{"title":"The Role of Religion in Civil War – Are We Really Getting It?","authors":"Isak Svensson","doi":"10.1177/00220027261480751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261480751","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148809810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Allard Duursma, Govinda Clayton, David Lanz, Marc Werner
{"title":"Blueprints and Blind Spots: Sixty Years of Mediation Scholarship and the Design of Peace Processes","authors":"Allard Duursma, Govinda Clayton, David Lanz, Marc Werner","doi":"10.1177/00220027261468727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261468727","url":null,"abstract":"This article reviews 60 years of academic research on peace mediation. Drawing on 395 academic articles published between 1966 and 2025, we assess the field through six core mediation process design questions: <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">why, when, who, how, what,</jats:italic> and <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">where</jats:italic> . We show that scholarship has generated important insights but has often addressed design questions in isolation, with limited attention to how they interact in practice. The literature on peace mediation is therefore marked by blind spots and conceptual fragmentation, not fully capturing the integrated nature of mediation processes. Organizing existing research through a process design framework allows us to identify key gaps and connections across strands of scholarship. We argue that research should more explicitly address the interdependence of design factors. This perspective clarifies priorities for future mediation research by identifying analytically promising questions and highlighting opportunities for more systematic and comparative inquiry.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"106 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148589074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ryan Shandler, Michael L. Gross, Yahli Shereshevsky
{"title":"Black Box Warfare: Human Judgment and Military Decision-Making in the Age of AI","authors":"Ryan Shandler, Michael L. Gross, Yahli Shereshevsky","doi":"10.1177/00220027261463443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261463443","url":null,"abstract":"How is AI transforming decision-making in modern conflict? This study provides a unique empirical window into that question by deploying a high-fidelity replica of an AI decision-support system (DSS) used in military targeting. After reconstructing the interface and functionality of the real-world system, we tested its impact on combat decisions in two experiments involving 2,015 Israeli military personnel. Contrary to widespread fears of automation bias, we find strong evidence of algorithmic aversion, especially in scenarios involving high collateral damage. Yet we also show that integrating “explainable AI” features reduces algorithmic aversion and promotes more thoughtful evaluations of algorithmic recommendations. These findings challenge prevailing assumptions, revealing that trust in military AI is dynamic, varying with individual predispositions, perceived operational stakes, and the informational features of the interface. By grounding normative concerns in empirical evidence, our study offers critical insight into the integration of AI in warfare and underscores the enduring importance of human agency in high-stakes military decision-making.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148364925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dominant Nationalism and Civil War","authors":"Andreas Juon, Lars-Erik Cederman","doi":"10.1177/00220027261466642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261466642","url":null,"abstract":"Civil war research has primarily studied ethnic nationalism in the form of emancipatory movements that seek to attain government representation or autonomy. In contrast, it has neglected nationalist movements whose ideology insists on a specific group’s political <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">dominance</jats:italic> . Addressing this gap, we argue that <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">dominant nationalism</jats:italic> increases the risk of civil war through three mechanisms: First, under the influence of dominant nationalist ideology, governing elites are more likely to politically exclude outgroups, even if doing so increases the risk of civil war. Second, if they control the government, dominant nationalists can also spark civil war by victimizing outgroup members. Finally, dominant nationalism fuels conflict-prone independence demands among outgroups. Using new data covering 90 countries since WWII, we find robust support for these expectations. Our results underline the need for cross-national conflict research to take more seriously the role of dominant nationalism and of ideology more broadly.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148364922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brian C. Rathbun, Caleb Pomeroy, Joshua D. Kertzer
{"title":"Shooting From the Hip: The Counterintuitively Intuitive Nature of Deterrence","authors":"Brian C. Rathbun, Caleb Pomeroy, Joshua D. Kertzer","doi":"10.1177/00220027261451440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261451440","url":null,"abstract":"Much if not most of human judgment is intuitive rather than reflective, but what types of behaviors result from non-deliberative as opposed to deliberative choice? We argue that for evolutionary reasons, intuition favors retaliatory aggression and a reliance on the deterrence model, the set of hunches that stress the importance of standing firm and demonstrating resolve to avoid challenges. By contrast, careful and analytical thought tends towards diplomacy and cooperation. By thinking from the gut and shooting from the hip, humans solved deterrence challenges in our evolutionary past. Across four studies—a time pressure experiment, an observational survey of thinking styles, a large-scale text analysis of Cold War US foreign policy elites, and a case study of US President Ronald Reagan—we find support for these expectations. These results are surprising, given that deterrence is often associated with rational deliberation. Instead, the intuitive nature of retaliatory aggression and the embrace of the deterrence model seem to be <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">ecologically</jats:italic> rational.