{"title":"“Luxury beliefs”: Signaling through ideology?","authors":"Margaret Samahita","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2026.102538","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2026.102538","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The concept of “luxury beliefs”—ideological stances used to signal status—has attracted growing attention in public discourse. Using a set of statements commonly described as “luxury beliefs”, I conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative U.S. sample (<span><math><mrow><mi>n</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>715</mn></mrow></math></span>) to examine how widely these beliefs are recognized, whether they are associated with higher socioeconomic status (proxied by education and income), and whether individuals use them for status signaling toward relevant audiences. I find that: (i) Only 39% of the participants, primarily Republicans, report having heard of “luxury beliefs”. (ii) Agreement with luxury beliefs is not associated with higher education or income. (iii) There is little evidence of signaling behavior, aside from suggestive evidence that Independents express higher agreement with luxury beliefs when paired with a Democrat. These results indicate that luxury beliefs are not widely recognized or used as status signals in the general population.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"121 ","pages":"Article 102538"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147397576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chiara Natalie Focacci , Tobias Gesche , Henry Kim , Ian Ayres , Alexander Stremitzer
{"title":"Can paying employees to quit boost motivation? Evidence from a lab experiment","authors":"Chiara Natalie Focacci , Tobias Gesche , Henry Kim , Ian Ayres , Alexander Stremitzer","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2026.102521","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2026.102521","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether pay-to-quit incentives can enhance worker productivity by conducting an online laboratory experiment with 1000 participants. Subjects were randomly assigned to either a control condition, which offered no financial inducement to quit, or to a treatment condition in which they received a one-time offer of CHF 5 ($ 6.16) to exit the task. While our design does not allow a clean decomposition of the total treatment effect into separate motivational and selection components our findings indicate that participants who reject the quit offer complete, on average, 33% more tasks than those in the control group. The evidence suggests that the foregone quit payment establishes a salient reference point, thereby inducing increased effort and a higher likelihood of surpassing performance thresholds. This study contributes to both behavioral decision research and the practice of personnel management by elucidating how a seemingly counterintuitive incentive can have dual effects: screening out less-committed employees and motivating those who remain to invest greater effort.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"121 ","pages":"Article 102521"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146079185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Beatrice Braut , Maria Alessandra Paissoni , Barbara Cavalletti , Susana Río Segade , Matteo Corsi , Luca Rolle
{"title":"Naturally biased? Experimental evidence on how the term natural influences wine consumers’ perceptions and preferences","authors":"Beatrice Braut , Maria Alessandra Paissoni , Barbara Cavalletti , Susana Río Segade , Matteo Corsi , Luca Rolle","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2026.102527","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2026.102527","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Food consumption choices have relevant consequences on the environment, and consumers are getting more and more conscious about it. In the absence of perfect information, consumers use signals to infer product quality, but these can also mislead. The object of our work is to test how a label can influence product evaluations and test if halo effects exist after subjects have experienced the product. We focus on wine and the label natural. Using an experimental design in a wine tasting setting, we find that sensory and quality perceptions of the wine are altered by the use of the term natural. The term \"natural\" is associated with a perceived higher sustainability of the product, potentially misleading the choices of environmentally conscious consumers. However, there is no such effect on the health domain, which would be a deep concern for wine. To drive the influence of the label are the subjects with less wine expertise, for whom information about the naturalness of the wine alters also the evaluation on the health domain.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"121 ","pages":"Article 102527"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146079182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anne Lieke Ebbers-Pardijs, Juliette Alenda-Demoutiez, Natascha Wagner
{"title":"Legal reforms, norms, and child marriage: observational evidence on behavioral responses in sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"Anne Lieke Ebbers-Pardijs, Juliette Alenda-Demoutiez, Natascha Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102499","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102499","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study takes a macro perspective to examine how age-of-marriage laws have evolved across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and how societal norms and behavior related to child marriage changed concurrently. The literature has not found a clear effect of age-of-marriage laws on the practice of child marriage. To analyze the possible reasons for the mixed results, we combine a document and discourse analysis of 88 age-of-marriage laws in 38 Sub-Saharan African countries with trend and regression analyses performed on 3312,019 individuals aged 15–49. We show that legal changes are not associated with a systematic decrease in child marriage even when accounting for the strictness of the law and specified punishments. The primary explanations center on the discrepancy between formal and informal institutions, and how national governments and individuals behaviorally accommodate this mismatch. The analysis highlights why treating child marriage laws as uniform interventions is prone to error and demonstrates that accounting for informal institutions matters. Adapting too much to informal norms may result in limited change, while completely overrunning informal institutions may create a significant gap between formal and informal rules, equally leading to limited progress. The findings also suggest that mandatory marriage registration could help address enforcement gaps.