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Measuring preferences for algorithms — How willing are people to cede control to algorithms? 衡量对算法的偏好--人们有多愿意将控制权让给算法？
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102270
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Michel Tolksdorf
{"title":"Measuring preferences for algorithms — How willing are people to cede control to algorithms?","authors":"Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel,&nbsp;Michel Tolksdorf","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102270","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102270","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We suggest a simple method to elicit individual preferences for algorithms. By altering the monetary incentives for ceding control to the algorithm, the menu-based approach allows for measuring in particular the degree of algorithm aversion. Using an experiment, we elicit preferences for algorithms in an environment with measurable performance accuracy under two conditions — the absence and the presence of information about the algorithm’s performance. Providing such information raises subjects’ willingness to rely on algorithms when ceding control to the algorithm is more costly than trusting in their own assessment. However, algorithms are still underutilized.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141785986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How does information about inequality shape voting intentions and preferences for redistribution? Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Indonesia 关于不平等的信息如何影响投票意向和再分配偏好？来自印度尼西亚随机调查实验的证据
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102274
Christopher Hoy , Russell Toth , Nurina Merdikawati
{"title":"How does information about inequality shape voting intentions and preferences for redistribution? Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Indonesia","authors":"Christopher Hoy ,&nbsp;Russell Toth ,&nbsp;Nurina Merdikawati","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102274","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102274","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We test the elasticity of people's voting intentions and preferences for redistribution to information about inequality through a large-scale, randomised survey experiment in Indonesia. Respondents received information about either (1) the level of national inequality, (2) the level of national inequality in combination with the degree of intergenerational mobility, (3) their position in the national income distribution, or no information. The first two treatments raised people's concern about inequality and mobility. The first treatment also increased the likelihood they would vote against the President. The third treatment lowered richer respondents’ support for redistribution. These findings provide new insights about the challenges of increasing public support for government-led redistribution, such as tax increases and greater spending on social protection, in middle-income country settings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141782833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Excessive discounting, longevity expectations, and retirement saving: An online survey 过度贴现、长寿预期和退休储蓄：一项在线调查。
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102266
Michal Krawczyk
{"title":"Excessive discounting, longevity expectations, and retirement saving: An online survey","authors":"Michal Krawczyk","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102266","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102266","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I report results of a major online experiment focused on two behavioural mechanisms that might affect long-term saving: impatience (excessive discounting) and distorted beliefs about own longevity. I observe the longevity expectations to be generally reasonable, both in terms of their mean values and their determinants, although the estimates show large variance and, on balance, slight pessimism. In line with previous studies, I find excessive discounting and (self-reported) insufficient retirement saving to be prevalent. Both expectations and excessive discounting affect retirement saving in the natural direction. However, there is no link between these two determinants: neither overly optimistic nor pessimistic predictions concerning own longevity seem to be systematically linked to excessive discounting. Thus, these two behavioural effects neither strengthen nor cancel each other out.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141845653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic dimensions of solar geoengineering: Economic theory and experiments 太阳能地球工程的战略层面：经济理论与实验
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102271
Daniel Heyen , Alessandro Tavoni
{"title":"Strategic dimensions of solar geoengineering: Economic theory and experiments","authors":"Daniel Heyen ,&nbsp;Alessandro Tavoni","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102271","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102271","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Solar geoengineering denotes a set of technologies that would enable a fast and relatively cheap global temperature reduction. Besides potential physical side-effects, a major concern is the strategic dimension: Who is going to use solar geoengineering and how would it affect others? How does the presence of solar geoengineering change the strategic incentives surrounding other climate policy instruments such as mitigation? We review the existing theoretical and experimental contributions to those questions and outline promising lines of future economic research.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141782834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Private monitoring revisited: When does a shared history matter? 重新审视私人监控：共享历史何时重要？
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102269
Xue Xu , Kun Zheng
{"title":"Private monitoring revisited: When does a shared history matter?","authors":"Xue Xu ,&nbsp;Kun Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102269","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102269","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study experimentally whether and when a shared history of signals affects players’ incentives to cooperate in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. We compare games where the player can privately observe imperfect signals about her partner’s actions to games where signals are perfect and games where signals are imperfect but public. Based on evidence from multiple specifications of stage payoffs, we find that when the return to cooperation is low, subjects are more likely to cooperate in games with public signals than in games with private signals. However, when the return to cooperation is high, the difference is not significant. Furthermore, we show evidence that strategies are more lenient with public signals than with private signals when the return to cooperation is low. The results suggest that a shared history of signals could increase players’ incentives to cooperate when the return to cooperation is low.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141782835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
DavidBourghellePascalGrandinFredjJawadiPhilippeRozinBehavioral finance and asset prices：投资者情绪的影响2023瑞士施普林格出版社XXI+214页，159.99欧元（精装书），ISBN 9,783,031,244,858，出版日期：2023年4月6日
