发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Conflict Resolution最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Trading Arms, Trading Values? Experimental Evidence on Attitudes Toward Arms Exports Among Citizens and Political Elites 交易武器，交易价值？公民和政治精英对武器出口态度的实验证据
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-04-04 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261439065
Tobias Risse, Christoph Valentin Steinert
{"title":"Trading Arms, Trading Values? Experimental Evidence on Attitudes Toward Arms Exports Among Citizens and Political Elites","authors":"Tobias Risse, Christoph Valentin Steinert","doi":"10.1177/00220027261439065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261439065","url":null,"abstract":"Foreign policy making involves balancing ethical values and instrumental concerns. Do politicians and citizens differ in how they weigh these factors when directly confronted with this trade-off? Focusing on attitudes toward arms exports, we argue that citizens, but not politicians, tend to prioritize human rights concerns over the political and economic benefits for their own states. We tested these arguments in four survey experiments among citizens and parliamentarians in the United Kingdom and Germany. We presented participants with fictitious arms deals and varied the human rights records of recipient regimes as well as the benefits of arms deals to assess how these factors influence attitudes toward arms exports. While we find substantial effects of both human rights violations and benefits on support for arms exports, their interaction remains insignificant across all samples. Hence, our findings yield no evidence for an elite-public gap in weighing ethical and instrumental concerns in foreign policy attitudes.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147617464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Targeted Sanctions Against Authoritarian Elites 针对专制精英的定向制裁
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-03-16 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261430751
Tsz-Ning Wong, Julia Grauvogel, Nikolay Marinov
{"title":"Targeted Sanctions Against Authoritarian Elites","authors":"Tsz-Ning Wong, Julia Grauvogel, Nikolay Marinov","doi":"10.1177/00220027261430751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261430751","url":null,"abstract":"A significant part of economic coercion deployed by the US, EU and the UN targets authoritarian regimes’ ruling elites. We develop a formal model to study the effects of such measures. The ruler chooses how much power to delegate to elites, while bracing for a challenge from the latter or from the masses. The elite decides whether to fight for the ruler, walk away, or stage a coup. Depending on how much the ruler trusts the elite, the imposition of individual sanctions may lead to more power being delegated, thus inducing coups and repression, or it may lead to less power being delegated, which results in liberalization. We illustrate these predictions with two case studies.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147462005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Civil-Military Relations and Heterogeneity in Foreign Military Force 军民关系与外国军事力量异质性
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-03-14 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261433524
Jeffrey Pickering, Ghashia Kiyani
{"title":"Civil-Military Relations and Heterogeneity in Foreign Military Force","authors":"Jeffrey Pickering, Ghashia Kiyani","doi":"10.1177/00220027261433524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261433524","url":null,"abstract":"The relationship between domestic civil-military relations and the use of foreign military force has long been debated. Unfortunately, mixed findings in cross-national studies have added little clarity to our understanding to date. We argue that past scholarship overlooks something fundamental in the relationship and, further, we present a new theoretical lens to help to fill this gap. We contend that measures of civil-military contestation like declining civilian control or rising civil-military conflict should be expected to produce increased cross-national variance in the proclivity to use force. Four theoretical pathways often link civil-military contestation to such variance: greater military agency, diversionary incentives, counterbalancing, and contestation induced decision-making error. In autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) estimates of 165 countries from 1946 to 2010, we find considerable empirical support for our contention. Our outcomes help to reconcile contradictory findings in the literature and they shed new light on this important relationship.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147454680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Institutionalized Defense Cooperation and Regime Security 防务合作机制化与体制安全
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-03-12 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261432196
Md Muhibbur Rahman
