{"title":"Assessing risk attitudes among physicians, medical students, and non-medical students with experimental data","authors":"Calogero Guccio , Domenica Romeo , Massimo Finocchiaro Castro","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102384","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102384","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recently, laboratory and field experiments have been increasingly used in health economics to predict the behavior of physicians in connection with different payment systems. However, these studies often employ students as decision-makers, assuming that they are a good proxy for the behavior of real physicians, as no qualitative difference between physicians and students’ decisions is often observed. Employing a large sample of experimental data, we investigate whether attitudes toward risk varied significantly between physicians, medical and non-medical students in the monetary domain. The results show significant variation in risk attitude regardless of the estimation technique employed, suggesting constant relative risk aversion as a supported representation of risk preferences. Finally, physicians were less risk-averse than any other participant type in the sample, suggesting that medical risk attitudes differed from other participants, at least in the monetary domain. Given the difficulty in involving real physicians due to their participation barriers, employing medical and non-medical students in experiments is the second-best option. However, researchers must be careful when designing tasks because choices may differ across various contexts. Additionally, policymakers must be cautious when drawing policy implications from laboratory predictions, not taking it for granted that students’ decisions fully match physicians’ decisions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102384"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144184394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effects of party size and dining duration on tipping behavior","authors":"Erik Haugom, Christer Thrane","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102386","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102386","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this study, we propose a theoretical framework to explain how party size and dining duration affect tipping behavior. The framework suggests that both the party size and the dining duration effects are hill-shaped and thus should be modeled nonlinearly. We use data from a large-scale transaction database (<em>n</em> > 800,000) for a Norwegian restaurant chain to test the proposed effects. We also merge these data with information on waiter characteristics and customer ratings for the 60 pizza restaurants in the sample. In line with the theoretical propositions, the results show that party size and dining duration affect tipping behavior nonlinearly. The association between both variables and tipping is mostly inversely U-shaped. Yet both effects are contingent on each other, the size of the bill, customer ratings, and the presence of alcohol consumption.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102386"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144146920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral preferences in ultimatum and impunity games","authors":"Valerio Capraro , Ismael Rodriguez-Lara","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102371","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102371","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We report on two experiments (total N <span><math><mrow><mo>=</mo><mn>2572</mn></mrow></math></span>) testing the role of moral preferences in one-shot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders. In the impunity game, if an offer is lower than the responder’s minimum acceptable offer, the proposer still receives his share, while the responder gets nothing. Study 1 is correlational and explores how moral preferences, as measured using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, explain behaviour in the two games. Study 2 is causal and investigates the effect of moral suasion on behaviour. Regarding proposers, both studies provide evidence that moral preferences affect offers more in the impunity game than in the ultimatum game. For responders, Study 1 shows that moral preferences explain behaviour similarly in both games, while Study 2 demonstrates that moral suasion influences behaviour more strongly in the impunity game. Exploratory analyses of the binding and individualizing dimensions help reconcile these results. Our findings shed light on the complex relationship between moral preferences and behaviour in ultimatum and impunity games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102371"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143942335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competitor ability, sorting and overconfidence: An experiment","authors":"Tianyi Li, Charles N. Noussair","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102373","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102373","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While overconfidence in one’s ability relative to others is common, the feeling that one is less qualified than one’s peers is widespread in elite groups. In this paper, we show that both effects simultaneously exist for the same individuals and we propose the notion of a <em>sorting bias</em> to capture the overall pattern. We conduct an experiment in which individuals first take a mathematics test. They are then sorted into levels based on their performance, and matched with a competitor who scored at a similar level. The matched pairs then take a second mathematics test. Before the sorting into levels, they are asked to predict the probability that they perform better than the person that they are paired with, in a strategy method protocol. If they properly condition on the rule that sorts participants into pairs, they would predict a probability of .5 of being the better performer in their pair. We find that participants act as if they condition on the way their opponent has been sorted but do not sufficiently account for their own sorting. Individuals are less optimistic about outperforming a similarly selected peer, the higher performing the group to which they are assigned. This effect co-exists with a general pattern of overplacement, measured here as a belief that one has a greater than 50% chance of outperforming a peer with similar qualifications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102373"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143906534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does lobbying discourage individuals from fighting climate change?","authors":"Raphael Epperson","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102372","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102372","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Lobbying is commonly expected to reduce climate protection. Does such a belief affect individuals’ own climate protection efforts? According to conditional cooperation, for example, it should discourage individuals from contributing. I investigate this issue of high policy relevance using an online experiment with a large heterogeneous sample from the German population. To identify the causal effect of citizens’ beliefs about the impact of lobbying on climate protection, I induce exogenous variation in these beliefs and measure subsequent individual behavior. I find some evidence for a discouragement effect: Expecting a more negative impact of lobbying reduces individual contributions to climate protection. While not all considered behaviors show a significant effect, treatment differences consistently point in the same direction. These results emphasize the risk of spillover effects through citizens’ beliefs and lend support to a more holistic approach when evaluating the consequences of lobbying or climate policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102372"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143906490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tobias Schütze , Kyle Nash , Britta Gehrke , Philipp C. Wichardt
