On Nuclear Superiority and National Security

IF 2.2 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Alexandre Debs
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Does nuclear superiority improve national security? The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) argues that it does not, but only after assuming that the nuclear balance is irrelevant militarily. Critics argue that it does, pointing at U.S. efforts to achieve nuclear superiority in the Cold War, when the nuclear stalemate was less stable than previously thought. Yet Washington could have been misguided. I offer a game-theoretic model where the nuclear balance matters militarily, perhaps allowing an escape from the nuclear stalemate, and show that greater nuclear capabilities unambiguously improve security under narrow circumstances. If they improve first-strike advantages or if the nuclear stalemate is fragile, they may improve peaceful terms, but only by raising the risk of disaster. I discuss the implications of this argument for our understanding of the U.S. nuclear policy in the Cold War.
论核优势与国家安全
核优势能提高国家安全吗?《核革命理论》(Theory of The Nuclear Revolution, TNR)认为,它并非如此,但前提是假定核平衡在军事上无关紧要。批评人士认为,确实如此,他们指出,美国在冷战期间努力实现核优势,而当时的核僵局并不像之前想象的那么稳定。然而,华盛顿可能被误导了。我提供了一个博弈论模型,其中核平衡在军事上很重要,也许可以摆脱核僵局,并表明更大的核能力无疑会在狭隘的情况下改善安全。如果他们提高了先发制人的优势,或者如果核僵局是脆弱的,他们可能会改善和平条件,但只会增加灾难的风险。我将讨论这一论点对我们理解冷战时期美国核政策的影响。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.30
自引率
9.70%
发文量
101
期刊介绍: The Journal of Conflict Resolution is an interdisciplinary journal of social scientific theory and research on human conflict. It focuses especially on international conflict, but its pages are open to a variety of contributions about intergroup conflict, as well as between nations, that may help in understanding problems of war and peace. Reports about innovative applications, as well as basic research, are welcomed, especially when the results are of interest to scholars in several disciplines.
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