Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory最新文献

{"title":"The domination of nature: A forgotten theme in critical theory?","authors":"Omar Dahbour","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12702","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12702","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135483201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Identity politics and the democratization of democracy: Oscillations between power and reason in radical democratic and standpoint theory","authors":"Karsten Schubert","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12715","url":null,"abstract":"Criticism against identity politics, both in public discourse and political theory, has intensified over the past decade with the rise of right-wing populism and the polarization of politics (Walters, 2018). Such criticism portrays identity politics as a threat to democracy, alleging that it erodes community, rational communication, and solidarity. Drawing on radical democratic and standpoint theories, I argue for the opposite thesis; namely, that identity politics is crucial for the democratization of democracy. I show that democratization works through disrupting hegemonic discourse and is, therefore, a matter of power; and that such power politics are reasonable when following minority standpoints generated through identity politics. In other words, the universal democratic claims of equality and freedom can only become effective through their repeated actualization in particular power struggles. Identity politics is a contested term. Nevertheless, there are systematic overlaps between current criticisms of identity politics that mainly repeat arguments that have been similarly articulated since the 1990s. Communitarians criticize identity politics as dividing the political community, liberals criticize it as disruptive of the public sphere and free deliberation (Fukuyama, 2018; Habermas, 2020; Lilla, 2017), and Marxist and anarchist theorists argue that identity politics undermines the struggle for justice and emancipation and stabilizes state power through neoliberal diversity politics (Fraser, 1990, 2007; Kumar et al., 2018; Newman, 2010; Táíwò, 2022; for a critique of these debates, see Bickford, 1997; Walters, 2018; Young, 2000, pp. 82−87; Paul, 2019). Based on universalist accounts of the political,1 all three positions share the concern that particularist identity politics conflates social positions with epistemological possibilities and political positions, resulting in standpoint fundamentalism. In other words, the critics claim that, in identity politics, it matters more who speaks than what is said.2 Discussions about difference (Benhabib, 1996), counterpublics (Fraser, 1990), and inclusion (Young, 2000) at the intersection of deliberative and Critical theory early criticized such universalist accounts of the political for their exclusionist effects. While these works offer valuable resources to construct the argument that strengthening identity politics is important for the development of more inclusive deliberations and institutions, they frame this as a correction of reason, leaving the aspect of power underdeveloped. To understand both the severe resistance against more inclusive politics and the strategic need for non-deliberative means to achieve it—such as protest, civil disobedience, “cancel culture,” or uprising—what is necessary is a theoretical framework that describes democratization as an oscillation between power and reason. Even Mansbridge (1996) does not offer such a theoretical framework, despite explicitly arguing—","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135193513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The politics of flight refugee movements between radical democracy and autonomous exodus","authors":"Johannes Siegmund","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12714","url":null,"abstract":"ConstellationsEarly View ORIGINAL ARTICLE The politics of flight refugee movements between radical democracy and autonomous exodus Johannes Siegmund, Corresponding Author Johannes Siegmund [email protected] Institute for Art Theory and Cultural Studies, Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna, Austria Correspondence Johannes Siegmund, Institute for Art Theory and Cultural Studies, Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna, Khevenhüllerstraße 12/3/6, 1190 Vienna, Austria. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Johannes Siegmund, Corresponding Author Johannes Siegmund [email protected] Institute for Art Theory and Cultural Studies, Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna, Austria Correspondence Johannes Siegmund, Institute for Art Theory and Cultural Studies, Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna, Khevenhüllerstraße 12/3/6, 1190 Vienna, Austria. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 29 September 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12714Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat REFERENCES Abizadeh, A. (2008). Democratic theory and border coercion: No right to unilaterally control your own borders. Political Theory, 36(1), 37–65. Agamben, G. (1995). We refugees. Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures, 49(2), 114–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/00397709.1995.10733798 Arendt, H. (1973). The origins of totalitarianism (New ed.). Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Arendt, H. (1994). We refugees. In M. Robinson (Ed.), Altogether elsewhere: Writers on exile (pp. 110–119). Faber and Faber. Arendt, H. (2006). On revolution ( J. Schell, Ed.). Penguin Books. Ataç, I., Kron, S., Schilliger, S., Schwiertz, H., & Stierl, M. (2015). Kämpfe der Migration als Un-/Sichtbare Politiken. Einleitung zur zweiten Ausgabe. Movements. Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies, 1(2). Balibar, É. (1993). Die Grenzen der Demokratie (Vol. 1). Argument-Verlag. Balibar, É. (2004). We, the people of Europe? Reflections on transnational citizenship. Princeton University Press. Balibar, É. (2015). Citizenship. Polity Press. Benhabib, S. (2004). The rights of others: Aliens, residents and citizens. Cambridge University Press. S. Benhabib (Ed.). (2010). Politics in dark times: Encounters with Hannah Arendt. Cambridge University Press. Bernau, O. (2022). Brennpunkt Westafrika: Die Fluchtursachen Und Was Europa Tun Sollte. C.H. Beck. Blatt, T. (1996). Sobibor: The forgotten revolt—A survivor's report. H.E.P. Boatcă, M. (2012). Global inequalities: Transnational pro","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135193097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The revolution will not be theorized: Neoliberal thought and the problem of transition","authors":"Thomas Biebricher","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12713","url":null,"abstract":"Neoliberalism is a notoriously contested term, and even among those who principally subscribe to it, which is mostly its critics, fierce debates persist over its nature, how to study it properly—and whether it is still the appropriate conceptual armament to understand the contemporary world and an arguably emerging “post-neoliberalism” (Davies & Gane, 2021). Not only is it controversial how neoliberalism should be defined—a governing rationality in the spirit of Foucault's governmentality lectures (Foucault, 2008), a portfolio of certain policies, or a strategy of transnational capital to restore and safeguard profit rates (Harvey, 2005)—but also on what level to study it, either that of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Cahill, 2014), a set of theories and arguments, or both. My starting point and focus for most of this paper is neoliberal thought as it is represented by the writings of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, the German ordoliberals, and, importantly, James Buchanan. My aim is to develop a critical account of neoliberal thought that will abstain from explicitly normative criticisms and rather opt for a more indirect but effective and somewhat novel critique that holds neoliberalism to its own standards and shows how it fails to meet them or is pushed into adopting highly questionable positions in the attempt to do so. The argument proceeds as follows: As already suggested, the meaning of neoliberalism is heavily contested, so I will provide the basis of my argument by laying out a brief account of neoliberalism, which relies on a theoretical-historical reconstruction of its context of emergence around the middle of the 20th century. What I conclude from this reconstruction is that we are well-advised not to narrow down neoliberalism too much and not to downplay its internal heterogeneities. Therefore, rather than trying to isolate a number of doctrines or positions as quintessentially neoliberal or even considering them to be the “essence” of neoliberalism, I argue that what unites neoliberal discourse is not a set of positive convictions—although there is some significant overlap in certain areas—but rather a shared problematic that pertains to the preconditions of functioning markets. Within that overall problematic, democracy is one of the most pressing problems according to neoliberal thinkers, because virtually all of them agree that it complicates the task of setting up and securing the workings of functioning markets significantly. Still, this basic agreement notwithstanding, neoliberal accounts of democracy display a considerable range of specific diagnoses as to the nature and source of its dysfunctionalities or even pathologies. Accordingly, the second step of the argument is a survey of some selected lines of critique of democracy as they are formulated by leading neoliberals. Among other things, this survey helps us appreciate the heterogeneities of neoliberal thought, but, more importantly for m","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135816164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"“What would I do?”: Political action under oppression in Arendt","authors":"Alzbeta Hajkova","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12704","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12704","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48496057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dialectical Aristotelianism: On Marx's account of what separates us from the animals","authors":"Tom Whyman","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12712","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12712","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I have noticed, in Anglophone philosophy, a certain way of invoking Marx. The pattern here is—understandably, given the relative scarcity of substantial engagement with Marx outside of (radical) political theory—a rather loose one. But I've spotted it in the work of John McDowell, Michael Thompson, and Mary Midgley. In each of these thinkers, Marx is invoked in the context of an inquiry into human nature: into the question of what (if anything) separates us from the animals.</p><p>In this paper, I propose to adjudicate a certain debate between these three thinkers—a debate which their shared invocation of Marx allows us to stage. I will argue that this debate between McDowell, Thompson, and Midgley, such as it is, is doomed to remain interminable, unless we clear up a confusion about Marx which all three share. Clearing up this confusion will allow us to get in focus an account of human nature I label “Dialectical Aristotelianism”. I am unable to offer a detailed defense of this position here—rather, I offer it as something which might be worked out more comprehensively in other work.