Andrew Roskos-Ewoldsen, Morgan Ellithorpe, Brandon J Kinne
{"title":"The Effect of Reciprocity on Trust: International Cooperation and COVID Aid","authors":"Andrew Roskos-Ewoldsen, Morgan Ellithorpe, Brandon J Kinne","doi":"10.1177/00220027251342144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251342144","url":null,"abstract":"Reciprocity is a well-known influence on international cooperation. However, we lack an explanation for how reciprocity at the international level affects individual beliefs and attitudes. How do people interpret situations where countries return favors, or fail to? In this study, we present a micro-level explanation of reciprocity based on the theoretical framework of Unbounded Generalized Reciprocity, where reciprocity operates as an informational shortcut about the trustworthiness of others. In an experimental survey of US adults, we test the roles of exposure to between-country reciprocity, perceived similarity, and costliness on trust toward a counterpart country, using the context of cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that reciprocity, compared to a reciprocity violation, predicted significantly more trust, and this was not moderated by similarity or costliness. We interpret these results as supporting evidence that reciprocity, at the individual-level, acts as a heuristic tool for determining the trustworthiness of other countries.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Model of Long-Term Conflict Resolution and Cooperation","authors":"David A. Peterson, Mirta Galesic, Ross A. Hammond","doi":"10.1177/00220027251338841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251338841","url":null,"abstract":"The formal end of a political conflict does not always create lasting peace, as interpersonal violence can persist for years or decades after large-scale hostility ends. A key question for policymakers and peace builders, then, is how interventions into situations of low social capital might resolve persistent interpersonal conflicts sustained through complex networks of interaction. Existing approaches to this question generally focus on the small-scale effects of interventions like peace education that seek to change the attitudes of a few individuals at a time. Less focus has been paid to how such programs could leverage social networks to have broader effects on society as a whole. This paper explores this scale effect by building a conceptual agent-based model of conflict resolution and cooperation to examine when new ideas introduced by peace builders might spread throughout a population. We find significant benefits to layering different kinds of programs on the same populations, with the goal of leveraging the structure of society to maximize intervention impact.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"126 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143932548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Selling Violent Extremism","authors":"Danny Klinenberg","doi":"10.1177/00220027251329598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251329598","url":null,"abstract":"Why do people join domestic violent extremist organizations? This paper examines an understudied reason: organizational outreach. I study how the inflow of new members to the Oath Keepers, until recently America’s largest paramilitary organization, changes when the group’s leadership employs three tactics: showcasing their ideological zeal through armed standoffs with the government, membership discounts, and sports sponsorships. Using a variant of the synthetic control method, I find that standoffs increase new memberships by 150 percent, discounts increase new memberships by over 60 percent, and sports sponsorships <jats:italic>decrease</jats:italic> new memberships. Membership is less responsive in counties with higher income inequality, but more responsive in politically conservative counties. The findings provide new insights into ways extremist groups attract potential recruits.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143930774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Nuclear Superiority and National Security","authors":"Alexandre Debs","doi":"10.1177/00220027251338457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251338457","url":null,"abstract":"Does nuclear superiority improve national security? The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) argues that it does not, but only after assuming that the nuclear balance is irrelevant militarily. Critics argue that it does, pointing at U.S. efforts to achieve nuclear superiority in the Cold War, when the nuclear stalemate was less stable than previously thought. Yet Washington could have been misguided. I offer a game-theoretic model where the nuclear balance matters militarily, perhaps allowing an escape from the nuclear stalemate, and show that greater nuclear capabilities unambiguously improve security under narrow circumstances. If they improve first-strike advantages or if the nuclear stalemate is fragile, they may improve peaceful terms, but only by raising the risk of disaster. I discuss the implications of this argument for our understanding of the U.S. nuclear policy in the Cold War.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143902930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crises and Consequences: The Role of U.S. Support in International Bond Markets","authors":"Lauren L. Ferry, Patrick E. Shea","doi":"10.1177/00220027251327970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251327970","url":null,"abstract":"Sovereign default should theoretically lead to creditor punishment through higher borrowing costs or market exclusion. However, empirical evidence shows that punishment is inconsistent across defaulters. We argue that this disconnect can be explained by examining the role of geopolitical relationships, particularly with the United States. US support conditions expectations of both borrowers and creditors by providing a fiscal cushion and subsidized insurance. This dynamic incentivizes riskier financial behavior, increasing default likelihood. Paradoxically, post-default US support signals a greater ability to pay, reducing creditors’ incentives to punish. Using data on commercial defaults from 1970 to 2012, we find that states with higher levels of US support are more likely to restructure their debts. After restructuring, these states face lower borrowing costs and experience shorter periods of exclusion from bond markets. Our findings contribute to our understanding of the complex interplay between geopolitics and sovereign debt.