发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Mathematical Social Sciences最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Optimal influence under observational learning 观察学习下的最佳影响力
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.011
Nikolas Tsakas
{"title":"Optimal influence under observational learning","authors":"Nikolas Tsakas","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the optimal targeting problem of a firm that is seeking to maximize the diffusion of a product in a society where agents learn from their neighbors. The firm can seed the product to a subset of the population and our goal is to find which the optimal subset to target is. We provide a condition that characterizes the optimal targeting strategy for any network structure. The key parameter in this condition is the agents’ decay centrality, which takes into account how close an agent is to others, in a way that distant agents are weighted less than closer ones.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 41-51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139674116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis 黎曼假设的博弈论含义
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.007
Christian Ewerhart
{"title":"A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis","authors":"Christian Ewerhart","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Riemann hypothesis (RH) is one of the major unsolved problems in pure mathematics. In the present paper, a parameterized family of non-cooperative games is constructed with the property that, if RH is true, then any game in the family admits a unique Nash equilibrium. We argue that this result is not degenerate. Indeed, neither is the conclusion a tautology, nor is RH used to define the family of games.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 52-59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000167/pdfft?md5=f43e23ae61ca2ca71d6971f39fd4c1a4&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000167-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139579252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamics of opinion polarization in a population 人口中舆论两极分化的动态变化
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.009
Ricardo Cano Macias , Jorge Mauricio Ruiz Vera
{"title":"Dynamics of opinion polarization in a population","authors":"Ricardo Cano Macias ,&nbsp;Jorge Mauricio Ruiz Vera","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article addresses the polarization of the population around an idea and proposes a simple model that describes its dynamics in a society characterized by asymmetries in freedom of expression. The model considers a population divided into followers of an idea, consisting of moderate sympathizers and staunch defenders, and a group of opponents who try to spread their position but are also susceptible to opinion change. An analysis of stability of the proposed system of differential equations is conducted to examine policies that prevent homogenization around the idea. The results reveal conditionally stable equilibrium points that represent the coexistence of opinions and the extinction of polarization. Two threshold values are proposed to determine the persistence of polarization over time. Furthermore, the results of the model are validated through the analysis of two real cases of polarization in Colombian society, demonstrating its ability to reproduce the general behavior of opinion divergence and its utility in polarization control.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 31-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000180/pdfft?md5=b0c31f70280598cc4da3168bdced3416&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000180-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139579116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Horizontal mergers with Bertrand competition and convex costs 贝特朗竞争和凸成本下的横向兼并
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.010
Elpiniki Bakaouka , Marc Escrihuela-Villar , Walter Ferrarese
{"title":"Horizontal mergers with Bertrand competition and convex costs","authors":"Elpiniki Bakaouka ,&nbsp;Marc Escrihuela-Villar ,&nbsp;Walter Ferrarese","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We discuss horizontal mergers in a homogeneous good industry where firms compete à la Bertrand with increasing marginal production costs. We show that profitable mergers can occur even for lower post-merger prices with respect to the pre-merger scenario, thus implying an increase in consumer surplus. The driving force of the result is the ability of the merged entity cutting production costs by sharing the output among its plants. This output rationalization effect can compensate for the revenue loss due to the merged entity producing less than the cumulated pre-merger production of the merging parties.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 60-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000192/pdfft?md5=c2982eb677dc27e32d813c92c257f903&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000192-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139633610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Note on “A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains” by Guanhao Li, Mathematical Social Sciences 125 (2023), 42–57 李冠豪《峰坑最大康德塞特域的分类》注释，《数学社会科学》125 (2023)，42-57
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.006
Clemens Puppe , Arkadii Slinko
{"title":"Note on “A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains” by Guanhao Li, Mathematical Social Sciences 125 (2023), 42–57","authors":"Clemens Puppe ,&nbsp;Arkadii Slinko","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The note presents a counter example to <span>Li (2023)</span>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 16-17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000155/pdfft?md5=360a99936da19b82d0674a578e5ae61e&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000155-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139503737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Expectations for the MPC chair and interest rate persistence 对货币政策委员会主席和利率持续性的预期
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.005
Yuta Saito
{"title":"Expectations for the MPC chair and interest rate persistence","authors":"Yuta Saito","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines how the public’s expectations for the chair of the monetary policy committee influence policy outcomes. We show that the expectation that the chair will propose their ideal policy at the meeting can lead a majority of the committee to reject the policy change. The result suggests that the expectation of the chair’s agenda setting is a determinant of interest rate persistence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 25-30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000143/pdfft?md5=2cd8a5d7e3ec5abf6b6cb2cbb5efd2f2&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000143-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139516384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games 合作博弈中的外在性和（前）核子
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003
Mikel Álvarez-Mozos , Lars Ehlers
{"title":"Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games","authors":"Mikel Álvarez-Mozos ,&nbsp;Lars Ehlers","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 10-15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016548962400012X/pdfft?md5=1b6e1ab17b414c1b38ceb0b8c2bee407&pid=1-s2.0-S016548962400012X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139493356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Classification aggregation without unanimity 无一致意见的分类汇总
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.002
Olivier Cailloux , Matthieu Hervouin , Ali I. Ozkes , M. Remzi Sanver
{"title":"Classification aggregation without unanimity","authors":"Olivier Cailloux ,&nbsp;Matthieu Hervouin ,&nbsp;Ali I. Ozkes ,&nbsp;M. Remzi Sanver","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A classification is a surjective mapping from a set of objects to a set of categories. A classification aggregation function aggregates every vector of classifications into a single one. We show that every citizen sovereign and independent classification aggregation function is essentially a dictatorship. This impossibility implies an earlier result of Maniquet and Mongin (2016), who show that every unanimous and independent classification aggregation function is a dictatorship. The relationship between the two impossibilities is reminiscent to the relationship between Wilson’s (1972) and Arrow’s (1951) impossibilities in preference aggregation. Moreover, while the Maniquet-Mongin impossibility rests on the existence of at least three categories, we propose an alternative proof technique that covers the case of two categories, except when the number of objects is also two. We also identify all independent and unanimous classification aggregation functions for the case of two categories and two objects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 6-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000088/pdfft?md5=0187f37c798bf0c6a8c9bf69de97a8da&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000088-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139422830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Characterizations of approval ranking 批准等级的特征
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.001
Hiroyuki Komatsu
{"title":"Characterizations of approval ranking","authors":"Hiroyuki Komatsu","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>In this paper, we consider those voting situations in which each voter decides whether he or she approves each candidate. Given a list of such approvals, a “social preference function” picks a ranking of the candidates. We are interested in finding out which social preference functions are </span><em>non-manipulable</em>. We show that a particular social preference function, referred to as <em>approval ranking</em>, is more decisive than any other social preference functions satisfying <em>completeness</em>, <em>neutrality</em>, <em>anonymity</em>, and <em>non-manipulability</em>. In addition, we show that approval ranking is axiomatized by these four axioms and <em>tie-breakability</em>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 18-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139421449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result 无策略的对象分配：表征结果
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004
Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson
{"title":"Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result","authors":"Tommy Andersson,&nbsp;Lars-Gunnar Svensson","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 1-5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489623001038/pdfft?md5=bc4467fdedc7062bd578e1c3b0ee345a&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489623001038-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139066781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信