{"title":"Influenced by others: Trusting behaviour and social influence","authors":"Tobias Schütze , Kyle Nash , Britta Gehrke , Philipp C. Wichardt","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102370","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102370","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper reports results from a trust game in which trustors, before deciding on their transfer, are shown a statement about the perception of the situation by another person. Statements expressed either suspicion, insecurity, worry of disappointment or curiosity. Trustors first had to indicate their identification with the statement before making trust game decisions. Compared to a standard trust game, all treatments negatively affect trusting behaviour, regardless of the message being framed negatively or mildly positively. The effect of the manipulations is moderated by neuroticism and the individual’s identification with the respective statement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102370"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143882669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How gender and prosociality affect machine interaction in tax compliance: A game-theoretic experiment","authors":"Yutaro Murakami , Satoshi Taguchi","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102369","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102369","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study explores how gender and prosociality affect machine interaction in tax compliance, assuming a game-theoretic situation in which the tax auditor is a human (participant) or computer. We adopt an experimental design with 116 participants, using a game-theoretic model between taxpayers and auditors. Our experimental results show that taxpayers report less tax-compliant behavior to computer than human auditors. Regarding the participants’ individual characteristics, men are more likely to more aggressively evade tax payments than women under the computer auditor condition, and participants with prosocial tendencies are more likely to engage in tax compliance when the tax auditor is human. Our study sheds light on policymaking for tax compliance in the digital age.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102369"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143799314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Debin Zheng , Yulin Long , Yuehua Wei , Zhenyu Cai , Zhiwen Cheng , Changlin Ao
{"title":"Anticipated regret and respondent uncertainty in assessing public preferences for air pollution treatment policies: A choice experiment","authors":"Debin Zheng , Yulin Long , Yuehua Wei , Zhenyu Cai , Zhiwen Cheng , Changlin Ao","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102368","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102368","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Compared with the traditional utility maximization decision mechanism in choice experiments, the role of anticipated regret in choosing air pollution treatment policies has received limited attention, especially when respondent uncertainty is considered. This study explores the importance of the regret mechanism compared with the traditional utility mechanism while accounting for respondent uncertainty. The preference characteristics between the two classes of respondents who follow different decision mechanisms are examined. Moreover, the impact of neglecting respondent uncertainty on the assessment of public preferences and willingness to pay is analyzed. Results suggest that a regret-based behavioral framework is more appropriate for explaining the public's choice of air pollution treatment policies compared to a traditional utility-based framework. Anticipated regret is the main driver influencing the public's choice behavior. There is obvious heterogeneity in the preferences for air pollution treatment between the two classes of respondents who follow different decision mechanisms. Notably, ignoring respondent uncertainty leads to distortions in the willingness-to-pay estimates of attributes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102368"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143760249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anticipatory effects of competition on confidence and risk preference","authors":"Stephen L. Cheung , Vindesh Nadan","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102367","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102367","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study anticipatory changes in confidence and risk preference aroused by the prospect of future competition. Participants in our treatment group are told they will later participate in a tournament, while those in the control group are told they will work for a piece rate. Beliefs over relative ability and risk attitudes are measured prior to this prospective task. We find no anticipatory effect on confidence in relative ability, but a significant effect on risk preference. Specifically, the treatment increases risk aversion in males, but not in females, such that the conventional gender difference in risk preference is neutralized.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102367"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143739931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Happiness and willingness to compete","authors":"Karl Overdick","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102365","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102365","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyses the effect of happiness on an objective measure of willingness to compete (WTC). It conducts two online experiments on 895 respondents with real-effort tasks eliciting WTC for different levels of happiness. Happiness shows no significant effect despite sufficient statistical power. I provide an explanation for the lack of an effect by analysing behavioural preferences as mediators. WTC is highly correlated with subjective competitiveness and task confidence. Happiness does not change these subjective attitudes towards competition or toward task completion (the answer to being asked how competitive one is or to how many tasks one will be able to do). In contrast, gender as a well-established factor shifts both subjective and objective WTC significantly.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102365"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143760247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}