{"title":"Moral preferences in ultimatum and impunity games","authors":"Valerio Capraro , Ismael Rodriguez-Lara","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102371","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102371","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We report on two experiments (total N <span><math><mrow><mo>=</mo><mn>2572</mn></mrow></math></span>) testing the role of moral preferences in one-shot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders. In the impunity game, if an offer is lower than the responder’s minimum acceptable offer, the proposer still receives his share, while the responder gets nothing. Study 1 is correlational and explores how moral preferences, as measured using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, explain behaviour in the two games. Study 2 is causal and investigates the effect of moral suasion on behaviour. Regarding proposers, both studies provide evidence that moral preferences affect offers more in the impunity game than in the ultimatum game. For responders, Study 1 shows that moral preferences explain behaviour similarly in both games, while Study 2 demonstrates that moral suasion influences behaviour more strongly in the impunity game. Exploratory analyses of the binding and individualizing dimensions help reconcile these results. Our findings shed light on the complex relationship between moral preferences and behaviour in ultimatum and impunity games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102371"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143942335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competitor ability, sorting and overconfidence: An experiment","authors":"Tianyi Li, Charles N. Noussair","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102373","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102373","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While overconfidence in one’s ability relative to others is common, the feeling that one is less qualified than one’s peers is widespread in elite groups. In this paper, we show that both effects simultaneously exist for the same individuals and we propose the notion of a <em>sorting bias</em> to capture the overall pattern. We conduct an experiment in which individuals first take a mathematics test. They are then sorted into levels based on their performance, and matched with a competitor who scored at a similar level. The matched pairs then take a second mathematics test. Before the sorting into levels, they are asked to predict the probability that they perform better than the person that they are paired with, in a strategy method protocol. If they properly condition on the rule that sorts participants into pairs, they would predict a probability of .5 of being the better performer in their pair. We find that participants act as if they condition on the way their opponent has been sorted but do not sufficiently account for their own sorting. Individuals are less optimistic about outperforming a similarly selected peer, the higher performing the group to which they are assigned. This effect co-exists with a general pattern of overplacement, measured here as a belief that one has a greater than 50% chance of outperforming a peer with similar qualifications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102373"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143906534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does lobbying discourage individuals from fighting climate change?","authors":"Raphael Epperson","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102372","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102372","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Lobbying is commonly expected to reduce climate protection. Does such a belief affect individuals’ own climate protection efforts? According to conditional cooperation, for example, it should discourage individuals from contributing. I investigate this issue of high policy relevance using an online experiment with a large heterogeneous sample from the German population. To identify the causal effect of citizens’ beliefs about the impact of lobbying on climate protection, I induce exogenous variation in these beliefs and measure subsequent individual behavior. I find some evidence for a discouragement effect: Expecting a more negative impact of lobbying reduces individual contributions to climate protection. While not all considered behaviors show a significant effect, treatment differences consistently point in the same direction. These results emphasize the risk of spillover effects through citizens’ beliefs and lend support to a more holistic approach when evaluating the consequences of lobbying or climate policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102372"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143906490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tobias Schütze , Kyle Nash , Britta Gehrke , Philipp C. Wichardt
{"title":"Influenced by others: Trusting behaviour and social influence","authors":"Tobias Schütze , Kyle Nash , Britta Gehrke , Philipp C. Wichardt","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102370","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102370","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper reports results from a trust game in which trustors, before deciding on their transfer, are shown a statement about the perception of the situation by another person. Statements expressed either suspicion, insecurity, worry of disappointment or curiosity. Trustors first had to indicate their identification with the statement before making trust game decisions. Compared to a standard trust game, all treatments negatively affect trusting behaviour, regardless of the message being framed negatively or mildly positively. The effect of the manipulations is moderated by neuroticism and the individual’s identification with the respective statement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102370"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143882669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How gender and prosociality affect machine interaction in tax compliance: A game-theoretic experiment","authors":"Yutaro Murakami , Satoshi Taguchi","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102369","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102369","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study explores how gender and prosociality affect machine interaction in tax compliance, assuming a game-theoretic situation in which the tax auditor is a human (participant) or computer. We adopt an experimental design with 116 participants, using a game-theoretic model between taxpayers and auditors. Our experimental results show that taxpayers report less tax-compliant behavior to computer than human auditors. Regarding the participants’ individual characteristics, men are more likely to more aggressively evade tax payments than women under the computer auditor condition, and participants with prosocial tendencies are more likely to engage in tax compliance when the tax auditor is human. Our study sheds light on policymaking for tax compliance in the digital age.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102369"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143799314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Debin Zheng , Yulin Long , Yuehua Wei , Zhenyu Cai , Zhiwen Cheng , Changlin Ao
