{"title":"Daughters, Savings and Household Finances","authors":"Xin Wen , Zhiming Cheng , Massimiliano Tani","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102395","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102395","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the link between child gender and household financial decisions within a cultural environment that strongly favours having a son. Using data from the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), we find that the presence of a daughter is associated with a lower saving rate, consistent with the hypothesis that the relative under-supply of unmarried women generates a less competitive marriage market for families with daughters vs. those with sons. As a result, such families have lower incentives to endow their daughters with bigger asset pools to enhance their marital prospects. The correlation becomes more pronounced as the daughter approaches marriageable age, and it is more common among families where the head has low financial literacy and limited education and lives in rural areas.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102395"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144338453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Juliane V. Wiese , Nattavudh Powdthavee , Jonathan X.W. Yeo , Yohanes E. Riyanto
{"title":"Unveiling the effects of hidden luck and merit on redistribution in groups","authors":"Juliane V. Wiese , Nattavudh Powdthavee , Jonathan X.W. Yeo , Yohanes E. Riyanto","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102392","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102392","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Success in life often arises from a combination of effort and being in the right place at the right time, making it difficult to disentangle the roles of merit and luck. This study explores whether revealing the unobserved performance of non-winners in unreceived opportunities influences the redistributive behavior of winners. We designed a game in which both winners and non-winners contribute to a task, but only the winners benefit from its success. A distinct feature of our design is that winning primarily depends on both initial and subsequent luck in securing opportunities, meaning winners can contribute minimally yet still achieve success. Our findings indicate that winners generally feel a strong sense of justified deservingness. The more winners contribute relative to non-winners during the production phase, the less they redistribute. However, when winners learn about non-winners’ potential performance in unreceived opportunities, redistribution significantly increases—even though this potential performance is irrelevant to the joint task. This suggests that acknowledging the potential contributions of non-winners leads to a shift in winners' perceptions of fairness. The effect remains consistent regardless of whether the task is based on luck or merit. These findings highlight the importance of considering both luck and merit in understanding redistributive behavior and suggest that recognising unobserved effort can mitigate the tendency to attribute success exclusively to one’s own contributions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102392"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144242699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"More than just grades: The role of physical attractiveness in college admission processes","authors":"Yunyun Wang , Ting Chen , Xunyong Xiang","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102391","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102391","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Despite extensive research on appearance discrimination in labor markets, little attention has been given to its role in higher education admissions. This paper investigates the impact of students' physical attractiveness on college admission outcomes, using unique data from an international high school in China. Employing an ordered logit model and AI-based attractiveness scoring, we find that more attractive students tend to be admitted to higher-ranked colleges. This effect is particularly pronounced in business-related majors, private institutions, and among male students. Furthermore, face-to-face interviews mitigate the bias induced by physical attractiveness, leading to more balanced admission decisions. These findings suggest that the “beauty premium” extends beyond labor markets into education, with important implications for fairness in university admissions. Our research contributes to the growing body of literature on appearance-based discrimination and highlights the need for more transparent and inclusive admissions practices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102391"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144229770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do giving voice and social information help in revising a misconception about rent–control?","authors":"Jordi Brandts , Isabel Busom , Cristina Lopez-Mayan","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102374","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102374","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Citizens’ ability to make informed and thoughtful choices when voting for policy proposals rests on their exposure to, and acceptance of, accurate information about the costs and benefits that each proposal entails. We study whether certain social factors affect the disposition to drop a misconception, the belief that rent control increases the availability of affordable housing. We design an on-line experiment where all participants watch a video explaining the scientific evidence on the consequences of this policy. We test whether letting them give feedback (giving voice) and informing them about others’ change of beliefs (social information) helps in reducing the misconception. Giving voice does not have an additional effect relative to a benchmark group that only watches the video. Social information further reduces the misconception, but only when it specifies how different groups of people have responded to the video. This result is compatible with several mechanisms, but our experiment is not designed to identify them. Additionally, changes in beliefs translate into intended voting against the policy, and into recommending the video. Finally, ideological position and a zero–sum mentality are correlated with the initial misconception, but these two factors do not hinder participants’ disposition toward dropping it following the intervention.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102374"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144189811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assessing risk attitudes among physicians, medical students, and non-medical students with experimental data","authors":"Calogero Guccio , Domenica Romeo , Massimo Finocchiaro Castro","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102384","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102384","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recently, laboratory and field experiments have been increasingly used in health economics to predict the behavior of physicians in connection with different payment systems. However, these studies often employ students as decision-makers, assuming that they are a good proxy for the behavior of real physicians, as no qualitative difference between physicians and students’ decisions is often observed. Employing a large sample of experimental data, we investigate whether attitudes toward risk varied significantly between physicians, medical and non-medical students in the monetary domain. The results show significant variation in risk attitude regardless of the estimation technique employed, suggesting constant relative risk aversion as a supported representation of risk preferences. Finally, physicians were less risk-averse than any other participant type in the sample, suggesting that medical risk attitudes differed from other participants, at least in the monetary domain. Given the difficulty in involving real physicians due to their participation barriers, employing medical and non-medical students in experiments is the second-best option. However, researchers must be careful when designing tasks because choices may differ across various contexts. Additionally, policymakers must be cautious when drawing policy implications from laboratory predictions, not taking it for granted that students’ decisions fully match physicians’ decisions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102384"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144184394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alice Pizzo , Manuel Suter , Jan M. Bauer , Lucia A. Reisch