<sup>1</sup></p><p>The point I wish to make here, and the way I wish to make it, unfortunately demands a structure which might at first glance seem a little obscure. To spell it out: in Section 1, I introduce the perennial philosophical problem of “what separates us from the animals”—working my way toward Midgley's critique of the “single distinguishing factor” conception of what separates human beings from other animals in <i>Beast and Man</i>. Sections 2 and 3 relate an existing debate between McDowell and Thompson, who both incorporate Marx into their attempts to find such a single distinguishing factor. In Section 4, I introduce Midgley's specific criticisms of what she sees as Marx's attempt to identify a “single distinguishing factor” answer to the question of what separates us from the animals—criticisms which would seem to do for McDowell and Thompson as well. In Section 5, I explain why (in my view) Midgley was wrong about Marx—and then proceed to demonstrate that, in <i>The German Ideology</i>, he and Engels (albeit in an incomplete, increasingly disputed text) can be read as providing us with a “single distinguishing factor” answer to the question of what separates us from the animals that does <i>not</i> suffer from the problems Midgley identifies with (usual) attempts to identify such a factor. The result is an account which is, handily, able to incorporate the best of Midgley's, McDowell's, and Thompson's views. This is the position that, in the conclusion, I label “Dialectical Aristotelianism”.</p><p>As human beings, we have some notion of ourselves as a species, and not only that, we have a sense of ourselves as a different kind of species, distinct somehow from all other animals. This sense of difference is perhaps best articulated as the Aristotelian notion that humans, as rational animals, are in some important sense “between beast and god”.<sup","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12712","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49431759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taylor and Feuerbach on the problem of fullness: Must a meaningful life have a transcendent foundation?","authors":"Jeff Noonan","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12709","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12709","url":null,"abstract":"<p>At first glance, there would appear to be no wider gulf than between persons who believe that life is meaningful and valuable only if oriented by some transcendent force or being and those who try to steer themselves by earthly signposts alone. Since at least the Enlightenment secular humanists have tried to construct what Charles Taylor has called purely “immanent” ethics. In Taylor's influential but controversial view, materialist humanist ethical theories, and accounts of the good for human beings can be internally consistent and satisfying to their adherents, but ultimately incomplete. Taylor's argument remains compelling more than a decade after the publication of <i>A Secular Age</i> because he does not argue that “exclusive” humanist doctrines are incomplete on the terms of believers in transcendent forces and beings, but incomplete on their own terms. All deep commitments to meaning, purpose, and value in life, he suggests provocatively, in fact contain a concealed longing for transcendence of the unrecoverable passage of time and the oblivion into which subjects will disappear if there is nothing more than the physical universe and the human social world.</p><p>This paper will treat Taylor's conclusions as a challenge to account for life-value within the confines of secular time and without making secret appeals to transcendent forces or beings.<sup>1</sup> I am not going to try to turn tables on Taylor and argue that all religious believers secretly interpret their sacred texts and principles with a view to earthly happiness, but I will argue that there are more overlapping concerns than dogmatists on either side believe. My argument will be critical of Taylor's conclusions, but it is also a response to his invitation for members of different faith, traditions, and secular humanists to engage in a “more frank exchange” that acknowledges the differences but is conducted “with the kind of respect that can only come from a sense that we have something to learn from each other” (Taylor, <span>2010a</span>, p. 402). I will argue that the most important lesson that humanism teaches is that the desire for fullness, in earthly life or on some transcendent plane is not necessary and may even be a mistake. In contrast to fullness as the overarching goal of life, I will suggest that receptive openness to the world best accords with the <i>known</i> conditions of human existence. Since the receptively open person who accepts the finality of death does not demand fullness, they cannot be justly suspected of secretly steering their goals by transcendent principles.</p><p>The paper begins with a focused analysis of Taylor's argument that the emergence of natural scientific accounts of the elements and dynamics of the universe created a crisis of meaning. Exclusive humanisms are attempts to reconstruct the foundations of meaning within the confines of secular time, but no matter how rich the texture of their values, Taylor argues, they must always f","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12709","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47564978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From politics to democracy? Bernard Williams’ basic legitimation demand in a radical realist lens","authors":"Janosch Prinz, Andy Scerri","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12710","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12710","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Political realists argue that political norms can more effectively guide judgment than can ideal norms derived from ethical principles. Three axioms shape the realist conceptualization of political norms: (a) Politics arises with the displacement of violent coercion by order and, so, authority. (b) Such authority needs a decision rule or rules. Historically, in Western states (“now and around here,” as put by Bernard Williams (<span>2005</span>, 8)), two such rules obtain. One (b<sub>1</sub>) is based on bargaining, whereby actors seek a mutually beneficial agreement that entails minimal concession, the other on deliberation (b<sub>2</sub>), whereby actors recognize a common end to pursue, taking as given relevant value differences and interests. (c) Political norms are an emergent property of the subsumption of moral values to the prudential considerations of actors involved in sustaining the step from (a) to (b).