{"title":"Bruce Russett Award for Article of the Year in JCR for 2023","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/00220027241291658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241291658","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Building Partner Capacity: US Aid to Security Sector Actors","authors":"Patricia Sullivan, Giovanny Rincon Alvarez, Nathan Marx","doi":"10.1177/00220027241276156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241276156","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces the US Aid to Security Sector Actors (USASSA) dataset, the product of a collaboration between academic researchers and the nonprofit Security Assistance Monitor. In addition to providing the most comprehensive source of data on US security assistance, the USASSA dataset transforms detailed information about how security assistance funds are spent into aid and recipient typologies that can be used to conduct more sophisticated analyses of how this foreign policy tool is employed, its utility, and its limitations. Our data clearly show not only the magnitude and geographic reach of US security assistance, but also its diversity. While some security assisance is akin to humanitarian aid, other types of assistance blur the line between foreign aid and proxy warfare. We demonstrate the utility of the dataset with an exploration of whether the effects of US security assistance on human rights violations and domestic terrorism vary across types of aid.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Terrorist Attacks and Trust in Institutions: Micro Evidence From Europe","authors":"Chandan Kumar Jha, Ishita Tripathi","doi":"10.1177/00220027241289843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241289843","url":null,"abstract":"The existing literature on terrorism focuses on the “rally-around-the-flag-effect” – a relatively short-term phenomenon. The non-immediate effects of terrorist attacks on trust in institutions, however, remain largely unexplored. Arguing that maintaining law and order and upholding peace is considered the responsibility of the political and legal institutions in democracies, we theorize the “accountability effect” suggesting that terrorist activities indicate institutional failures in preventing casualties, undermining residents’ trust in these institutions. Using over 350,000 individual-level observations from the European Social Survey, we find evidence of the accountability effect showing that exposure to terrorist activities undermines self-reported trust in various national and international institutions, including the parliament, legal institutions, the police, politicians, political parties, the European Parliament, and the United Nations. Whereas this negative relationship does not weaken with additional terrorist attacks, strong governance and high trust in institutions mitigate these adverse effects. Lastly, terrorist attacks do not affect trust among people.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Terrorism Works, for its Supporters","authors":"Andrew J. Coe, Peter Schram, Heesun Yoo","doi":"10.1177/00220027241283824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241283824","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical studies have shown that terrorists’ policy goals are rarely achieved, leading some to conclude that terrorism doesn’t work. We theorize that terrorism can work, but for its supporters rather than for the terrorists themselves. Because supporters are willing to contribute resources to a terrorist organization, thereby increasing the organization’s ability to launch attacks, this can coerce the targeted government to revise its policies in accordance with the supporters’ preferences. Targeted governments may respond with concessions in order to erode support and thereby render the terrorists easier to defeat. Support can be rational even when supporters’ ideal policies are closer to those of the government than to those of the terrorists. We examine Hamas and the Provisional IRA, generally regarded as failures. We show that targeted governments sometimes made concessions that placated supporters but not the terrorists, and that this was followed by reduced support for and occurrence of violence.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142329040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Credibility, Organizational Politics, and Crisis Decision Making","authors":"Don Casler","doi":"10.1177/00220027241268586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241268586","url":null,"abstract":"When and why do foreign policy officials believe that it is important to fight for credibility? Conventional wisdom suggests that policymakers tend to care uniformly about how others perceive them. Yet this logic overlooks substantial variation in how officials prioritize credibility when weighing policy options. I argue that organizational identity affects the dimensions of credibility that policymakers value and their preferences on the use of force. Diplomats see the world from a reputational perspective, whereas military officials do so through the lens of military capabilities. During crises, diplomats match their advice to reputational considerations, while military officials attend to available capabilities. I examine these propositions via an original, vignette-based elite experiment involving over 250 U.S. national security officials and analysis of historical elite survey data. The findings demonstrate that where you sit shapes when you want to fight for credibility.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142050628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Media Attention and Compliance With the European Court of Human Rights","authors":"José M. Reis, Marcel Garz","doi":"10.1177/00220027241269897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269897","url":null,"abstract":"International courts lack traditional enforcement mechanisms. Scholars theorize that compliance with human rights rulings is therefore often driven by domestic processes, including political mobilization and parliamentary agenda setting. A necessary condition underlying these processes is attention to the rulings which is in part expected to be mediated by media attention. However, these conditions have not been explicitly addressed by the existing compliance literature. In this paper, we assess the impact of media attention to rulings by the European Court of the Human Rights on the likelihood of their implementation, using a novel dataset of case-specific news coverage. Exploiting exogenous variation in media attention caused by competing newsworthy events, we find that the probability of compliance increases, the more coverage a ruling receives. Our findings indicate that domestic news media play a key role for compliance with international courts.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141991933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations","authors":"Haonan Dong","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267777","url":null,"abstract":"States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"2014 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141986210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In the Army We Trust: Public Confidence in Global South Militaries","authors":"Nicholas J. Lotito, Renanah Miles Joyce","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267839","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the phenomenon of high levels of public trust in the military across the Global South. We extend arguments from the US civil-military relations literature to a broader context and generate testable hypotheses to explain trust in the armed forces driven by the military’s performance and professionalism, and the public’s patriotism and partisanship. Using public opinion survey data from 73 countries between 1995 and 2017, we find broad but nuanced support for the hypotheses. Many determinants of public trust in the military, theorized in the US context, generalize globally: battlefield performance, resources, national pride, and right-wing partisanship all increase trust in the military, while coups and civil wars decrease it. By contrast, the effect of conscription is opposite to that in the United States, with national service providing a trust boost. The study highlights the implications of public trust for civil-military relations, political stability, and governance.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141986211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Returning Veterans’ Attitudes Toward Democracy: Evidence From a Survey of Ukraine’s ATO Veterans","authors":"Konstantin Ash, Miroslav Shapovalov","doi":"10.1177/00220027241269980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269980","url":null,"abstract":"How is service history associated with returning veterans' attitudes about democracy? Existing research predicts pro-government militia veterans have less support for democracy because of political efficacy gained from service and divergent policy preferences from the general population. We test that theory in Ukraine through surveys of both returning veterans and the general population between 2019 and 2022. Our findings differ from predictions. Veterans who joined the armed forces as volunteers were more supportive of democracy as an institution than ordinary Ukrainians. At the same time, Army volunteers, as well as veterans who were drafted into the armed forces and veterans who were rejected from the armed forces and joined pro-government militias were more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. In-depth interviews reveal both those rejected from the armed forces and army conscripts opposed democracy because they felt rampant draft evasion made civilians unqualified to make political decisions.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141980707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Insurgent Conscription for Capacity and Control: State Violence and Coerced Recruitment in Civil War","authors":"Emily Myers","doi":"10.1177/00220027241269952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269952","url":null,"abstract":"Though previous research has recognized that armed groups do not always recruit fighters on a voluntary basis, varieties and determinants of insurgent forced recruitment are still poorly understood. What drives armed groups to employ certain methods of coercive recruitment? This article conceptualizes and studies a particular form of coerced recruitment—insurgent conscription—whereby rebel groups rely on their administrative capacity to compel civilians to fight. Building on scholarship that highlights the impact of state violence on rebel recruitment, I theorize that state violence incentivizes armed groups to employ insurgent conscription. Leveraging a novel, cross-national dataset of insurgent conscription in state-rebel dyads between 1946 and 2008, I find that state targeting of an armed group’s civilian support base increases the likelihood of insurgent conscription. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between state violence and insurgent recruitment, rebel-civilian relationships, and the transformation of institutions and networks in civil wars.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141974309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}