{"title":"Food waste salience and task knowledge to reduce individual food waste: A field experiment in a restaurant setting","authors":"Alice Pizzo , Manuel Suter , Jan M. Bauer , Lucia A. Reisch","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102375","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102375","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Food waste related to individual consumption creates high economic, social and environmental costs. This study explores two informational strategies for reducing food waste among restaurant guests. We test a two-stage intervention to achieve a reduction in customer food waste. First, we introduce a food waste-related message emphasizing the salience of food waste as an issue and highlighting the restaurant’s commitment to reducing food waste, inviting guests to join its efforts before they select their meals. The second intervention additionally provides guests with details about the portion size of each meal and encourages reflection on their current hunger levels. We find that salience about the issue of food waste alone leads to a 16 percentage point reduction in the probability of reporting food waste compared to the control group. The second intervention, which provides additional task knowledge to better match individual hunger with ordered portion size, shows no difference from the control. We further explore pathways on how salience reduces the probability of reporting food waste and show that the effective intervention had no negative effects on customer satisfaction.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102375"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144213004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effects of party size and dining duration on tipping behavior","authors":"Erik Haugom, Christer Thrane","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102386","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102386","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this study, we propose a theoretical framework to explain how party size and dining duration affect tipping behavior. The framework suggests that both the party size and the dining duration effects are hill-shaped and thus should be modeled nonlinearly. We use data from a large-scale transaction database (<em>n</em> > 800,000) for a Norwegian restaurant chain to test the proposed effects. We also merge these data with information on waiter characteristics and customer ratings for the 60 pizza restaurants in the sample. In line with the theoretical propositions, the results show that party size and dining duration affect tipping behavior nonlinearly. The association between both variables and tipping is mostly inversely U-shaped. Yet both effects are contingent on each other, the size of the bill, customer ratings, and the presence of alcohol consumption.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102386"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144146920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of process automation on performance","authors":"Christina Strobel","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102377","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102377","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores how process automation affects performance, particularly in bonus-related evaluations. Using a principal–agent framework, we study the impact of predefined criteria set during system design. Specifically, we examine two scenarios in which the performance threshold for bonus payments is set either ex-ante (before performance is known) or ex-post (after performance is known). Worker performance is measured using the chosen-effort method. Our design emphasizes the role of the decision-maker in the automation process, while also considering the influence of process fairness, trust in the process, and expectations. We find that performance is significantly lower when an automated process is used, but there is no difference in performance based on who makes the decision to automate. Furthermore, we observe no variation in perceived fairness or trust between the two processes, although expectations differ. Our results suggest that while automation impacts performance, the decision-maker’s role and perceptions of fairness and trust do not significantly affect the performance, but expectations do.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102377"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144222369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral preferences in ultimatum and impunity games","authors":"Valerio Capraro , Ismael Rodriguez-Lara","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102371","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102371","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We report on two experiments (total N <span><math><mrow><mo>=</mo><mn>2572</mn></mrow></math></span>) testing the role of moral preferences in one-shot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders. In the impunity game, if an offer is lower than the responder’s minimum acceptable offer, the proposer still receives his share, while the responder gets nothing. Study 1 is correlational and explores how moral preferences, as measured using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, explain behaviour in the two games. Study 2 is causal and investigates the effect of moral suasion on behaviour. Regarding proposers, both studies provide evidence that moral preferences affect offers more in the impunity game than in the ultimatum game. For responders, Study 1 shows that moral preferences explain behaviour similarly in both games, while Study 2 demonstrates that moral suasion influences behaviour more strongly in the impunity game. Exploratory analyses of the binding and individualizing dimensions help reconcile these results. Our findings shed light on the complex relationship between moral preferences and behaviour in ultimatum and impunity games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102371"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143942335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competitor ability, sorting and overconfidence: An experiment","authors":"Tianyi Li, Charles N. Noussair","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102373","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102373","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While overconfidence in one’s ability relative to others is common, the feeling that one is less qualified than one’s peers is widespread in elite groups. In this paper, we show that both effects simultaneously exist for the same individuals and we propose the notion of a <em>sorting bias</em> to capture the overall pattern. We conduct an experiment in which individuals first take a mathematics test. They are then sorted into levels based on their performance, and matched with a competitor who scored at a similar level. The matched pairs then take a second mathematics test. Before the sorting into levels, they are asked to predict the probability that they perform better than the person that they are paired with, in a strategy method protocol. If they properly condition on the rule that sorts participants into pairs, they would predict a probability of .5 of being the better performer in their pair. We find that participants act as if they condition on the way their opponent has been sorted but do not sufficiently account for their own sorting. Individuals are less optimistic about outperforming a similarly selected peer, the higher performing the group to which they are assigned. This effect co-exists with a general pattern of overplacement, measured here as a belief that one has a greater than 50% chance of outperforming a peer with similar qualifications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102373"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143906534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}