{"title":"Search costs, choice overload, and intermediary deviation: Barriers to optimal insurance choices in multi-distribution channel setting","authors":"Claire Mouminoux , Jean-Louis Rullière , Stéphane Loisel","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102458","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102458","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores the challenges that insurance purchasers face when selecting from multiple distribution channels and their impact on insurance demand optimality. It investigates the choice between independently assessing various insurance contracts or relying on potentially dishonest intermediaries. We use a lab experiment mimicking real-world insurance distribution channels with varying informational frameworks, where information is gathered in exchange for search costs. Search costs deter some individuals from thorough exploration, preventing them from finding optimal contracts. However, suboptimality in choices also arises for those exploring extensively, due to choice overload. Lastly, some individuals prefer to delegate to intermediaries, but intermediaries are likely to deviate from optimal advice due to their own financial incentives. Overall, we find that brokers yield the highest rate of optimal choices, but these choices also come at a higher cost.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102458"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145319915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Augustinos Dimitras , Vasileios Fourlas , Erich Kirchler , George Peppas
{"title":"Drivers of tax compliance: Survey evidence from 1761 Greek micro-firms","authors":"Augustinos Dimitras , Vasileios Fourlas , Erich Kirchler , George Peppas","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102480","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102480","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In countries where tax compliance is low and tax evasion is widespread, the specific compliance behavior of micro-business owners remains poorly understood. This study addresses this gap by analyzing both voluntary and enforced tax compliance among a nationally representative sample of 1761 micro-business owners in Greece. Guided by the Slippery Slope Framework (SSF), we find that trust in tax authorities is closely associated with voluntary compliance, whereas perceptions of coercive power are primarily linked to enforced compliance. Notably, women leading micro-businesses report higher trust and stronger compliance intentions across both motivational types. Perceptions of fairness, legitimacy, and corruption, as well as emotional responses toward tax authorities, are related to trust and indirectly associated with voluntary compliance. Our findings underscore the central role of trust in understanding cooperative taxpayer behavior and suggest that service-oriented, transparent, and fair administrative practices could support greater voluntary compliance, particularly within the micro-business sector.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102480"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145528501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evaluating behavioural strategies for environmental cooperation: Evidence from a public goods game","authors":"Valeria Faralla , Alessandro Innocenti","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102464","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102464","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a laboratory experiment, this study investigates the effectiveness of different behavioural interventions designed to promote climate-friendly behaviours within the framework of a public good game. The results show that educative nudging, which involves providing information-based cues to encourage contribution levels, significantly increased participant cooperation levels. In contrast, non-educative nudges, a classical default option, and boosting techniques proved less effective in fostering collaborative behaviour. While participants generally perceived educational interventions favourably, their acceptability declined when considering real-life applications, and the acceptability of nudging/boosting instruments in experimental and real-life contexts was not significant in terms of contributions to the game. The study also finds that individuals with stronger environmental values were more inclined to contribute to the public good. These results underscore the importance of effectiveness and ethical concerns regarding the acceptability of behavioural interventions in decision-making, suggesting the need for further research to refine these approaches and enhance their long-term impact in real-world settings.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102464"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145415086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rank versus inequality—Does gender composition matter?","authors":"Duk Gyoo Kim , Max Riegel","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102466","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102466","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the influence of gender composition on allocation decisions involving a rank–inequality tradeoff. In a real-time online experiment, participants chose to either alleviate inequality by relinquishing their current relative rank or exacerbate inequality while maintaining their current rank. Two essential features of the experiment are: (1) participants’ relative rank is the outcome of their real-effort performance and luck; (2) participants’ genders are naturally revealed by gender-specific nicknames. We found that female participants are more reluctant to relinquish their current relative rank when the persons ranked below and above them are of the opposite gender. This tendency was less pronounced in the male participants.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102466"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145415087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Time pressure and motivated delay effects on sanctioning in a social dilemma: Experimental evidence","authors":"Todd Guilfoos , Jordan F. Suter","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102403","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102403","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine intuitive and deliberative cognitive processes on collective action through sanctioning in a social dilemma using two experiments with cognitive manipulations. The first experiment applies time pressure during the voting stage for sanctions to prompt quick and intuitive thought processes to the decision. The second experiment applies a motivated delay treatment to enact deliberative cognitive processes to the voting stage. We find that time pressure and motivated delay do not effect voting for cooperative rules.