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Journal of Conflict Resolution最新文献

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Expression of Concern 表达关注
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231157263
{"title":"Expression of Concern","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/00220027231157263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231157263","url":null,"abstract":"The Editor hereby issues an Expression of Concern on the following article: Haas, M. (1978). A Response. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22(1), 163–164. (https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277802200111) Michael Haas contacted SAGE and The Journal of Conflict Resolution to note that he did not author the essay cited above. Despite our efforts, due to the length of time passed since its publication, SAGE have been unable to verify the claims around authorship of this essay. The handling Editor at the time has not retained any records that could be used to resolve the concerns raised. Michael Haas has provided a brief response to alert readers on the matters included in the essay cited above.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"67 1","pages":"1271 - 1273"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49052220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Achieving Minimum Deterrence: A New Dyadic Dataset on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capabilities 实现最小威慑：战略核武器运载能力的新Dyadic数据集
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-06-30 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231187310
Kyung-Hong Suh
{"title":"Achieving Minimum Deterrence: A New Dyadic Dataset on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capabilities","authors":"Kyung-Hong Suh","doi":"10.1177/00220027231187310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231187310","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that existing quantitative studies mistakenly assume that all nuclear states can impose nuclear destruction on opponents by simply distinguishing nuclear states from non-nuclear states. This practice, however, does not capture variation in 1) nuclear states’ possession of delivery capabilities, 2) the range of deployed nuclear delivery systems, and 3) the geographic distance between nuclear states and their dyadic counterparts. Instead of this monadic nuclear statehood approach, I propose the dyadic nuclear reach approach, which uses a new dyad-specific measure of states’ strategic nuclear delivery capabilities. It codes whether a nuclear state can launch a nuclear strike against a given opponent by using the information about the estimated range of each nuclear state’s strategic nuclear delivery platforms, nuclear operation bases, and states’ capital cities. An empirical application shows that using an appropriate measure of nuclear capabilities does significantly alter existing empirical knowledge of nuclear weapons and international conflict.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42395753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War 反抗，留下，还是辞职?美国内战初期军事精英的决策
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-06-23 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231185575
Peter B. White
{"title":"Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War","authors":"Peter B. White","doi":"10.1177/00220027231185575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231185575","url":null,"abstract":"A critical element in civil wars is military fragmentation. Yet, we have a limited understanding of why military elites fight in civil wars and on what side. In this article I develop a theory of the economic and professional motivations of military elites. I test this theory using the case of West Point graduates in the American Civil War. I argue that in addition to home state, economic and professional interests were a major influence on West Pointers. Graduates with connections to Southern cash crops were less likely to fight for the Union and more likely to fight for the Confederacy. Higher ranking graduates were more likely to fight for both sides, as they were better positioned to compete for promotion. I test this argument using a new dataset of more than 1000 West Point graduates’ wartime allegiances and antebellum careers and find strong evidence in support of my expectations.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64834636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deliberate Nuclear First Use in an Era of Asymmetry: A Game Theoretical Approach 不对称时代的蓄意核首次使用：一种博弈论方法
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-06-22 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231185154
E. Larsen
{"title":"Deliberate Nuclear First Use in an Era of Asymmetry: A Game Theoretical Approach","authors":"E. Larsen","doi":"10.1177/00220027231185154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231185154","url":null,"abstract":"Most nuclear dyads are characterized by some degree of nuclear and conventional asymmetry. This paper argues that these asymmetries create an environment in which deliberate nuclear first use (DNFU) can be rational. This possibility has been discarded in the formal literature on nuclear escalation because of the common reliance on the assumption of mutually assured destruction (MAD). This paper develops a formal model that traces how and under what circumstances two types of DNFU are rational. First, nuclear imbalances and advancements in counterforce technologies create a damage limitation incentive for a strong actor. Second, conventional asymmetry creates an incentive for the coercive use of nuclear weapons by the weaker player. Moreover, this paper illustrates that these asymmetric conditions are a relevant characteristic in important and very different nuclear dyads: DPRK–US, Pakistan–India, and Russia–US. Thus, the model demonstrates the potential core drivers of DNFU in today’s nuclear landscape.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46736406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Broadcasting Out-Group Repression to the In-Group: Evidence From China 向集团内部传播集团外压制：来自中国的证据
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-06-22 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231185148
Erin Baggott Carter, B. Carter
{"title":"Broadcasting Out-Group Repression to the In-Group: Evidence From China","authors":"Erin Baggott Carter, B. Carter","doi":"10.1177/00220027231185148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231185148","url":null,"abstract":"Many autocrats govern with an in-group, whose support must be secured, and an out-group, which is subject to repression. How do autocrats exploit in-group/out-group dynamics to secure their survival? One strategy, we argue, is to broadcast out-group repression to the in-group as a signal of the regime’s capacity for violence. Empirically, we focus on China, where the government represses ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Drawing on 1 million articles from six propaganda newspapers, we show that the regime broadcasts out-group repression to urban elites on each anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, when 10% of Beijing residents joined anti-regime protests. To understand its effects, we conducted a survey experiment balanced on the national census during the June 2020 Tiananmen anniversary. Using a list experiment to mitigate preference falsification, we show that CCP propaganda about Uyghurs during the Tiananmen anniversary discourages protests among politically engaged urban elites because they fear repression.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41821363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Violence and Children’s Education: Evidence From Administrative Data 暴力与儿童教育:来自行政数据的证据
1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-06-21 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231180114
Valentina Duque
{"title":"Violence and Children’s Education: Evidence From Administrative Data","authors":"Valentina Duque","doi":"10.1177/00220027231180114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231180114","url":null,"abstract":"This paper exploits the sharp escalation of violence in Colombia in the 1980s associated with the emergence of drug cartels to provide novel evidence on the long-run effects of violence exposure throughout the life-course, on children’s educational attainment and academic achievement using administrative data. I find that, a higher homicide rate in early-childhood is associated with a higher probability of school dropout and conditional on completing high school, lower scores on a national end-of-high school exam. Results are robust to several falsification tests, and analyses of potential sources of selection bias. I provide supportive evidence that changes in fetal, child, and adolescent health outcomes are important potential mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136296187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Do Failed or Weak States Favor Resident Terrorist Groups’ Survival? 失败或弱小的国家是否有利于恐怖组织的生存?