{"title":"Institutionalized Defense Cooperation and Regime Security","authors":"Md Muhibbur Rahman","doi":"10.1177/00220027261432196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261432196","url":null,"abstract":"How does the institutionalization of external security cooperation affect government-military relations? This question has become increasingly salient amid a dramatic increase in bilateral defense cooperation agreements over the past few decades. I argue that DCAs help stabilize government-military relations and bolster regime security by mitigating a persistent credibility problem between signatory governments and their armed forces. By securing military-specific resources, DCAs limit the government’s ability to divert benefits elsewhere. The involvement of partner states further enhances credibility, as reneging on these bilateral agreements carries diplomatic and reputational costs. Because the military depends on the government to sustain these arrangements, the costs of plotting a coup increase: any extra-constitutional removal of the government threatens the institutional channels through which critical resources flow. A cross-sectional time-series analysis of 160 countries from 1980 to 2010 suggests that one or more DCAs exhibit significantly lower odds of coup attempts. The study highlights the role of international agreements in shaping domestic political stability. It also expands our understanding of states’ unique role in managing domestic civil-military relations through international brokerage and cooperation.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147454679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Humanitarian Military Interventions Foster Economic Growth? 人道主义军事干预能促进经济增长吗？
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-03-11 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261431290
Luqman Saeed
{"title":"Do Humanitarian Military Interventions Foster Economic Growth?","authors":"Luqman Saeed","doi":"10.1177/00220027261431290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261431290","url":null,"abstract":"Humanitarian military interventions (HMIs) are undertaken to end violent conflicts and establish political and economic stability in targeted countries. Their frequency has risen since the end of the Cold War and the United Nations’ adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. Previous research shows neutral HMIs - targeting all perpetrators - reduce conflict intensity, while biased HMIs-supporting one side-escalate violence. This study empirically tests the effects of these interventions on long-run economic growth in targeted countries from 1960 to 2019. The findings suggest that countries receiving neutral interventions experience approximately 14 percentage points higher cumulative GDP per capita growth over 5 years compared to conflict-affected countries that do not. No statistically significant evidence is found that biased HMIs contribute positively to economic growth. Furthermore, the positive effect of neutral HMIs on growth diminishes as prior conflict duration increases. These results highlight the importance of impartiality in HMIs for sustainable economic recovery.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"82 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147393411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Political Geography of Sanctions Support: Evidence From Kazakhstan 制裁支持的政治地理：来自哈萨克斯坦的证据
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-03-11 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261427300
Shannon P. Carcelli, Margaret Hanson
{"title":"The Political Geography of Sanctions Support: Evidence From Kazakhstan","authors":"Shannon P. Carcelli, Margaret Hanson","doi":"10.1177/00220027261427300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261427300","url":null,"abstract":"Economic sanctions have become an increasingly prominent tool in twenty first-century statecraft. However, it is relatively easy for third-party states to undermine their effectiveness. This vulnerability makes it important to understand how and why their local publics support or oppose sanctions. Drawing from the case of Kazahkstan’s response to the global sanctions regime against Russia, we find that support for the sanctions varies based on ethnicity and geography. Specifically, ethnic Russians view the sanctions far more negatively than ethnic Kazakhs. Surprisingly, however, ethnic Russians located in non-traditional border regions express approval levels on par with ethnic Kazakhs. We argue that this difference stems from economic interest: due to their geographical proximity and informal ties with co-ethnics across the border, this group is well-positioned to benefit economically from sanctions evasion. Income reporting data offer further support for this argument. Our findings suggest that those developing sanctions regimes would benefit from considering how political geography and identity interact to shape support for sanctions—and their efficacy.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"104 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147393368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intrastate Conflict, War Finance, and the Expropriation of Foreign Firms 国内冲突、战争财政与外国公司的征用
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-03-11 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261425881
Hoon Lee, Daehee Bak, Kyu Young Lee, Dongkyu Kim
{"title":"Intrastate Conflict, War Finance, and the Expropriation of Foreign Firms","authors":"Hoon Lee, Daehee Bak, Kyu Young Lee, Dongkyu Kim","doi":"10.1177/00220027261425881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261425881","url":null,"abstract":"Intrastate conflict is often identified to increase the risk of foreign asset expropriation due to heightened incentives for short-term economic gains. In this paper, we investigate this notion both theoretically and empirically, and refine the conventional wisdom by examining conditions under which intrastate conflict incentivizes a host government to expropriate foreign assets. We argue that intrastate conflict increases the risk of expropriation when the government’s capability to finance civil conflict is significantly constrained. The empirical results indicate that intrastate conflict has a positive effect on the expropriation risk only when the government’s war financing capabilities are substantially low due to a high level of external debt burdens. The findings show that host governments take a strategic approach in revenue generation and the capability to finance war is the key to understanding the relationship between conflict and expropriation.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147393720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Violence as a Condition: Structure, Composition, and the Use of Lethal Force 暴力作为一种条件：结构、构成和致命武力的使用