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102403"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144632413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unintended consequences of nudges: Challenges in improving attitudes towards shared e-scooters","authors":"Neel Ocean, Roger Woodman","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102437","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102437","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>As part of a push towards sustainable transportation, there have been several rental e-scooter trials in UK cities. However, vandalism and mistreatment have plagued these schemes, and the adoption of e-scooters remains low. We test the effectiveness of nudges designed to improve attitudes towards shared e-scooters, as well as increase uptake. These are based on three main mechanisms: ownership, social norm messaging, and social status signalling. Using randomised survey experiments, we find that our main ownership and social status nudges are not only ineffective, they worsen attitudes towards shared e-scooters and reduce intended uptake. Injunctive norm messaging did not have any significant impact on stated adoption or willingness to report misuse. Our results highlight the potential consequences of nudges that backfire. We recommend carefully testing proposed nudges within the intended context before implementation, even if they have been successful in a different context, in order to avoid negative consequences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102437"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145104976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Esther Schuch , Maria Apergi , Luis Correa Lindarte
{"title":"The honest (electricity) thief—Experimental evidence on the relationship between electricity theft and social norms","authors":"Esther Schuch , Maria Apergi , Luis Correa Lindarte","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102457","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102457","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The sustainable development goals (SDGs) aim for universal access to affordable and reliable clean energy by 2030, but especially in rural areas this has not been achieved yet. Small scale electricity theft is one of the major obstacles to achieving electrification access in many countries of the Global South. Electricity theft has been associated with a number of different factors such as poverty, quality of electricity services, and social norms. Electricity theft causes problems that not only affect the electricity providers but have negative effects on whole communities. Combating electricity theft effectively requires a better understanding of the underlying causes. To analyse the role of dishonesty in electricity theft, we use the die-in-a-cup game to establish the prevalence of dishonest behaviour within Puebloviejo, Magdalena, a community in Colombia. We combine the game with a survey-based social norm elicitation to identify the predominant social norms. We find that acceptance of electricity theft is conditional on the reason, with poverty being the justification with the highest support. We find clear differences of dishonesty between people condoning or opposing electricity theft, with people condoning electricity theft being more honest.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102457"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145319914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Refusing to lose: Reciprocity in complete information first-price sealed-bid auctions","authors":"Rachel Mannahan","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102483","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102483","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I characterize the pure strategy equilibria in complete information, first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders have reciprocity preferences. While the equilibria under selfish preferences persist, two additional types of equilibria arise under reciprocity. There is an equilibrium with negative reciprocity in which a bidder with a low value may refuse to lose by overbidding to win the auction. There is also an equilibrium with positive reciprocity in which several bidders collude by submitting a tying bid at a low price.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102483"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145579152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effects of zero price and reciprocity on online consumer reviews","authors":"Xian. Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102416","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102416","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Online consumer reviews are important for businesses because they potentially influence product sales and profits. This study examines the zero price effect on online consumer reviews and reciprocity as the mechanism through which such an effect operates. By conducting a lab experiment, I observed review behaviour of subjects who received coffee for free or for 1 cent and measured their degree of reciprocity using a Trust Game. Although zero pricing did not significantly change review participation, ratings and emotions, subjects under the zero price treatment wrote longer reviews, therein possibly expressing their greater appreciation. No significant differences in review behaviour were found between high and low reciprocal subjects. Model estimations further show that the zero price effect is significantly negative on the rating of overall performance for those with low reciprocity, but higher reciprocity can mitigate this effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102416"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144580435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does local diversity affect charitable giving?","authors":"Barış K. Yörük","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102467","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102467","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How does diversity affect charitable giving? On the one hand, diversity can lead to increased charitable giving, as individuals may feel more connected to and invested in their community when they see the diversity of needs and perspectives within it. On the other hand, diversity can also create challenges for charitable giving, as individuals may have different priorities, beliefs, and cultural norms that affect their willingness to give to certain causes and organizations. Using data from 2010–2020 county-level income tax returns linked to the U.S. Census population estimates, I find a negative impact of local ethnic diversity on charitable giving. In particular, I document that a one percentage point increase in the local ethnic fragmentation index is associated with up to a 2.9 percent decrease in the fraction of tax returns with charitable contributions and a 2 percent decrease in charitable contributions as a fraction of adjusted gross income. I find that local ethnic diversity neither significantly affects charities’ fundraising efforts nor increases potential donors’ probability of receiving a charitable solicitation, which suggests that the estimated effects of diversity cannot be attributed to potential differences in strategic charity behavior that may stem from heterogeneous community characteristics. I also present some evidence that while the effect of political diversity on charitable giving is mixed, religious diversity does not have a significant impact on giving.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102467"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145416180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}