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102268
Vikky Renaldi, Tri Wahyuningsih
{"title":"","authors":"Vikky Renaldi,&nbsp;Tri Wahyuningsih","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102268","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102268","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141883293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Recruiting mid-qualified workers in product-innovating firms: Which personality traits matter? 在产品创新型企业中招聘中级员工：哪些人格特质很重要？
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102267
Luisa Minssen , Mark Levels , Harald Pfeifer , Caroline Wehner
{"title":"Recruiting mid-qualified workers in product-innovating firms: Which personality traits matter?","authors":"Luisa Minssen ,&nbsp;Mark Levels ,&nbsp;Harald Pfeifer ,&nbsp;Caroline Wehner","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102267","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102267","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Change in the work context is an important characteristic of product-innovating firms, and the innovation's profitability often depends on the workers’ adaptive capability to cope with change. Personality traits shape the individual adaptive capability. Nevertheless, the current economic recruitment literature does not discuss personality trait-oriented recruitment in product-innovating firms. We investigate whether recruiters in product-innovating firms prefer mid-qualified job applicants with certain Big Five personality traits. We conduct a discrete choice experiment among 799 firms in Germany and use mixed logit models to estimate the heterogeneous personality preferences of recruiters by distinguishing between firms performing i) radical and ii) incremental product innovations. We find that recruiters prefer more emotionally stable workers regardless of the firm's innovation type. However, recruiters from firms engaging in radical innovations also prefer more conscientious applicants. Our findings have practical implications for firms, applicants and policy makers designing training curricula, because we show that recruiters from product-innovating firms consider personality trait-oriented recruitment not only for high-qualified workers but also for mid-qualified workers.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324001046/pdfft?md5=bff6343773da1d52b9e667978c50e0c8&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324001046-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141782836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Choosing a victim you know 选择你认识的受害者--将交流引入暴徒游戏
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102265
Dmitri Bershadskyy, Alexandra Seidel
{"title":"Choosing a victim you know","authors":"Dmitri Bershadskyy,&nbsp;Alexandra Seidel","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102265","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102265","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Mobbing causes severe damages to the victims and is a prime example of antisocial coordination. Using the ‘mobbing game’ by Abbink and Doğan (2019), we investigate the role of communication and incremental incentives on mobbing in a laboratory experiment. Doing so, we vary the degree of strategic vs. social communication on the one hand and the pecuniary incentives of repeatedly bullying a certain victim on the other hand. Results indicate that incremental incentives increase nomination rates (i.e., attempts to mob another player) and mobbing rates (i.e., successful group coordination to reduce payoffs of one player). In contrast, communication decreases nomination rates without having significant effect on mobbing rates. Further, communication analysis indicates our approach to eliminate strategic communication was successful and can be applied in other setups.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324001022/pdfft?md5=3606530a5e817906474dca777b5a14f3&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324001022-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141698147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Preference for working from home – subjective perceptions of COVID-19 matter more than objective information on occupational exposure to contagion 在家工作的偏好--对 COVID-19 的主观看法比职业传染接触的客观信息更重要
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102264
Piotr Lewandowski , Katarzyna Lipowska , Mateusz Smoter
{"title":"Preference for working from home – subjective perceptions of COVID-19 matter more than objective information on occupational exposure to contagion","authors":"Piotr Lewandowski ,&nbsp;Katarzyna Lipowska ,&nbsp;Mateusz Smoter","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102264","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate how subjective and objective assessment of COVID-19 risks affect preferences toward working from home (WFH) and whether informing workers about the level of exposure to contagion in their occupation affects these preferences. In the summer of 2021, we conducted a discrete choice experiment combined with an information provision experiment with more than 11 000 workers in Poland. Estimating willingness to pay for WFH, we find that, on average, workers' are willing to give up 3.2%, 95% CI [2.8%; 3.6%] of earnings for such an option. The subjective assessment of COVID-19 risk matters as workers who perceive COVID-19 as a threat are willing to sacrifice a higher share of earnings for WFH than those who do not (4.1%, vs. 1.3% [p&lt;0.00]). However, the preferences toward WFH differ to a smaller extent between workers in occupations with high or low exposure to COVID-19 [3.8% vs. 2.7%, p=0.01]. Informing workers about occupational exposure to contagion generally does not affect preferences toward WFH.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141604809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social antagonism, identity-driven beliefs, and loss avoidance: Evidence from Guinea 社会对抗、身份驱动信念和损失规避：来自几内亚的证据
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102263
Klarizze Anne Martin Puzon , Ruth Tacneng , Thierno Barry
{"title":"Social antagonism, identity-driven beliefs, and loss avoidance: Evidence from Guinea","authors":"Klarizze Anne Martin Puzon ,&nbsp;Ruth Tacneng ,&nbsp;Thierno Barry","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102263","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We use a lab-in-the-field experiment to study identity preferences, other-regarding beliefs, and conflict behavior among the Fulani and Malinke in Guinea, Sub-Saharan Africa. In a hawk-dove game, we explore the existence of out-group hostility and ingroup cooperation compared to the baseline where pairs are uninformed of each other's region of origin. We observe that ethnic identity, especially among the Malinke, encourages loss aversion in situations where negative earnings are possible. Identitydriven beliefs, i.e. expectations of others, lead to either reciprocity among homogeneous pairs or materialism in diverse pairs. Using complementary survey data, we also find that high out-group trust and less linguistic diversity are correlated with conflict avoidance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324001009/pdfft?md5=28ea3d21b34b0c30d9d569b7fc1f3c5e&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324001009-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141596808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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