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-03-11 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261431829
Sky Kunkel, Matthew Kyle Ellis
{"title":"Violence as a Condition: Structure, Composition, and the Use of Lethal Force","authors":"Sky Kunkel, Matthew Kyle Ellis","doi":"10.1177/00220027261431829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261431829","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2014, Russia’s Wagner Group has gained prominence, expanding its role from driving Russian foreign policy across many African and Middle Eastern countries into an integral part of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In this paper, we first draw on the one-sided violence (OSV) literature to show how organizational incentives explain Wagner’s violence against civilians pre-November 2021. Despite the static context of organizational incentives, Wagner’s OSV lethality increased dramatically after the initial invasion. While prior research on this topic assumes organizations to be unitary and rational, we use personnel composition as an additional explanatory factor to explain OSV. Situated within research on combat psychology and health sciences, we introduce <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">pre-combat experience</jats:italic> (PCE) as key to understanding how training contributes to the use of OSV. By clarifying the role of PCE on OSV, we provide novel theoretical logic and empirical evidence explaining how individual-level experience aggregates to unit-level violence.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147454681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Economic Decoupling as a Readiness Signaling Device 经济脱钩作为一种准备度信号装置
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-02-27 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261426878
Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu
{"title":"Economic Decoupling as a Readiness Signaling Device","authors":"Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu","doi":"10.1177/00220027261426878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261426878","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of economic decoupling as a deterrence mechanism amid the renewed risk of international conflict between two economically integrated superpowers. In our model, a potential aggressor considers initiating military conflict, while the defender, anticipating this risk, can preemptively decouple to signal its readiness to resist aggression. We examine both a full-information game and a more realistic setting with incomplete information about the defender’s priorities. Under full information, we identify the optimal degree of decoupling that ensures effective deterrence. With incomplete information, deterrence becomes more fragile: although a peace equilibrium remains possible within a narrower parameter range, hybrid equilibria, where conflict occurs with positive probability, also emerge. The results highlight how even minor informational imperfections can generate intrinsic geopolitical instability, emphasizing the fragility of peace under conditions of economic interdependence.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"131 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147292656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why do Armed Groups Return to War after Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration? Introducing the DDR-40 Dataset (1980–2020) 武装团体为何在解除武装、复员和重返社会后重返战场？DDR-40数据集介绍（1980-2020）
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2026-02-26 DOI: 10.1177/00220027261426874
Sally Sharif
{"title":"Why do Armed Groups Return to War after Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration? Introducing the DDR-40 Dataset (1980–2020)","authors":"Sally Sharif","doi":"10.1177/00220027261426874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261426874","url":null,"abstract":"Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is a crucial component of transitions from conflict. DDR starts the demilitarization of politics, a critical first step in reducing the feasibility of political success through violence and preventing conflict recurrence. Existing research on DDR is hampered by the absence of cross-national data. This paper introduces DDR-40, a pioneering global dataset documenting 83 DDR programs with 57 yearly attributes, encompassing 407 program-years (1980–2020). DDR-40 captures detailed program-specific characteristics, including target groups, membership size, group type, cantonment period, budget, implementation scores for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, implementation bodies, and program outcomes. For the duration of every program, the dataset also codes the implementation of other peace agreement provisions, including commitments to amnesty, prisoner release, boundary demarcation, women’s rights, and children’s rights, as well as provisions for various institutional reforms, such as executive, legislative, electoral, constitutional, judicial, and military reform. The paper outlines the dataset structure, provides descriptive statistics, and shows how the data can be used to explain conflict recurrence during DDR.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"119 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147287349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信
小红书