{"title":"社会困境中时间压力和动机延迟对制裁的影响:实验证据","authors":"Todd Guilfoos , Jordan F. Suter","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102403","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine intuitive and deliberative cognitive processes on collective action through sanctioning in a social dilemma using two experiments with cognitive manipulations. The first experiment applies time pressure during the voting stage for sanctions to prompt quick and intuitive thought processes to the decision. The second experiment applies a motivated delay treatment to enact deliberative cognitive processes to the voting stage. We find that time pressure and motivated delay do not effect voting for cooperative rules.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102403"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Time pressure and motivated delay effects on sanctioning in a social dilemma: Experimental evidence\",\"authors\":\"Todd Guilfoos , Jordan F. Suter\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102403\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We examine intuitive and deliberative cognitive processes on collective action through sanctioning in a social dilemma using two experiments with cognitive manipulations. The first experiment applies time pressure during the voting stage for sanctions to prompt quick and intuitive thought processes to the decision. The second experiment applies a motivated delay treatment to enact deliberative cognitive processes to the voting stage. We find that time pressure and motivated delay do not effect voting for cooperative rules.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51637,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics\",\"volume\":\"119 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102403\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804325000692\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804325000692","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Time pressure and motivated delay effects on sanctioning in a social dilemma: Experimental evidence
We examine intuitive and deliberative cognitive processes on collective action through sanctioning in a social dilemma using two experiments with cognitive manipulations. The first experiment applies time pressure during the voting stage for sanctions to prompt quick and intuitive thought processes to the decision. The second experiment applies a motivated delay treatment to enact deliberative cognitive processes to the voting stage. We find that time pressure and motivated delay do not effect voting for cooperative rules.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.