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Journal of Conflict Resolution最新文献

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The Double-Edged Sword: How State Capacity Prolongs Autocratic Tenure but Hastens Democratization 双刃剑：国家能力如何延长专制任期却加快民主化进程
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-10-19 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241293395
Per F. Andersson, Jan Teorell
{"title":"The Double-Edged Sword: How State Capacity Prolongs Autocratic Tenure but Hastens Democratization","authors":"Per F. Andersson, Jan Teorell","doi":"10.1177/00220027241293395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241293395","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites to switch tactics to peaceful support for democracy. An autocrat may prolong his tenure by investing in state capacity, but this brings on the downfall of the autocratic regime itself. We analyze the implications of our argument using a variety of historical sources providing information on 47 autocracies from 1800 to 2012. Our empirical findings, in part based on original data collection, are in line with the theoretical expectations: in strong states autocrats survive, but autocracies die.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142451383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Productive and Destructive Group Contests: An Experimental Investigation 生产性和破坏性群体竞赛：实验研究
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241290770
Guillaume Cheikbossian, Julie Rosaz
{"title":"Productive and Destructive Group Contests: An Experimental Investigation","authors":"Guillaume Cheikbossian, Julie Rosaz","doi":"10.1177/00220027241290770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241290770","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical results of a contest game between groups when the value of the prize is fixed and when it is endogenously determined. It can decrease with contest efforts of all groups as in the case of an armed conflict or a lawsuit. The value of the prize can also increase with contest efforts as in the case of a patent race. We also analyze the impact of different groupings of players on contest efforts. We observe overinvestment and no negative effect of group size whether the prize value is exogenous or endogenous. Also, a productive contest seems to have no positive effect on individual investments. A destructive contest, however, does have a significant negative impact, but this effect is reduced with a larger number of competing groups.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Explaining Public Demands for Border Militarization 解释公众对边境军事化的要求
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-10-14 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241268482
Michael R. Kenwick, Sarah Maxey
{"title":"Explaining Public Demands for Border Militarization","authors":"Michael R. Kenwick, Sarah Maxey","doi":"10.1177/00220027241268482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241268482","url":null,"abstract":"The militarization of border control is a defining feature of contemporary international politics. Why do states flock toward these policies despite their questionable efficacy? We theorize that border militarization stems in part from public reactions to the threat of international and domestic decline. We test this argument with two conjoint experiments that randomize the implementing agency, strategy, costs, and effectiveness of different policies. First, we evaluate whether the public has a baseline preference for militarization, holding constant the material costs and consequences of the border policy. Second, we prime threats of decline—in terms of either America’s dominant status in the world or the majority position of white-identifying Americans within the U.S.—and track changes in preferences for militarized border policies. The results indicate that both threats of decline can increase support for border militarization, with important partisan differences. Border militarization plausibly stems from the reactionary politics of domestic audiences.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bruce Russett Award for Article of the Year in JCR for 2023 布鲁斯-拉塞特 2023 年《联合通讯》年度文章奖
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-10-14 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241291658
{"title":"Bruce Russett Award for Article of the Year in JCR for 2023","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/00220027241291658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241291658","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Building Partner Capacity: US Aid to Security Sector Actors 建设合作伙伴能力：美国对安全部门行动者的援助
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241276156
Patricia Sullivan, Giovanny Rincon Alvarez, Nathan Marx
{"title":"Building Partner Capacity: US Aid to Security Sector Actors","authors":"Patricia Sullivan, Giovanny Rincon Alvarez, Nathan Marx","doi":"10.1177/00220027241276156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241276156","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces the US Aid to Security Sector Actors (USASSA) dataset, the product of a collaboration between academic researchers and the nonprofit Security Assistance Monitor. In addition to providing the most comprehensive source of data on US security assistance, the USASSA dataset transforms detailed information about how security assistance funds are spent into aid and recipient typologies that can be used to conduct more sophisticated analyses of how this foreign policy tool is employed, its utility, and its limitations. Our data clearly show not only the magnitude and geographic reach of US security assistance, but also its diversity. While some security assisance is akin to humanitarian aid, other types of assistance blur the line between foreign aid and proxy warfare. We demonstrate the utility of the dataset with an exploration of whether the effects of US security assistance on human rights violations and domestic terrorism vary across types of aid.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Terrorist Attacks and Trust in Institutions: Micro Evidence From Europe 恐怖袭击与机构信任：欧洲的微观证据
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241289843
Chandan Kumar Jha, Ishita Tripathi