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143712925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Secessionism and Wartime Sexual Violence","authors":"Changwook Ju","doi":"10.1177/00220027251321756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251321756","url":null,"abstract":"Sexual violence (SV) in secessionist conflicts reflects distinct political intentions behind rebels’ pursuit of statehood and incumbents’ commitment to territorial integrity. I argue that, compared with their counterparts in non-secessionist conflicts, (1) secessionist rebels are more motivated to eschew SV to garner domestic support and international recognition, while (2) central governments are more incentivized to employ SV to repress and discourage secessionist endeavors. I further theorize that, in secessionist conflicts relative to non-secessionist conflicts, (3) rebel-perpetrated SV is more likely to go unreported, whereas (4) state-perpetrated SV is less likely to go unreported, primarily because of secessionist rebels’ legitimacy-seeking and international actors’ disproportionate attention to heavy-handed state SV. Zero-inflated ordered probit analysis strongly supports these differential implications of secessionist strife for rebel and state SV and the reporting thereof. The theoretical and empirical contributions presented in this article enrich both our understanding of wartime SV and broader conflict studies.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143661255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Decision Making on the World Court: Are International Judges Geopolitically Biased?","authors":"Arthur Dyevre","doi":"10.1177/00220027251326576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251326576","url":null,"abstract":"Do international adjudicators align with the foreign policy interests of their home country? This article contributes new evidence that judges on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) diverge along similar lines as their home states in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Ideal points for judges and countries are estimated from nonunanimous judicial votes up to January 2023 using Item Response Modelling and then related to country ideal points estimated from UNGA votes in earlier research. The analysis reveals that, as with countries in the UNGA, a pro-anti-Western divide order constitutes the main dimension of disagreement on the Court. Moreover, ideal points derived from UNGA voting patterns are themselves robust predictors of voting affinity among judges as well as between judges and the parties involved in litigation. Judges originating from nations exhibiting greater geopolitical divergence are more likely to disagree. Just as judges from more pro-Western states are less likely to favour anti-Western litigant states.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143631321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multidimensional Identity Cleavages and Religious Discrimination","authors":"Nikola Mirilovic, Ariel Zellman, Jonathan Fox","doi":"10.1177/00220027251324465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251324465","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent does minority distinctiveness from the majority mitigate or exacerbate discrimination? Similarities between majority and minority groups may reduce societal and political discrimination. Yet shared identities along one cleavage coupled with distinctive characteristics along another may also render commonalities salient for inter-group competition and conflict. We examine how cross-cuttingness of group-level religious identity with ethnicity, geographic concentration, and economic class influences societal religious discrimination (SRD) and governmental religious discrimination (GRD) against religious minorities at the state level. We find that greater cross-cuttingness of religion and ethnicity leads to decreased SRD and GRD. Yet while more cross-cutting geographic distributions of religious groups correlate with lower SRD and higher GRD, greater economic cross-cuttingness between religious groups correlates with higher SRD and lower GRD. These findings offer a nuanced theoretical and empirical bridge to understand discrimination, as social and political behaviors between individual expressions of societal prejudice and intergroup violent conflict.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143607830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do States Constrain Non-State Hackers? International Telecommunication Union Elections and Non-State Cyber Aggression","authors":"Conner B. Joyce","doi":"10.1177/00220027251323557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251323557","url":null,"abstract":"Do states constrain non-state hackers? This article extends research on the role of transnational cyber aggression in international relations, showing that governments can be incentivized to mitigate non-state hacking. To test this argument, I leverage competitive elections to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which requires states to campaign on their cybersecurity record. By exploiting this variation, I demonstrate that states are responsive to incentives. Candidates reduce non-state cyber aggression to increase their likelihood of election. This finding demonstrates the potential utility of international institutions as a policy solution to transnational hacking, suggesting that structural incentives can induce states to constrain hackers operating in their territory.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Citizen Action and Elite Responses: Opposition Mass Movements and Regime Change From Within, 1900–2019","authors":"Vilde Lunnan Djuve, Carl Henrik Knutsen","doi":"10.1177/00220027251318938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251318938","url":null,"abstract":"The mobilization of opposition mass movements may spur regime change via different processes, including popular revolutions or coups. We zoom in on one salient channel through which mass mobilization may induce regime change, namely via provoking incumbent responses. Synthesizing different arguments, we detail how incumbent elites sometimes preemptively alter the regime to diffuse threats by incumbent-guided democratization or by using opposition mobilization as windows of opportunity to transform the regime into one they prefer over the status quo (e.g., via self-coups). We combine data on opposition campaigns with detailed data on modes of regime breakdown and find that, overall, sustained mass movements are clearly associated with subsequent incumbent-led transitions. When disaggregating, violent movements typically precede only non-liberalizing transitions. In contrast, nonviolent movements are associated with all incumbent-led transitions, including democratizing ones. Thus, nonviolence is a key component in many successful campaigns for democracy, also absent full-fledged revolutions.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143385415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}