore, businesses often pay tax <i>for nothing</i>. For many businesses, as far as taxation is concerned, <i>to pay or not to pay?</i> that is the question. This article is aimed at teasing out this taxation problem that may or may not be a moral dilemma. In view of certain ethical considerations, this article shows why in spite of social contract obligations, there is no consensus or canonical agreement on whether, as law-abiding citizens and juridical persons (legal entities), businesspersons and businesses ought to or ought not to pay tax to the Nigerian government in this COVID-19 pandemic.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"51 1","pages":"5-17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-021-00354-2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9719089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Conditional Analysis of the Agentive Modals: a Reply to Mandelkern et al. 代理情态的条件分析：对 Mandelkern 等人的答复》（The Conditional Analysis of the Agentive Modals: a Reply to Mandelkern et al.
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2023-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-06-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00664-7
Simon Kittle
{"title":"The Conditional Analysis of the Agentive Modals: a Reply to Mandelkern et al.","authors":"Simon Kittle","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00664-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11406-023-00664-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A proper understanding of agentive modals promises to clarify issues to do with free will, know how, and other philosophically interesting topics. In this paper I identify one constraint on, and one structural feature of, trying-based versions of the conditional analysis of the agentive modals. I suggest that the constraint and structural feature together provide a novel account of why the famous Lehrer-Chisholm objection to conditional analyses of ability modals is so powerful. I argue that Mandelkern et al.'s 'Agentive Modals' (<i>Philosophical Review,</i> <i>126/3</i>, 301-343, 2017) conditional analysis of the agentive modals fails to avoid this problem. I also identify two further problems for their account. I close by summarising a number of criteria which any successful semantic analysis of the agentive modals should satisfy.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"51 4","pages":"2117-2138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10501924/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10652405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Value of Knowledge and Other Epistemic Standings: A Case for Epistemic Pluralism. 知识的价值和其他认识论立场：以认识多元主义为例。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2023-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00647-8
Guido Melchior
{"title":"The Value of Knowledge and Other Epistemic Standings: A Case for Epistemic Pluralism.","authors":"Guido Melchior","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00647-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11406-023-00647-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected in the discussion of epistemic value, which focuses to a large extend on the value problem of knowledge. This discussion suggests that knowledge has an outstanding value among epistemic standings because its value exceeds the value of its constitutive parts. I will argue that the value of knowledge is not outstanding by presenting epistemic standings of checking, transferring knowledge, and proving in court, whose values exceed the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"51 4","pages":"1829-1847"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10501942/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10652404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Junk Science, Junk Journals, and Junk Publishing Management: Risk to Science's Credibility. 垃圾科学、垃圾期刊和垃圾出版管理：科学公信力的风险。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2022-11-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-022-00590-0
Jaime A Teixeira da Silva
{"title":"Junk Science, Junk Journals, and Junk Publishing Management: Risk to Science's Credibility.","authors":"Jaime A Teixeira da Silva","doi":"10.1007/s11406-022-00590-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11406-022-00590-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":" ","pages":"1-4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9684982/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"35347282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dretske's Naturalistic Representationalism and Privileged Accessibility Thesis. 德雷茨克的自然主义表象论和特权可及论。
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-022-00578-w
Manas Kumar Sahu
{"title":"Dretske's Naturalistic Representationalism and Privileged Accessibility Thesis.","authors":"Manas Kumar Sahu","doi":"10.1007/s11406-022-00578-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11406-022-00578-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The objective of the current paper is to provide a critical analysis of Dretske's defense of the naturalistic version of the privileged accessibility thesis. Dretske construed that the justificatory condition of privileged accessibility neither relies on the appeal to perspectival ontology of phenomenal subjectivity nor on the functionalistic notion of accessibility. He has reformulated introspection (which justifies the non-inferentiality of the knowledge of one's own mental facts in an internalist view) as a displaced perception for the defense of naturalistic privileged accessibility. Both internalist and externalist have been approved the plausibility of first-person authority argument through privileged accessibility; however, their disagreement lies on the justificatory condition of privileged accessibility. Internalist hold the view that the justificatory warrant for privileged accessibility is grounded on phenomenal subjectivity. In contrast to the internalist view, externalists uphold the view that the justificatory condition for privileged accessibility lies outside the domain of phenomenal subjectivity. As a proponent of naturalistic content externalism, Dretske defends the view that subject's privileged accessibility is not due to having access to the particular representational state (hence, they have the privilege of getting sensory representational information) and the awareness of mental fact rather the awareness of the whole representational mechanism. Having the knowledge of a particular representational state through privileged access is not the sufficient condition for the accuracy of knowledge about one's own mental facts. The justificatory warrant lies external to the subject. Even though Dretske's naturalistic representation is not plausible enough while dealing with the reduction of phenomenal qualities of experience, however, provides a new roadmap to compatibilists for the defense of privileged accessibility and has a major impact on transparency theorists.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":" ","pages":"1-23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9476446/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40371014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Devil is in the Framework. Comment on Mizrahi vs. all Debate on the Strength of Arguments from an Expert Opinion 魔鬼在框架里。评论米兹拉希与所有关于专家意见的论点强度的辩论
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2022-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-022-00490-3
Szymon Makuła
{"title":"The Devil is in the Framework. Comment on Mizrahi vs. all Debate on the Strength of Arguments from an Expert Opinion","authors":"Szymon Makuła","doi":"10.1007/s11406-022-00490-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00490-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 1","pages":"1999 - 2013"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75241174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to: Public Reason in a Pandemic: John Rawls on Truth in the Age of COVID-19 大流行中的公共理性:约翰·罗尔斯论COVID-19时代的真理
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2022-03-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-022-00491-2
C. H. Warner
{"title":"Correction to: Public Reason in a Pandemic: John Rawls on Truth in the Age of COVID-19","authors":"C. H. Warner","doi":"10.1007/s11406-022-00491-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00491-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"11 1","pages":"1515 - 1515"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77011553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
 Public Reason in a Pandemic: John Rawls on Truth in the Age of COVID-19. 大流行中的公共理性:约翰·罗尔斯论新冠肺炎时代的真相
Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-021-00459-8
Calvin H Warner
{"title":" Public Reason in a Pandemic: John Rawls on Truth in the Age of COVID-19.","authors":"Calvin H Warner","doi":"10.1007/s11406-021-00459-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00459-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In \"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,\" John Rawls suggests an approach to a public conception of justice that eschews any dependence on metaphysical conceptions of justice in favor of a political conception of justice. This means that if there is a metaphysical conception of justice that actually obtains, then Rawls' theory would not (and could not) be sensitive to it. Rawls himself admitted in Political Liberalism that \"the political conception does without the truth.\" Similarly, in Law of Peoples, Rawls endorses a political conception of justice to govern the society of peoples that is not concerned with truth, but instead concerned with being sufficiently neutral so as to avoid conflict with any reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The odd result is that this neutrality excludes any conception of truth at all. Therefore, in times of crisis that demand incisive decision making based on scientific, economic or moral considerations, public reason will stall because it can contain no coherent conception of truth.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"50 3","pages":"1503-1513"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8801277/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39755407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信