</p><p>Realists have thus far focused on normative theorizing from the axioms through the lens of legitimacy (Cozzaglio & Greene, <span>2019</span>; Cross, <span>2021</span>; Rossi, <span>2012</span>; Sigwart, <span>2013</span>; Sleat, <span>2014</span>). They have had little to say about the relationship, if any, between norms associated with (liberal) legitimacy and with democracy. This has led to claims that the new realism has little to offer democratic theory (e.g., Frega, <span>2020</span>). Interestingly, Williams gestured toward theorizing such a relationship. However, he did not fully elaborate his ideas. He not only claims that “[a]ny theory of modern [legitimacy] requires an account of democracy and political participation” (15) and that “it is a manifest fact—that some kind of democracy, participatory politics at some level, is a feature of [legitimacy] for the modern world” (17). At least implicitly, he also saw his account of liberal legitimacy and linked theory of the establishment of politics as a framework for “exploring what more radical and ambitious forms of participatory or deliberative democracy are possible …” (<span>2005</span>, 17). Taking our cue from Williams, we here begin to clarify the relationship between norms formed through the establishment of politics, we sometimes shorten as \"politicization,\"<sup>1</sup> and those through democratic agency. Motivation arises from our suspicion that Williams’ theorization of the establishment of politics—creating a normative requirement that states satisfy a “basic legitimation demand (BLD),” wherein its authority is justified “<i>to each subject</i>” (4)—stands in tension with his commitment to conceptualizing political norms in historical context and, so, genealogically (<span>2002</span>, 20ff; also, <span>2006</span>, 156). We show that Williams’ account of the norms that coincide with the establishment of politics—to whit, the step from (a) to (b) above—should not be read as also necessarily encompassing the establishment of conditions for the deepening of ","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12710","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47926067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The value form and the wounds of neoliberalism","authors":"David Lebow","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12706","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12706","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Perhaps no contemporary thinker has contributed as many fundamental insights into the political pathologies and dangers of the neoliberal era as Wendy Brown. In her recent book, <i>In the Ruins of Neoliberalism</i>, Brown deepens the Foucauldian understanding of neoliberalism as a political rationality that aims to make competition the universal governing principle of society. In her previous intervention, she explored how the metastasis of neoliberal rationality's figuration of subjectivity as <i>homo economicus</i> eviscerates democratic institutions (Brown, <span>2015</span>). Both building from and amending this work, Brown now draws a close connection between neoliberalism and popular anti-democratic mobilization. Brown observes that Hayek's understanding of society as a spontaneous order that results from human action but cannot be planned by ignorant human will is a theory not just of market coordination but also of moral traditionalism. In place of social justice and democratic self-rule—whose deliberate dimension makes them incompatible with spontaneous order and individual freedom—neoliberalism substitutes the institutional anchors of property rights and “family values.” Expanding the personal sphere by Christianizing the public sphere through the language of religious liberty and defending the nation conceived as a family against nontraditional identity groups and immigrants are developments internal to neoliberal reason.</p><p>Brown argues that “neoliberal rationality prepared the ground for the mobilization and legitimacy of ferocious antidemocratic forces in the second decade of the twenty-first century” (Brown, <span>2019</span>, p. 7). The intellectual architects of neoliberalism dreaded an ignorant populace agitated by authoritarian demagogues. Nevertheless, neoliberal rationality has brought about such an outburst, not as its “intended spawn” but its “Frankensteinian creation” (Brown, <span>2019</span>, p. 10). The neoliberal program has left people without civil norms and commitments but has not wholly vanquished extra-market society. The painful humiliations of economic abandonment and the dethronement of White patriarchy have elicited a return of the repressed. Left without alternative bases for mobilization, this politics draws from a moral traditionalism that, emptied of real content, arises as vengeful patriarchism and White supremacy.</p><p>Behind Brown's reliance on Foucault lies an ambivalent relation to Marxism. Despite an avowal of indebtedness to “neo-Marxist” approaches to neoliberalism as a “new chapter of capitalism,” a reader could be forgiven for thinking upon finishing the book that the cause of our ills is neoliberal reason rather than the social imperative to accumulate (Brown, <span>2019</span>, p. 21, contrast with Brown, <span>2015</span>, p. 76). Brown criticizes Marxists far more than she cites them. At one point, she chides Marxist approaches for “tend[ing] to focus on institutions, policies, economi","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12706","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42853049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Deliberative constitutionalism through the prism of popular sovereignty","authors":"Deven Burks","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12699","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12699","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49375139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}