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 102499"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hey, what did you expect ? Confirmation bias in credence goods markets: Theoretical and experimental analyses","authors":"Maxime Perodaud , Michela Chessa","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102495","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102495","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates how consumer confirmation bias affects expert decision-making in credence goods markets by combining theoretical modeling with experimental analysis. Using psychological game theory, we develop a dynamic two-player model in which an expert’s utility is shaped by both financial incentives and the psychological disutility associated with not meeting consumer expectations. The model predicts that experts with higher psychological sensitivity are more likely to deviate from profit-maximizing strategies to align with consumer beliefs, potentially increasing market inefficiencies. Experimental results show that the extent to which confirmation bias influences expert behavior depends on both the expert’s sensitivity and state of the world. Under conditions of high sensitivity and consumer bias, experts adjusted their recommendations to match consumer expectations, even when doing so led to suboptimal outcomes. These findings have policy implications and contribute to the literature on credence goods by highlighting the tension between expert judgment and consumer-driven expectations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 102495"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145694047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Remembering past present biases","authors":"Barna Bakó , Antal Ertl , Hubert János Kiss","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102484","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102484","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines a potential link between present bias and reduced memory accuracy in intertemporal decision-making. In a classroom experiment with university students, participants made choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards on two occasions. The second time included an immediate option, tempting present-biased participants to choose the immediate reward. During a third visit, participants were randomized into two groups and asked to recall their decisions from one of the previous visits. The results show that participants with present bias had lower memory accuracy than their time-consistent peers in situations involving immediate rewards. Regression analysis indicates that this reduced accuracy is consistent with motivated misremembering — in which individuals recall their past decisions as more virtuous than they actually were. Robustness checks reveal that time inconsistency is positively associated with lower memory accuracy in general, but present-biased participants exhibit clearly distinct patterns compared to their future-biased counterparts. These results are weighed against alternative explanations, notably the possibility of noisy cognition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 102484"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145625085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Misperception of descriptive norms and adoption of eco-schemes by French farmers","authors":"Benjamin Ouvrard , Arnaud Reynaud","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102496","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102496","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Social norms have been shown to explain the adoption of sustainable agriculture practices by farmers. In this article, we focus on the role played by <em>perceived</em> social norms regarding eco-schemes (ES), a new type of direct monetary compensation provided to European farmers who voluntarily adopt specific environmentally-friendly practices. Using data from a large-scale web-survey (N = 1109), we assess to what extent French farmers’ willingness to adopt ES depends on their beliefs about peers’ participation, accounting for the fact that farmers may hold wrong beliefs about what peers think or do. We demonstrate that French farmers systematically underestimate the share of peers wishing to adopt ES, and that this misperception is substantial (more than 20 percentage points). French farmers who misperceive peers’ adoption of ES are also less likely to adopt ES themselves. Finally, we show that the perceived effectiveness of the ES influences both their adoption and the monetary compensation French farmers require to implement them.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 102496"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why should I comply with taxes if others don’t?: Social information and behavioral convergence: An experimental study","authors":"Nathalie Etchart-Vincent , Marisa Ratto , Emmanuelle Taugourdeau","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102497","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102497","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This experimental study investigates the impact of social information about others’ tax behavior on individuals’ subsequent tax decisions. Two types of social information are introduced: (i) the average income reported within the subject’s entire group, and (ii) the average income reported within a reference subgroup made of either peers or non-peers and chosen by the subject. Our results show that social information significantly affects subsequent tax decisions, with a change in reported income ranging from 15% to 30% of total income on average. Moreover, the influence of whole-group information on tax behavior appears to be stronger than that of chosen-group information. Quite strikingly, a majority of subjects show more interest in the tax behavior of non-peers than in that of peers. Finally, our data provide strong evidence of behavioral convergence towards the average tax behavior of others.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 102497"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effect of trust and information on household risky financial investments","authors":"Li Jia , Yi Yuan , Yuxuan Dong , Gerrit Antonides","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102503","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102503","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The effect of trust on household risky financial investments was investigated using a recently developed measure of trust radius. Using data from the 2018 China Family Panel Studies, we show that trust affected both the household decision to invest and the amount of risky investments. These effects were inverted U-shaped. Also, we found that the perceived importance of information from traditional media sources moderated this effect, such that higher importance of information turned the effect of trust on risky investments from inverted U-shaped into U-shaped. The effect of trust was significant only for wealthier households and for households in regions with more inclusive financial development. Several robustness checks and endogeneity analyses corroborated our results. Implications for policy making are included.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 102503"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145790324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Meritocracy meets cooperative behavior in redistribution decisions","authors":"Cristina Cattaneo , Daniela Grieco , Claudio Daminato","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102485","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102485","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper studies redistributive choices and tests the trade-off between a meritocratic ideal and the willingness to reward cooperation. We design an online experiment that collects information on real redistribution in favor of subjects that differ in relative performance and cooperative levels. Cooperative behavior plays a major role in making people “deserve” redistribution; furthermore, redistribution to reward cooperation is influenced by the subjects’ income. To quantify the weight of cooperative behavior in redistribution, we present a model and structurally estimate its parameters. We find that a percentage between 37% and 56% of total redistribution is driven by cooperation-related concerns.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 102485"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145580300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}