危机与后果:美国对国际债券市场的支持作用

IF 2.2 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Lauren L. Ferry, Patrick E. Shea
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引用次数: 0

摘要

主权违约理论上应该通过提高借贷成本或市场排斥导致债权人受到惩罚。然而,经验证据表明,违约者受到的惩罚是不一致的。我们认为,这种脱节可以通过研究地缘政治关系的作用来解释,尤其是与美国的关系。美国通过提供财政缓冲和补贴保险来支持借款人和债权人的预期。这种动态刺激了风险更高的金融行为,增加了违约的可能性。矛盾的是,违约后美国的支持意味着更强的支付能力,从而降低了债权人惩罚的动机。利用1970年至2012年的商业违约数据,我们发现,获得美国支持程度较高的州更有可能重组债务。重组后,这些州将面临更低的借贷成本,被债券市场排斥的时间也会缩短。我们的发现有助于我们理解地缘政治与主权债务之间复杂的相互作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Crises and Consequences: The Role of U.S. Support in International Bond Markets
Sovereign default should theoretically lead to creditor punishment through higher borrowing costs or market exclusion. However, empirical evidence shows that punishment is inconsistent across defaulters. We argue that this disconnect can be explained by examining the role of geopolitical relationships, particularly with the United States. US support conditions expectations of both borrowers and creditors by providing a fiscal cushion and subsidized insurance. This dynamic incentivizes riskier financial behavior, increasing default likelihood. Paradoxically, post-default US support signals a greater ability to pay, reducing creditors’ incentives to punish. Using data on commercial defaults from 1970 to 2012, we find that states with higher levels of US support are more likely to restructure their debts. After restructuring, these states face lower borrowing costs and experience shorter periods of exclusion from bond markets. Our findings contribute to our understanding of the complex interplay between geopolitics and sovereign debt.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.30
自引率
9.70%
发文量
101
期刊介绍: The Journal of Conflict Resolution is an interdisciplinary journal of social scientific theory and research on human conflict. It focuses especially on international conflict, but its pages are open to a variety of contributions about intergroup conflict, as well as between nations, that may help in understanding problems of war and peace. Reports about innovative applications, as well as basic research, are welcomed, especially when the results are of interest to scholars in several disciplines.
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