{"title":"Terrorist Attacks and Trust in Institutions: Micro Evidence From Europe","authors":"Chandan Kumar Jha, Ishita Tripathi","doi":"10.1177/00220027241289843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241289843","url":null,"abstract":"The existing literature on terrorism focuses on the “rally-around-the-flag-effect” – a relatively short-term phenomenon. The non-immediate effects of terrorist attacks on trust in institutions, however, remain largely unexplored. Arguing that maintaining law and order and upholding peace is considered the responsibility of the political and legal institutions in democracies, we theorize the “accountability effect” suggesting that terrorist activities indicate institutional failures in preventing casualties, undermining residents’ trust in these institutions. Using over 350,000 individual-level observations from the European Social Survey, we find evidence of the accountability effect showing that exposure to terrorist activities undermines self-reported trust in various national and international institutions, including the parliament, legal institutions, the police, politicians, political parties, the European Parliament, and the United Nations. Whereas this negative relationship does not weaken with additional terrorist attacks, strong governance and high trust in institutions mitigate these adverse effects. Lastly, terrorist attacks do not affect trust among people.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Terrorism Works, for its Supporters 恐怖主义对其支持者有用
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-09-28 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241283824
Andrew J. Coe, Peter Schram, Heesun Yoo
{"title":"Terrorism Works, for its Supporters","authors":"Andrew J. Coe, Peter Schram, Heesun Yoo","doi":"10.1177/00220027241283824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241283824","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical studies have shown that terrorists’ policy goals are rarely achieved, leading some to conclude that terrorism doesn’t work. We theorize that terrorism can work, but for its supporters rather than for the terrorists themselves. Because supporters are willing to contribute resources to a terrorist organization, thereby increasing the organization’s ability to launch attacks, this can coerce the targeted government to revise its policies in accordance with the supporters’ preferences. Targeted governments may respond with concessions in order to erode support and thereby render the terrorists easier to defeat. Support can be rational even when supporters’ ideal policies are closer to those of the government than to those of the terrorists. We examine Hamas and the Provisional IRA, generally regarded as failures. We show that targeted governments sometimes made concessions that placated supporters but not the terrorists, and that this was followed by reduced support for and occurrence of violence.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142329040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Credibility, Organizational Politics, and Crisis Decision Making 可信度、组织政治和危机决策
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-08-24 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241268586
Don Casler
{"title":"Credibility, Organizational Politics, and Crisis Decision Making","authors":"Don Casler","doi":"10.1177/00220027241268586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241268586","url":null,"abstract":"When and why do foreign policy officials believe that it is important to fight for credibility? Conventional wisdom suggests that policymakers tend to care uniformly about how others perceive them. Yet this logic overlooks substantial variation in how officials prioritize credibility when weighing policy options. I argue that organizational identity affects the dimensions of credibility that policymakers value and their preferences on the use of force. Diplomats see the world from a reputational perspective, whereas military officials do so through the lens of military capabilities. During crises, diplomats match their advice to reputational considerations, while military officials attend to available capabilities. I examine these propositions via an original, vignette-based elite experiment involving over 250 U.S. national security officials and analysis of historical elite survey data. The findings demonstrate that where you sit shapes when you want to fight for credibility.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142050628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Media Attention and Compliance With the European Court of Human Rights 媒体关注和遵守欧洲人权法院的规定
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241269897
José M. Reis, Marcel Garz
{"title":"Media Attention and Compliance With the European Court of Human Rights","authors":"José M. Reis, Marcel Garz","doi":"10.1177/00220027241269897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269897","url":null,"abstract":"International courts lack traditional enforcement mechanisms. Scholars theorize that compliance with human rights rulings is therefore often driven by domestic processes, including political mobilization and parliamentary agenda setting. A necessary condition underlying these processes is attention to the rulings which is in part expected to be mediated by media attention. However, these conditions have not been explicitly addressed by the existing compliance literature. In this paper, we assess the impact of media attention to rulings by the European Court of the Human Rights on the likelihood of their implementation, using a novel dataset of case-specific news coverage. Exploiting exogenous variation in media attention caused by competing newsworthy events, we find that the probability of compliance increases, the more coverage a ruling receives. Our findings indicate that domestic news media play a key role for compliance with international courts.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141991933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations 危机谈判中的拖延政治
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-08-14 DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267777
Haonan Dong
{"title":"The Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations","authors":"Haonan Dong","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267777","url":null,"abstract":"States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141986210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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