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148299386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Green-Lighting Accountability: Transitional Justice and Compliance With Rulings From the Inter-American Court of Human Rights","authors":"Pearce Edwards, Kelly Morrison, Chesani Askew","doi":"10.1177/00220027261459942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261459942","url":null,"abstract":"When do democratically-elected leaders comply with rulings from international courts? While international courts have been studied independently, little research examines their interaction with state-level transitional justice (TJ) institutions. We evaluate the incentives of post-authoritarian leaders to comply with rulings of international courts related to violence under military dictatorships. We expect leaders to be more likely to comply with international court rulings addressing authoritarian human rights violations when maximalist TJ (domestic trials and vettings) has been implemented. In contrast, we expect leaders will be no more likely to comply when minimalist TJ (amnesties) has been adopted. Using data on remedies issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from 1989 to 2020 for abuses committed under military dictatorships, we find that compliance is more likely following domestic trials and vettings but amnesties have no significant effect on the likelihood of compliance, as predicted. Overall, our results suggest that international courts serve as complements for domestic TJ.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"180 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148299391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crumbling Safe Havens? International Justice Regime and Conflict Amnesty for Serious Crimes","authors":"Myung Jung Kim","doi":"10.1177/00220027261457611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261457611","url":null,"abstract":"Why does amnesty for mass atrocities persist despite the international justice regime’s efforts to end impunity? I address this puzzle by highlighting a new dynamic in contemporary civil wars: the growing risk of international prosecution in rebel groups’ foreign sanctuaries. I argue that the international justice regime—particularly the International Criminal Court (ICC) and universal jurisdiction—undermines the security of these sanctuaries, making return under amnesty more attractive for rebel groups. This logic explains why amnesty for serious crimes persists, if not increases, despite the global norm against impunity. Large-N analyses show, first, that rebel groups operating abroad and facing international legal risk are more likely to obtain amnesty, and second, that amnesty provisions increase as prosecution risks rise in host states. The findings reveal an irony of global justice: a system created to end impunity entrenches it through amnesties, while simultaneously constraining warlords’ operational space and narrowing their strategic options.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"123 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Outbidding: Armed Group Responses to Transnational Jihadist Competition","authors":"Mark Berlin, Ilayda B. Onder","doi":"10.1177/00220027261449748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261449748","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous jihadist organizations pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (AQ) or the Islamic State (IS) in recent years. How do armed groups respond to competition from transnational jihadist rivals? A prominent strand of research argues that increased competition leads armed groups to <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">outbid</jats:italic> rivals through violent escalation. However, an alternative theory suggests that groups can <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">restrain</jats:italic> their violence to distinguish themselves from extremist rivals and appeal to local and international audiences. We test these competing hypotheses surrounding outbidding and restraint using original data on pledges to AQ and IS and a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis of militant violence against civilians. We find that pledges to AQ or IS are associated with a moderate decline in the violence of other armed groups against civilians. Importantly, these findings are primarily driven by non-religious organizations and groups that are not formally designated as terrorists. This study contributes to research on militant competition, civilian victimization, and transnational actors.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"152 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Training to Influence: The Role of U.S. Military Training in Turkish Officers’ Decisions","authors":"Ilker Kalin, Carla Martínez Machain","doi":"10.1177/00220027261451771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261451771","url":null,"abstract":"How does U.S. military education build influence among foreign officers? This study proposes two theoretical pathways from training to influence. The extrinsic pathway is based on material incentives for cooperation and acceptance of the U.S.-led hierarchy. In contrast, the intrinsic pathway relies on interpersonal networks based on trust and reciprocity expectations. The study argues for the latter: Cooperation by U.S.-trained officers occurs not out of subordination, but because they view themselves as part of a network with the U.S. The empirical analysis focuses on the case of Turkey: a NATO ally that nevertheless has a history of anti-American sentiment among the military ranks. Through both interviews and a survey experiment with Turkish officers, we provide individual-level evidence showing that U.S.-trained officers are more likely to both grant and make informal requests when dealing with U.S. counterparts, and that this effect is larger for those officers who participate in longer programs.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions: Counterterrorism Assistance as Insurance","authors":"Boris Brekhov","doi":"10.1177/00220027261432195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261432195","url":null,"abstract":"A puzzling feature of conditional military aid is that its amount is correlated negatively with the level of its recipients’ security cooperation. I propose a new explanation for the apparent failure of security assistance, demonstrating that using foreign aid as a source of income stabilisation for the recipient rationalises the inverse relationship observed between the provision of foreign aid and policy concessions. Aid conditionality is modelled as an implicit interstate agreement that specifies how a recipient allocates domestic and foreign financial resources across different security-related policy areas in an infinitely-repeated agency game. It is shown that efficient security cooperation between countries with conflicting interests involves a certain diversion of conditional assistance. I illustrate the model’s logic by reference to the purported epitomes of the ineffectiveness of foreign aid as a counterterrorism tool, which are the post-9/11 security relationships between the United States and Pakistan as well as Yemen.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}