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-06-13 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231183939
Khusrav Gaibulloev, James A. Piazza, T. Sandler
{"title":"Do Failed or Weak States Favor Resident Terrorist Groups’ Survival?","authors":"Khusrav Gaibulloev, James A. Piazza, T. Sandler","doi":"10.1177/00220027231183939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231183939","url":null,"abstract":"Employing two alternative measures of state failure, we investigate how state weakness influences resident terrorist groups’ survival. Theoretically, state failure favors resident terrorist groups’ survival, while state territorial control fosters resident groups’ termination until some control threshold. Empirically, we uncover a robust negative relationship between a country’s weakness and its control of terrorism through the lens of the resident terrorist groups’ survival prospects. The discovered relationship withstands a host of robustness tests – e.g., alternative estimates and samples. We apply an instrument designed to address endogeneity concerns. In particular, our novel instrument for failed states consists of the interaction between natural disasters and ethnic fractionalization. As a state’s percentage of territorial control increases, resident terrorist groups are more prone to ending until some threshold control percent. Our analysis can guide counterterrorism policy by exploiting the nuanced theoretical determinants identified here that foster resident groups’ termination in failing states.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44362535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When Does Security Cooperation Increase Foreign Aid Allocation? 安全合作何时增加对外援助分配?
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-06-13 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231183945
Qi Zhang
{"title":"When Does Security Cooperation Increase Foreign Aid Allocation?","authors":"Qi Zhang","doi":"10.1177/00220027231183945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231183945","url":null,"abstract":"While many scholars find that security cooperation increases the foreign aid that allies receive from a major power, other studies show that an alliance also has negative effect and its terms can change over time. This article argues that a donor’s security environment impacts its participation in security cooperation and, subsequently, foreign aid allocation to allies. When the security environment is competitive, a donor will concentrate its resources on strengthening its ties with allies. In contrast, when the environment is favorable to a donor, it can use security cooperation as leverage to obtain policy concessions from allies, thus reducing its own foreign aid expenditures. This paper analyzes the aid allocation of three major power donors as well as 72 formal defense pacts and 70 bilateral defense cooperation agreements, and it finds that a favorable security environment allows a donor to reduce its economic contribution to its allies by 19 percent.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43828075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Slow-Rolling Disaster: Assessing the Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Militant Violence 一场缓慢的灾难：评估新冠肺炎大流行对军事暴力的影响
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-06-06 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231180101
Robert A. Pape, C. Price
{"title":"A Slow-Rolling Disaster: Assessing the Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Militant Violence","authors":"Robert A. Pape, C. Price","doi":"10.1177/00220027231180101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231180101","url":null,"abstract":"Despite alarming predications about the Covid 19 pandemic that appear to fit the literature on the impact of natural disasters on civil wars, there are reasons to be suspicious that a rise in militant violence would likely occur quickly or uniformly. Although the COVID-19 pandemic is most definitely a disaster that caught the world by surprise, this “slow-rolling” shock differs in important ways from the more commonly studied acute onset natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis that often increase violent competition among groups for scarce resources. Instead, the effects of slow-rolling disasters unfold in phases that, at least in the short run, are likely to encourage a period of relative decline in violence, as actors try and assess the effects of COVID-19 on their organization and their opponents. Both statistical and qualitative evidence from the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic supports the initial phases of our theory.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47919925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Virtual Immersive Contact: A Field Experiment to Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination in Central African Republic 虚拟沉浸式接触：减少中非共和国偏见和歧视的实地实验
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2023-06-06 DOI: 10.1177/00220027231180098
Lindsay Branham
{"title":"Virtual Immersive Contact: A Field Experiment to Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination in Central African Republic","authors":"Lindsay Branham","doi":"10.1177/00220027231180098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231180098","url":null,"abstract":"This present research explores a progressive repurposing of Virtual Reality technology, Virtual Immersive Contact (VIC), in a real-world setting to; explore viability to reduce prejudice and investigate the role of empathy in motivating prosocial behavior. The study employed a between-subjects repeated-measures experimental design of a randomized sample ( n = 113) split into two conditions to reduce prejudice and discrimination in the active conflict area of the Central African Republic (CAR). In line with the study’s hypotheses, VIC produced a significant increase in empathic concern for the Muslim outgroup and intentions to donate to a Muslim family, while also showing that the relationship between empathy and helping behaviours was mostly explained by confounding variables. This research provides both the first evidence of its kind that VIC could be a new form of fostering positive intergroup contact in an active conflict setting, crating a new facet of intergroup contact theory, and further evolving the literature on the empathy, prosocial behaviour relationship.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45771213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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