{"title":"Anticipated regret and respondent uncertainty in assessing public preferences for air pollution treatment policies: A choice experiment","authors":"Debin Zheng , Yulin Long , Yuehua Wei , Zhenyu Cai , Zhiwen Cheng , Changlin Ao","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102368","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102368","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Compared with the traditional utility maximization decision mechanism in choice experiments, the role of anticipated regret in choosing air pollution treatment policies has received limited attention, especially when respondent uncertainty is considered. This study explores the importance of the regret mechanism compared with the traditional utility mechanism while accounting for respondent uncertainty. The preference characteristics between the two classes of respondents who follow different decision mechanisms are examined. Moreover, the impact of neglecting respondent uncertainty on the assessment of public preferences and willingness to pay is analyzed. Results suggest that a regret-based behavioral framework is more appropriate for explaining the public's choice of air pollution treatment policies compared to a traditional utility-based framework. Anticipated regret is the main driver influencing the public's choice behavior. There is obvious heterogeneity in the preferences for air pollution treatment between the two classes of respondents who follow different decision mechanisms. Notably, ignoring respondent uncertainty leads to distortions in the willingness-to-pay estimates of attributes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102368"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143760249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anticipatory effects of competition on confidence and risk preference","authors":"Stephen L. Cheung , Vindesh Nadan","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102367","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102367","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study anticipatory changes in confidence and risk preference aroused by the prospect of future competition. Participants in our treatment group are told they will later participate in a tournament, while those in the control group are told they will work for a piece rate. Beliefs over relative ability and risk attitudes are measured prior to this prospective task. We find no anticipatory effect on confidence in relative ability, but a significant effect on risk preference. Specifically, the treatment increases risk aversion in males, but not in females, such that the conventional gender difference in risk preference is neutralized.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102367"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143739931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Happiness and willingness to compete","authors":"Karl Overdick","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102365","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102365","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyses the effect of happiness on an objective measure of willingness to compete (WTC). It conducts two online experiments on 895 respondents with real-effort tasks eliciting WTC for different levels of happiness. Happiness shows no significant effect despite sufficient statistical power. I provide an explanation for the lack of an effect by analysing behavioural preferences as mediators. WTC is highly correlated with subjective competitiveness and task confidence. Happiness does not change these subjective attitudes towards competition or toward task completion (the answer to being asked how competitive one is or to how many tasks one will be able to do). In contrast, gender as a well-established factor shifts both subjective and objective WTC significantly.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102365"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143760247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ahmed Bouteska , Taimur Sharif , Petr Hajek , Mohammad Zoynul Abedin
{"title":"Predicting prices of the US and G7 stock indices in uncertain times: Evidence from the application of a hybrid neural network","authors":"Ahmed Bouteska , Taimur Sharif , Petr Hajek , Mohammad Zoynul Abedin","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102366","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102366","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the application of Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) to forecast the one-day-ahead closing price of the US and G7 indices, and makes an extended analysis of three distinct periods, namely, the pre-2008 financial crisis (2003–2007), post-crisis recovery (2009–2016), and recent economic uncertainty (2017–2022). Unlike the traditional predictive approaches, our model distinguishes itself by utilizing a hybrid ANN-based architecture that integrates variable selection and forecasting stages. The proposed model consists of two main parts: selecting relevant input variables and developing a forecasting model. In the first part, an ANN-based variable selection model is utilized to identify significant input variables based on historical market conditions that reflect economic and psychological influences over the study period. These inputs are then refined by eliminating variables with low contributions, resulting in improved model performance. In the second part, we evaluate the impact of different training algorithms, hidden layer sizes, and training data distributions on the ANN's forecasting accuracy. The findings demonstrate that ANNs can effectively forecast the S&P 500 index's and G7 indices’ prices with high accuracy, particularly when employing the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm with a simplified model architecture. Moreover, the expanded dataset covering three distinct periods has enabled us to test the model's stability and generalization across diverse market volatility and structural conditions. The study highlights the critical role of data volume in enhancing the model's performance, confirming that extensive training data is essential for capturing the complex dynamics of market behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102366"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143739932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Salience perception and dominated choices in contracts","authors":"Mark Schneider , Cary Deck , Patrick DeJarnette","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102363","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102363","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We apply salience theory to choices over lotteries with multiple dimensions, such as insurance plans with deductibles and premiums, or monetary and non-monetary rewards. We show that salience theory can explain empirically observed dominated choices with large welfare costs to consumers (the selection of dominated insurance plans with low deductibles, dominated energy plans with a cancellation fee, and dominated consumption bundles with free features). The same framework also addresses a basic empirical puzzle in principal–agent problems: the effectiveness of non-monetary incentives over equivalent-in-value monetary incentives. Our results show that these systematically dominated choices documented in markets emerge from the same basic principles of salience perception that generate dominated choices in the laboratory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102363"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143760248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}